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Case: CV-2008-0000121 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss
In The Matter of Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency
In The Matter of Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency

All Other
Judge

late
I
I

!/13/2008

1512008

1012008

912008

1/2008

New Case Filed - Other Claims
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid
by: Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency (subject) Receipt number: 0008086
Dated: 2/13/2008 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Rexburg Urban Renewal
Agency (subject)
Notice of Filing
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/17/2008 10:OO AM)
Memorandum in Support of Judicial Confirmation
Affidavit of Judy Coy
Affidavit of Michael C Moore
Continued (Motion 03/24/2008 10:OO AM)
Continued (Motion 03/31/2008 10:30 AM)
Supplemental Notice of Filing of Petition For Judicial Confirmation And
Revised Hearing Date
Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition For Judicial Confirmation
Supplemental Affidavit of Judy C Coy
Filing: 17A - Civil Answer Or Appear. Ail Other Actions No Prior Appearance
Paid by: Hart, Kenneth W (other party) Receipt number: 0008880 Dated:
3/28/2008 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Hart, Kenneth W (other party)
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: David Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/31/2008 10:30 AM: Hearing Held
Memorandum Decision
Miscelianeous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Judy Coy Receipt number: 0009763 Dated:
5/13/2008 Amount: $7.00 (Cash)
M~scelianeousPayment Fax Fee Pad by Assoc~atedPress Rece~pt
number 0009842 Dated 511512008 Amount $21 00 (Credtt card)
Miscelianeous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Associated Press
Receipt number: 0009842 Dated: 5/15/2008 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card)
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ludwig Shoufler Receipt number. 0009924
Dated: 512012008 Amount: $83.00 (Check)
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, Judgment and Decree
STATUS CHANGED: closed
Civil Disposition entered for: Hart, Kenneth W, Other Party; Rexburg Urban
Renewal Agency, Subject.
order date: 5/29/2008
Miscelianeous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Jon M Steele Receipt number: 0010547 Dated:
6/18/2008 Amount: $100.00 (Credit card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Jon M Steele
Receipt number: 0010547 Dated: 6/18/2008 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card)
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Case: CV-2008-0000121 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss
In The Matter of Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency
In The Matter of Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency
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All Other
Date
6/18/2008

7/1/2008

7/2/2008
7/3/2008

7/8/2008

Judge
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court ($86.00 Directly to Supreme Brent J. Moss
Court Plus this amount to the District Court) Paid by: Jon M Steele
Receipt number: 0010548 Dated: 6/18/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Cash) For:
[NONE]
Other party: Hart, Kenneth W Appearance Karl J.F. Rune
Brent J. Moss
Appealed To The Supreme Court
Brent J. Moss
Other party: Hart, Kenneth W Appearance Jon M Steele
Brent J. Moss
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Brent J. Moss
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency Receipt number:
0010554 Dated: 6/28/2008 Amount: $4.00 (Cash)
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Transcripts For Appeal Per Brent J. Moss
Page Paid by: Runft & Steele Receipt number: 0010834 Dated: 7/1/2008
Amount: $115.00 (Check)
Request for Additional Record
Brent J. Moss
Miscellaneous Pavment: For Makino Coov Of Anv File Or Record Bv The Brent J. Moss
Clerk, Per Page paid by: Tod young ~ e b e inumber:
~t
0010886 ~ a i e d :
7/3/2008 Amount. $27.00 (Credit card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Tod Young
Brent J. Moss
Receipt number: 0010886 Dated: 7/3/2008 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card)
Amended Notice of Appeal
Brent J. Moss
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Attorneys for Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF MADISON

In Re:
)

REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL
AGENCY,
Petitioner,

1

)
)
)

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION

1
COMES NOW Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency ("Petitioner"), by and through
its attorneys, Elam & Burke, P.A., and petitions this court, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-1304, et
seq., for a judicial examination and determination of the validity of the power of Petitioner to
issue certain bonds and execute certain agreements. Idaho Code 5 7-1304 provides a valid
mechanism for obtaining an early judicial examination of the validity of actions and the power of
local entities, by providing certainty prior to the expenditure and commitment of extensive public
resources, thereby promoting the public welfare.
This action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction of all parties
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 1
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interested will be obtained by publication and posting, as provided by Idaho Code 5s
7-1305 and 7-1306.
11.
Petitioner is an independent public body corporate and politic and is an urban renewal
agency created and existing under the authority of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title
50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. Petitioner is a political subdivision
authorized to institute a judicial confirmation proceeding pursuant to Idaho Code Section 71304, and pursuant to the definition of Idaho Code Section 7-1303(6).
111.
Petitioner is authorized to issue revenue allocation (tax increment) bonds pursuant to the
terms and provisions of the Local Economic Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code,
as amended and supplemented, for the purpose of financing the undertaking of an urban renewal
project.

N.
As passed by the Legislature, the Local Economic Development Act empowers an urban
renewal agency to provide for revenue allocation financing as part of an urban renewal plan.
Idaho Code 5 50-2902 allows for the raising of revenue to finance economic growth and
development of urban renewal areas within municipalities. A revenue allocation area is defined
in Idaho Code 5 50-2903(15) as "that portion of an urban renewal area. . . . the equalized
assessed valuation (as shown by the taxable property assessment rolls) of which the local
governing body has determined, on and as a part of an urban renewal plan, is likely to increase as
a result of the initiation of an urban renewal project. . . . The base assessment roll or rolls of
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 2
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revenue allocation area or areas shall not exceed at any time ten percent (10%) of the current
assessed valuation of all taxable property within the municipality." The Act provides, at Idaho
Code section 50-2909(4), that revenue allocation will be terminated when the principal and
interest on any indebtedness or bonds have been paid in full.
v.
By Resolution dated November 6, 1991, the City Council of the City of Rexburg created
an urban renewal agency pursuant to Chapter 20, Title 50, Idaho Code, making findings
regarding the characteristics of the area, implementing the statutory criteria, empowering the
Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency, authorizing the Mayor to appoint five commissioners to the
urban renewal agency and finding the North Highway area to be a "deteriorated" or
"deteriorating" area.
VI.
On December 27,1991, following notice duly published and a public hearing, the City
Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Ordinance No. 728, approving the North Highway Urban
Renewal Plan ("Plan") and making certain findings. On December 30, 1998, following notice
duly published and a public hearing, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Ordinance
No. 815, approving the North Highway Amended and Restated Plan ("Amended and Restated
Urban Renewal Plan") and making certain findings.
In September 2005, Petitioner authorized the commencement of an eligibility study and
the preparation of an eligibility report ("Eligibility Report") which examined the then labeled
North Highway, South Addition Area. The Eligibility Report, dated November 7,2005, was
submitted to the Petitioner for its consideration and approval. On November 8,2005, Petitioner
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 3
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accepted the Eligibility Report by way of Resolution No. 2005-1. Pursuant to Resolution No.
2005-1, Petitioner sought authorization to pursue the development of an amendment to the urban
renewal plan for the City of Rexburg within a geographical area which Petitioner sought the City
Council's determination of qualification for urban renewal activity. On November 9,2005, the
City Council of the City of Rexburg reviewed the Eligibility Report and by way of Resolution
No. 2005-17, accepted the Eligibility Report and deemed the additional area as a deteriorated or
deteriorating area. Petitioner prepared a proposed Second Amended and Restated Urban
Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal Project, including South Addition, for the area
previously designated as eligible for urban renewal planning and the area proposed to be eligible.
Such proposed North Highway, South Addition Plan contained revenue allocation financing
provisions. On November 18,2005, Petitioner adopted Resolution No. 2005-2, recommending
adoption of the North Highway, South Addition Plan. On November 21,2005, the North
Highway, South Addition Plan was submitted to the affected taxing entities. On November 19,
2005, notice of the public hearing on the North Highway, South Addition Plan was caused to be
published by the City Clerk of Rexburg, Idaho in the Standard Journal. On Deceinbcr 1,2005,
the City of Rexburg Planning and Zoning Commission considered the North Highway, South
Addition Plan and its compliance with the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg and
forwarded its findings to the City Council. On December 21,2005, the City Council of the City
of Rexburg, following publication of notice and public hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 950,
approving the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban
Renewal Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan") and making certain findings. Ordinance No. 950 became effective upon publication on
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 4
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December 23,2005.
On December 4,2007, Petitioner adopted Resolution No. 2007-4, approving a Bond
Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement") with Zions Bank Public Finance, to provide for
the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of Petitioner and Zions Balk Public Finance for

I
I

purchase from Petitioner in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 Revenue Allocation
(Tax Increment) Bonds.
On December 4,2007, Petitioner adopted Resolution No. 2007-4 (the "Resolution"),
authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008, in the
principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 (the "Series 2008 Bonds") for the purpose of
providing financing for the Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project, consisting of (1) acquisition
of land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities,
access road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and
furnishing of a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for
soccer, football, baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2)
deposit of funds into the Debt Service Reserve Fund in an amount sufticient to meet the Reserve
Fund Requirement; and (3) payment of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the
Bonds.
Petitioner and Zions Bank Public Finance, have entered into the Purchase Agreement
dated as of November 13,2007, with respect to the development of a project in accordance with
the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan.
VII.
The Resolution includes, by exhibit, the Purchase Agreement between the Petitioner and
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 5
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Zions Bank Public Finance. The Purchase Agreement requires Petitioner to obtain a judgment
confirming the validity of:
a.

Petitioner's authority under the Constitution and the laws of Idaho to issue
the Series 2008 Bonds;

b.

that the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in
accordance with their terms; and

c.

that the Purchase Agreement will be valid and enforceable in accordance
with their terms.

Petitioner must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel.
Under the Resolution No. 2007-4, Petitioner is required to tender funds from revenue
allocation proceeds to the Revenue Allocation Fund. The revenue allocation proceeds deposited
therein shall be used only for the following purposes and in the following order of priority: first,
to pay the interest accruing on the Series 2008 Bonds and any Additional Bonds by required
deposits into the Bond Fund; second, to pay the principal of the Series 2008 Bonds and any
Additional Bonds payable within the next Bond Year by required deposits into the Bond Fund;
third, to fund the Debt Service Reserve Fund by required deposits thereto, if any; fourth, to fund
the Administration Fund; fifth, for any other lawful purpose of Petitioner.

vnr.
Under Resolution No. 2007-4, the Series 2008 Bonds will be used to finance those
improvements described therein.
IX.
Under the Judicial Confirmation Law, Chapter 13, Title 7, Idaho Code, the governing
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 6
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body of any political subdivision seeking to file a Petition for Judicial Confirmation, must first
hold a public hearing to consider whether it should adopt a resolution authorizing the filing of the
petition. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the public hearing, a notice of the time, place and
summary of the matter must be published. The filing of the petition must be authorized by a
resolution adopted by the governing body. Petitioner published its notice of public hearing as
required on January 5, 2008. Petitioner held the public hearing on January 22,2008. As required
by the Judicial Confirmation Law, Petitioner then convened a special meeting on February 12,
2008, at least fourteen (14) days later, to consider the resolution. Petitioner convened its meeting
and adopted Resolution No. 2008-1 on February 12,2008.

X.
Petitioner seeks a determination of the validity of Resolution No. 2007-4, the Purchase
Agreement, and the Series 2008 Bonds to be issued pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4, given the
following potential questions concerning validity of Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho Code, the Local
Economic Development Act, Ordinance Nos. 728,815 and 950, the Second Amended and
Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal Project, including South
Addition, in light of the following issues:
1.

Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho

Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation, contained in Idaho Constitution Article 7,
Section 5.
2.

Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of the Idaho

Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to private entities as contained in
Article 8, Section 4, and Article 12, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether it further
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 7
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generally violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from incurring
an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year without the assent
of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 3.
3.

Whether by reason of the composition, action and operation of the Rexburg

Urban Renewal Agency Board of Directors, the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter ego
of the City of Rexburg, and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Rexburg
Urban Renewal Agency therefore violates the provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting
municipalities from lending credit to private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 8,
Section 4, and whether it further violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a
municipality from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a
specific year without the assent of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution Article 8,
Section 3.
4.

Whether by virtue of the ability of the city comcil to declare itself as the board of

commissioners of the urban renewal agency, under Section 50-2006(b)(2) and (3), whether
exercised or not, an urban renewal agency is the alter ego of a municipality.
5.

Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing power

in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and standards as required under the
doctrine of separation of powers, to govern the assessment and collection of tax, to ensure that
the taxes collected are used in furtherance ofthe legislative purpose and in hrtherance of the
public purpose.
6.

Whether the provisions of the statute and the ordinance violate the due process

rights of taxpayers of the State of Idaho, by not requiring the expenditure of public funds
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 8
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collected from taxpayers for a public purpose.
7.

Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violates Article I,

Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws which impair the obligation of
contracts.
8.

Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by the Legislature for a "City

Purpose" in violation of Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution.
9.

Whether the revenue allocation method of taxation violates Article 7, Section 7 of

the Idaho Constitution.
10.

Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits

received.

11.

Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for a judicial examination and determination of the
validity of the:
1.

Series 2008 Bonds to be issued pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4 approved by
Petitioner on December 4,2007;

2.

Purchase Agreement between Petitioner and

Bank Public Finance;

3.

Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban

Renewal Project, including South Addition, approved by the City Council of the City of Rexbug
by the adoption of Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005; and a declaration that Petitioner is
duly authorized by a valid state statute to enter into the agreements authorized by Resolution No.
2007-4, and that Resolution No. 2007-4, the Purchase Agreement, the Series 2008 Bonds and
other agreements authorized by Resolution No. 2007-4 will be valid and binding on the parties
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 9
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thereto and on all persons interested therein in full accordance with their terms, and thkt all
Madison County officials, including the Madison County Auditor and Tax Assessor and the
Madison County Treasurer, he authorized to carry out the duties and obligations set forth in
Chapter 20, Title 50, Idaho Code, the Idaho Urban Renewal Law and Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho
Code, the Local Economic Development Act, including, but not limited to, the disbursement to
Petitioner of revenue allocation proceeds.
DATED This

/dfh

day of February, 2008.

ELAM & BURKE

, the firm
Ryan ~ h h r u s t e r of
Attorneys for Petitioner
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
) ss:

County of Madison
GLEN POND, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the President of the Board of Commissioners, acting in their capacity as the
governing body of the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency of tbe City of Rexburg; that he has read
the foregoing instrument, knows the contents thereof, and believes the contents thereof to be true
and correct.

-

Glen Pond, President of the Board,
Rexburg Redevelopment Agency, the Urban
Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this

&day of ~ebruary,2008.
.--.L

Notary l%blic for Idaho
Residing at: L L - 5 , A
-!,
My Commission ~ x ~ i % S/Y/
d
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Z

Ryan P. Armbruster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM &BURKE, P.A.
Key Financial Center, 10th Floor
702 West Idaho
P. 0. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
(208) 343-5454
Armbruster: #I878
Sullivan: #7038
Attorneys for Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
In Re:
CASE NO.
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY,
Petitioner.

/

c\/ob' /a/

NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION

Notice is hereby given that Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency ("Petitioner") has
filed a petition, pursuant to Idaho Code $7-1301 et seq., for judicial confirmation of the validity
of the power of Petitioner to issue certain bonds and notes and execute certain agreements.
The Petitioner seeks c o n h a t i o n of the validity of the following:
1.

Resolution No. 2007-4 (the "Bond Resolution"), adopted by Petitioner on

December 4,2007, authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds,
Series 2008 (the "Bonds");

NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
PAGE 15

IICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 1
Xexberg.doc

2.

The Bond Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") dated November 13,

2007, between Petitioner and Zions Bank Public Finance, the Underwriters, as authorized by
Resolution No. 2007-4;
3.

The North Highway Urban Renewal Plan ("Plan") approved by the Rexburg City

Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 728 on December 27, 1991;
4.

The North Highway Amended and Restated Plan ("Amended and Restated Urban

Renewal Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 815 on
December 30, 1998; and

5.

The Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban

Renewal Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 950 on
December 21,2005.
The Bond Resolution and the Purchase Agreement anticipate the issuance of bonds based
upon revenue allocation (tax increment) financing, as authorized by the Local Economic
Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. The Series
2008 Bond proceeds will be used for the purpose of providing financing for the Riverside Park
Urban Renewal Project, consisting of (1) acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor
swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related
furnishings and improvements; construction and h i s h i n g of a building for sporting and
community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other public
recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2) deposit of funds into the Debt Service
Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and (3) payment
of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the Bonds. The total cost of the project is
NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
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estimated to be $6,300,000. The Series 2008 Bonds will be retired by use of revenue allocation
funds generated from the revenue allocation area.
The Petition seeks a determination of the validity of the above-referenced documents,
including Ordinance Nos. 728,815 and 950, the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan, and including Resolution No. 2007-4, and the Purchase Agreement, in light of the existence
of potential questions concerning the validity of the revenue allocation statute. The Petition
seeks judicial confirmation of the power of Petitioner to rely on revenue allocation financing.
Interested parties who wish to view the Petition, Resolution No. 2007-4, or the Purchase
Agreement may do so at the offices of the Petitioner, c/o The Development Company, 299 East
4th North, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or the City Clerk's Office, Rexburg City Hall, 12 North
Center, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or through Petitioner's Counsel at its office located at 251 E.
Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho 83702, during office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday.
Any interested party may appear and move to dismiss or answer the Petition at any time
prior to the date set for hearing, which has been set for

&

2008, at /o; w A m . , in the Madison County Courthouse, before the Honorable Judge
%+id

X ~ SAny
S .such motion or answer may be filed with the court in the above-entitled

case. The Petition shall be taken as confessed by all persons who fail to so appear.
DATED This

/3

day of February, 2008.
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Ryan P. Armbruster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
rpa@elamburke.com
tnes@ela1nbur1ce.com
Atmbruster ISB #I878
Sullivan ISB #7038
Attorneys for Petitioner Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF MADISON

I

In Re:

URBAN RENEWAJ.. AGENCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG,
Petitioner.

STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of Madison

) ss:
)

CASE NO. CV 08-121
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY C. COY

I

JUDY C. COY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That I am the duly qualified and acting Administrative Assistant of the Urban

Renewal Agency ofthe City of Rexburg ("Agency"). On February 13,2008, I received a
conformed copy of the Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation ("Notice")
2.

On Februav 14,2008,I caused one conformed copy of the Notice to be posted at

the Agency's administrative office and Rexburg City Hall pursuant to the requirement of Idaho

AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY C. COY
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Code 5 7-1306. The Notice was posted in aprolninent place at the main door of the
administrative offices of the Agency and the main entrance to the Rexburg City Hall, in a place
normally used for posting of public notices, and has remained posted there until at least today's
date and will remain posted there tlxough Marcb 17,2008, and thus was posted for more than 30
days prior to March 17,2008, the date set for hearing.
In addition, I caused one confonned copy to be delivered to the Standard Journal,

3.

a newspaper of general circulation within the City of Rexbwg, for publication for three
consecutive weeks, the first publication on February 21,2008, and the last publication scheduled
for Marcb 6,2008. A copy of the PuOlication is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

4.

On or about February 28,2008, an individual seeking infonnation regarding the

Judicial Confirmation Petition came by tile Agency's adnlinistrative office. He asked a number
of questions and indicated that he may attend the hearing. To date, the Agency has not received
any comments regarding the Judicial Confmnation Petition.
The Agency Board of Comlnissioners ("Agency Board") consists of a total of

5.

nine (9) members. On or about November 18,2005, the Second Amended and Restated Urban
Renewal Plan was adopted by Resolution of the Agency. At that time one (1) Rexburg City
Council member, Farrell Young, sat on the Agency Board, in addition to the Mayor of Rexburg,
Shawn Larsen.
6.

At present, one (1) Rexburg City Council member, Rex Erickson, sits on the

Agency Board, in addition to the Mayor of Rexburg, Shawn Larsen.
7.

The city of Rexburg has decreed that it will not exercise its power to designate

itself as the Agency Board under section 50-2006, Idaho Code so long as any Agency bonds are
outstanding.

AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY C. COY
PAGE 19

DATED This &day

ofMarch 2008,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this
I

NOTARY PUBLIC

AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY C. COY
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&

day of March 2.008.
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Ryan P. h b r u s t e r
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Armbruster ISB #I878
Sullivan ISB #7038
Attorneys for Petitioner Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

I

In Re:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG,
Petitioner.

CASE NO. CV 08-121
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL C. MOORE

I

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Ada

) ss:
)

MICHAEL C. MOORE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That I am ofcounsel to thelaw firm ofMoore, Smith, Buxton &Turcke, Chtd., which

serves as bond counsel for the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency ("Agency").
2.

That our firm has been asked by the Agency to render the approving Bond Counsel

opinion with respect to the financing for the Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008
(the "Bonds"). Various legal questions relating to the power of the Agency to issue bonds and notes
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL C. MOORE
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payable from revenue allocation (tax increment) revenues have arisen in the course of our review.

In particular, the following legal questions remain unresolved:
a.

Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho

Constitution requiringuniformity of taxation, contained in Idaho Constitution Article 7, Section 5.
b.

Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of the

Idaho Constitution prohibitingmunicipalities from lendingtheir credit to private entities as contained
in Article 8, Section 4, and Article 12, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether it further
generally violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from incurring an
indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year, and pledging ad valorem
taxes for the payment of such indebtedness, without the assent of qualified electors, as provided in
Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 3.
c.

Whether, by reason of the composition, action and operation of the Rexburg

Urban Renewal Agency Board of Co~nmissioners,the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter
ego of the City of Rexburg, and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Rexburg
Urban Renewal Agency therefore violates the provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting
municipalities from lending credit to private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 8,
Section 4, and whether it further violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a
municipality from incuning an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific
year, and pledging ad valorem taxes for the payment of such indebtedness, without the assent of
qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution h i c l e 8, Section 3.
d.

Whetherby virtue ofthe ability ofthe city council to declare itself as the board

of commissioners of the urban renewal agency, under Section 50-2006(b)(2) and (3), whether
AFFIDAVIT OF MICI-IAEL C. MOORE - 2
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exercised or not, the urban renewal agency is the alter ego of a municipality.
e.

Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing

power in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and standards as required under
the doctrine of separation of powers, to govern the assessment and collection of tax, and to ensure
that the taxes collected are used in furtherance of the legislative purpose and in furtherance of the
public puspose.
f.

Whether the provisions ofthe statute and the ordinance violatethe due process

rights of taxpayers of the State of Idaho, by not requiring the expenditure of public funds collected
from taxpayers for a public pulpose.
g.

Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violates Article I,

Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws which impair the obligation of
contracts.
h.

Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by theLegislature for a "City

Purpose" in violation of Asticle 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution.
i.

Whether the revenue allocation method of taxation violates Article 7, Section

7 of the Idaho Constitution.
j.

Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits

k.

Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts.

received.

All of these questions have an impact upon the validity of the Bonds and notes to be issued
secured by revenue allocation financing proceeds and are questions that must be resolved before our
firm can issue an unqualified legal opinion regarding the issuance of the Series 2008 Bonds
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL C. MOORE - 3
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authorized by the Agency pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4.
3.

Without an unqualified approving opinion of Bond Counsel, the Series 2008 Bonds

cannot be successfully marketed on the public bond market.
DATED This

lLZ?

day of March 2008.

~

M HAEL C. MOORE
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN To before me this

d
'$ -

L
day of March 2008

L m f &
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires:
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Ryan P. Armbluster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM &BURKE, P.A.
251 West Front Street, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
(208) 343-5454
Armbluster: #I878
Sullivan: #7038
Attorneys for Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

In Re:
CASE NO. 08-121
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY,
Petitioner.

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF FILING OF
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION AND REVISED
NEARING DATE

Supplemental notice is hereby given that Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency
("Petitioner") has filed a petition, pursuant to Idaho Code 57-1301 et seq., for judicial
confirmation of the validity of the power of Petitioner to issue certain bonds and notes and
execute certain agreenlents.
The Petitioner seeks confirmation of the validity of the following:
1.

Resolution No. 2007-4 (the "Bond Resolution"), adopted by Petitioner on

December 4,2007, authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds,
Series 2008 (the "Bonds");

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF FILING OF
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION AND
REVISED HEARING DATE

rITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
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Notice of Filing Petition

2.

The Bond Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") dated November 13,

2007, between Petitioner and Zions Bank Public Finance, the Undenvritcrs, as authorized by
Resolution No. 2007-4;
3.

The North Highway Urban Renewal Plan ("Plan") approved by the Rexburg City

Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 728 on December 27, 1991;
4.

The North Highway Amended and Restated Plan ("Amended and Restated Urban

Renewal Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordiilance No. 8 15 on
December 30, 1998; and
5.

Tile Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban

Renewal Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordi~lanceNo. 950 on
December 21,2005.
The Bond Resolution and the Purchase Agreement anticipate the issuance of bonds based
upon revenue allocation (tax increment) financing, as authorized by the Local Economic
Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. The Series
2008 Bond proceeds will be used for the purpose of providing financing for the Riverside Parlc
Urban Renewal Project, co~lsistingof (1) acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor
swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related
furnishings and improvements; construction and furnishing of a building for sporting and
community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other public
recreation purposes, and related improvenlents; (2) deposit of funds into the Debt Service
Reserve Fund in an amount sufficie~ltto meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and (3) payment
of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the Bonds. The total cost of the project is
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF FILING OF
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION AND
REVISED HEARING DATE
PAGE 28
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estimated to be $6,300,000. The Series 2008 Bonds will he retired by use of revenue allocation
funds generated from the revenue allocation area.
The Petition seeks a determination of the validity of the above-referenced documents,
including Ordinance Nos. 728,815 and 950, the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan, and including Resolution No. 2007-4, and the Purchase Agreement, in light of the existence
of potential questions concerning the validity of the revenue allocation statute. The Petition
seeks judicial confimlation of the power of Petitioner to rely on revenue allocation financing.
Interested parties who wish to view the Petition, Resolution No. 2007-4, or the Purchase
Agreement may do so at the offices of the Petitioner, c/o The Development Company, 299 East
4th North, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or the City Clerk's Office, Rexburg City Hall, 12 North
Center, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or through Petitioner's Counsel at its office located at 251 E.
Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho 83702, during office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday.
Any interested party may appear and move to dismiss or answer the Petition at any time
prior to the REVISED DATE SET FOR HEARING, which has been set for MONDAY,
MARCH 31,2008, AT 10:30 A.M., in the Madison County Courthouse, before the Honorable

Judge Brent J. Moss. Any such motion or answer may be filed with the court in the aboveentitled case. The Petition shall be talten as confessed by all persons who fail to so appear.
DATED This

day of March, 2008.

SUPPLEMENTALNOTICE OF FILING OF
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION AND
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Ryan P. Armbruster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street. Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
rpa@elamburke.com
mes@elarnburke.com
Armbruster - ISB #I878
Sullivan - ISB #7038
Attorneys for Petitioner
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

I CASE NO. CV 08-121

In Re:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION

URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG,
Petitioner.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rcxburg ("Agency"), has filed this
action pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-1301, et seq., seeking judicial confirmation of the validity of
the power of the Agency to issue certain bonds and execute certain agreements, rcpayment of
which is secured by revenue allocation, or "tax increment" financing, as permitted by the Local
Economic Development Act (the "Act"), Idaho Code 5 50-2901, et seq. The Agency seeks to
confirm its power to issue bonds relying upon revenue allocation financing. Confirmation of the
Agency's power will depend upon an analysis of the validity of the Act and, to the extent
necessary, an analysis of applicable provisions of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965 (the
"Law"), Idaho Code § 50-2001, et seq. The Agency has siinultaneously filed a volume of
Exhibits to this Memorandum. All reference to Exhibits are noted by an identifying number.
The Agency has also filed the Affidavits of Michael C. Moore and Judy C. Coy in support of its
Petition.
11.
IDAHO'S URBAN RENEWAL LAW AND
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT

In 1965 Idaho established a mechanism whereby local govenments were given the
authority of establishing an urban renewal agency for the purpose of redeveloping dcteriorated or
deteriorating areas of individual municipalities. See Idaho Code $ 50-2001, et seq.
In 1988 the Idaho Legislature passed the Act to allow revenue allocation financing by
individual redevelopment agencies within cities with a population less than 100,000. In 1990 the
Act was amended to climinate the population limitation. In enacting the Act, the Legislature
determined that the financing needs of urban renewal areas throughout the state were of sufficient
magnitude to warrant use of a financing device that had not previously been available to them.
Since the effective date of the 1990 legislative amendment, all cities within the State of Idaho
MEMORANDUM
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have been operating under the same provisions of the Act. Since 1988, there have been several
amendments to the Act. Citation and quotation throughout this memorandum reflect the most
current codification.
50-2902. Findings and purpose. It is hereby found and
declared that there exists in municipalities a need to raise revenue to
finance the economic growth and development of urban renewal areas
and competitively d[$iidvatiraged border community arcas. l h e
purposc of t h ~ act
s is to provide for the allocation of a poltion of the
property taxes levied against taxable property located in a revenue
allocation area for a limited period of time to assist in the financing
of urban renewal plans, to encourage private development in urban
renewal areas and competitively disadvantaged border community
areas, to prevent or arrest the decay of urban areas due to the inability
of cxisting financing methods to promote needed public
improvements, to encourage taxing districts to cooperate in the
allocation of future tax revenues arising in urban areas and
competitively disadvantaged border community areas in order to
facilitate the long-term growth of their common tax base, and to
encourage private investment within urban areas and competitively
disadvantaged border community areas. The foregoing purposes are
hereby declared to be valid public purposes for municipalities.

The Act's primary purpose, urban renewal, remained the same. Accordingly, municipalities are
still authorized to adopt revenue allocatio~lprovisions or amend their original urban renewal plan
to permit for revenue allocation financing:
50-2904. Authority to create revenue allocation area.An
authorized municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to
adopt, at any time, a revenue allocation fiuancing provision, as
described in this chapter, as part of an urban renewal plan or
t y ordinance. A
competitively disadvantaged border c o m u ~ ~ iarea
revenue allocation financing provision may be adopted either at the
time of the original adoption of an urban renewal plan or the creation
by ordinance of a competitively disadvantaged border comuuity
area or thereafter as a modification of an urban renewal plan or the
ordinance creating the competitively disadvantaged border
community area. Urban renewal plans existing prior to the effective
date of this section may be modified to include a revenue allocation
financingprovision. Except as provided below, no revenue allocation
provision of an urban renewal plan or competitively disadvantaged
border community arcd ordiriansc. includingall ~tmcndincnrsthereto,
shall h31.e a durnt~onexceeding twcrity-four (24) years from thc dale
the ordinance is approved by the municipality.

"Authorized municipality" is defined in Idaho Code 50-2903(3):
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"Authorized municipality" or "municipality" means
(3)
any county or incorporated city which has established an urban
renewal agency, or by ordinance has identified and created a
competitively disadvantaged border community.
A specific procedure must be used to adopt revenue allocation financing. Municipalities
are required to hold a public hearing and pass an ordinance outlining a revenue allocation plan.
See Idaho Code 5 50-2906. The local governing body is required to prepare a notice indicating

an urban renewal plan will be established or modified to provide for revenue allocation. Idaho
Code 5 50-2906(3). "Revenue allocation area" is further defined in the statute:
(15) "Revenue allocation area" means that portion of an
urban renewal area. . . the equalized assessed valuation (as shown by
the taxable property assessment rolls) of which the local governing
body has determined, on and as a part of an urban renewal plan, is
likely to increase as a result of the initiation of an urban renewal
project. . . . The base assessment roll or rolls of revenue allocation
area or areas shall not exceed at any time ten percent (10%) of the
cunent assessed valuation of all taxable property within the
municipality.
Idaho Code 5 50-2903(15). Following enactment of an ordinance adopting a revenue allocation
provision, the urban renewal agency is required to create a special rund for the deposit of revenue
allocation proceeds. Idaho Code 5 50-2908(3). The Act specifically delineates the purposes for
which special fund monies may be used.
50-2909. Issuance of bonds-Bond provisionsrfl) If the
local governing body of an authorized municipality has enacted an
ordinance adopting a revenue allocation financing provision as part
of an urban renewal plan, the urban renewal agency established by
such municipality is hereby authorized and empowered:

To apply the revenues allocated to it pursuant
(a)
to section 50-2908, Idaho Code, for payment of the projected
costs of any urban renewal project located in the revenue
allocation area;
To borrow money, incur indebtedness and
(b)
issue one (1) or more series of bonds to finance or refinance,
in whole or in part, the urban renewal projects authorized
pursuant to such plan within the limits established by
paragraph (c) below; and
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To pledge irrevocably to the payment of
(c)
principal of and interest on such monies borrowed,
indebtedness incnrred or bonds issued by the agency the
revenues allocated to it pursuant to 50-2908, Idaho Code.
All bonds issued under this section shall be issued in
accordance with section 50-2012, Idaho Code, except that suchbonds
shall be payable solely from the special fund or funds established
pursuant to section 50-2908, Idaho Code.
In addition, while an agency is obligated to repay any indebtedness incurred, the obligation is
incnrred only to the extent that "the moneys are available in a special fund or funds established
under section 50-2908, Idaho Codc . . . ." Idaho Code 5 50-2909(2). This limited obligation is
further clarified in Idaho Code $50-2910.
50-2910. Bonds not general obligation of agency or
municipality.-Except to the extent ofmoneys deposited in a special
fund or funds under this act and pledged to the payment of the
principal of and interest on bonds or other obligations, the agency
shall not be liable on any such bonds or other obligations. The bonds
issued and other obligations incurred by any agency under this
chapter shall not constitute a general obligation or debt of any
municipality, the state or any of its political subdivisions. Inno event
shall such bonds or other obligations give rise to general obligation
or liability of the agency, the municipality, the state, or any of its
political subdivisions, or give rise to a chargc against their general
credit or taxing powers, or be payable out of any funds or properties
other than the special fund or funds of the agency pledged therefor;
and such bonds and other obligations shall so state on their face.
Such bonds and other obligations shall not constitutean indebtedness
or the pledging of faith and credit within the meaning of any
constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction.

111.
REVENUE ALLOCATION FINANCING
A.

An Introduction to Revenue Allocation Financing
Historically, heavy reliance has been placed upon the availability of federal funds to

finance urban renewal projects. The availability of these funds has decreased drastically. See
Tax Increment Financing,for Development and Redevelopment, 61 OR.L.REV. 123 (1982); Tax
Increment Financing: A New Source oflunds for Community Redevelopment in Illinois. . SUPPORT
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People, ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 30 DEPAULL.REv. 467 (1981); The Use o f Tax
Increment Financing to Attract Private Investment and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20
Va.Tax Rev. 777 (2001). Consequently, local and state governments have increasingly turned to
other sources of financing. A tool which has become increasingly popular with local
governments is the use of revenue allocation financing. Id. Although many states refer to this
method of financing as "tax increment" financing, the Idaho statute refers to it as "revenue
allocation." The concept is the same. Revenue allocation financing, simply explained, merely
allows a taxing entity to divert a portion of funds collected from property taxes without raising
the rate of the tax itself
Tax increment financing earmarks a portion of the property
taxes of a designated area for a particular purpose, such as raising the
one-third local share. The ad valorem taxes levied on property within
a designated redevelopment area are divided into two parts. The
taxes levied on the base value-ihe assessed valuation at the time the
project began-are allocated to the city, county, schools, and other
taxing units in the usual manner. The taxes levied on the
increment-the increase in the assessed valuation over the base
value-are
allocated to the redevelopment authority. The
redevelopment authority may use the allocated taxes to finance the
public costs of the redevelopment project, either by paying for current
projects on apay-as-you-go basis orby repaying tax allocation bonds
issued by thc redevelopment authority. The financing method is
premised on the theory that, without the redevelopment project,
property values would not increase. Therefore, property taxes levied
on that increase in value may be allocated to pay the costs of
redevelopment without affecting local taxing units. The taxing units
eventually benefit from redevelopment; after the incurred
indebtedness is repaid, the increased property taxes become available
to the taxing units.
Tax Increment Financingfor Development and Redevelopment, 61 OR.L.REV. 123, 124 (1982)
(footnote omitted). This financing tool is popular because it avoids reliance upon federal funds
and allows local government entities to finance projects within their communities based on the
increases in property value that result from the redevelopment itself. In addition, local
government entities are able to avoid the unpopular method of financing by increasing property
taxes. However, because it is the tax
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and not the tax *evenue that is frozen during the

revenue allocation period, the option of increasing tax revenue is still available to all local
government taxing entities during the redevelopment financing process. Thus, if there is a need
for local entities, in particular special purpose districts, such as school districts, to increase the
millage rate during the increment period, and thus increase gross tax revenues, that option is still
available (though the taxes generated from the increase millage in the tax increment area koin
the increased assessed value does flow to the urban renewal agency). The revenue allocation
financing method is thus often viewed as a fair and equitable method of assessing taxes and
paying for development, which development in turn benefits the entire community.
As a mechanism for financing redevelopment projects, revenue allocation financing first
began in 1952 in California. See Tan Increment Financingfor Redevelopment in Missouri:
Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L.REv. 77 (1985); The Use of Tux Increment Financing to
Attract Private Investment and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20 Va.Tax Rev. 777 (2001).

At this time, many states are using such a mechanism in one form or another. Some states have
constitutional provisions allowing for such a financing mechanism. See CaliEConst. art. 13,
$ 18; 0r.Const. art. IX, $ l(c). See also Cal. Health & Safety Code §$ 33670-33679 (2007);

0r.Rev.Stat. $5 457.420-,460 (2007). Other states have enacted statutory mechanisms to allow
the use of this financing tool for local governments. See, list of statutory references on tax
increment financing in the appendix hereto. Thus far, all 50 states, including Idaho, and the
District of Columbia have statutory schemes for tax increment or revenue allocation financing.
B.

History of the Citv of Rexburg's Adoption of Revenue Allocation Financing and
Judicial Confirmation Action

On November 6, 1991, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Resolution
No. 91-8, implementing the statutory criteria pursuant to the Law, empowering the Rexburg
Urban Renewal Agency, and authorizing the Mayor to appoint five commissioners to the urban
renewal agency. (Ex. 1.) By Resolution No. 91-8, the City Council made certain findings of
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fact, determining the North Second East Street and Teton River Area to be a deteriorating and
deteriorated area and authorizing the Agency to establish an urban renewal plan. (Ex. 1.) On
November 22, 1991, the Agency passed Resolution No. 3, proposing the North Highway Urban
Renewal Plan ("Plan") for the North Highway Project in the City of Rexburg. The Plan includes
revenue allocation financing provisions. On November 26, 1991, the City of Rexburg Planning
and Zoning Commissioll considered the Plan, and by Resolution No. 91.9, declared that the Plan
was in conformity with the Comprehensive Plan ofthe City of Rexburg.
Notice of a public hearing by the City Council to consider the Plan was published on
November 26, 1991 and December 10, 1991. Likewise, on November 25, 1991, notice was
mailed to the taxing entities regarding the City Council's intent to consider the Plan at its
December 27, 1991, meeting. During its meeting of December 27, 1991, the City Council of the
City of Rexburg adopted Ordinance No. 728 enacting a revenue allocation financing area within
the urban renewal area of the City of Rexburg, pursuant to the Plan. On December 31, 1991,
Ordinance No. 728, as adopted by the City Council of the City of Rexburg on December 27,
1991, was published in the Standard Journal, and thus, pursuant to the Idaho Urban Renewal
Law, became effective as of December 3 1, 1991, and retroactive to January 1,1991. See Idaho
Code 9 50-2906(2). Ordinance No. 728 specifically found that the Project Area as defined by the
Plan is a deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Idaho Urban Renewal Law.
On November 18,1998, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Resolution
No. 98.7, making certain findings of fact and determining the North Highway North and South
Area to be a deteriorating and deteriorated area. Resolution No. 98.7 directed the Agency to
prepare an urban renewal plan. On November 24, 1998, the Agency adopted Resolution No.981, adopting the North Highway Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan ("Amended and
Restated Urban Renewal Plm"), and recommending its adoption by the City Council. The
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan includes revenue allocation financing provisions.
On December 9, 1998, the City of Rexburg Planning and Zoning Commission considered the
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Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, and by Resolution No. 98-1 1, found that the Plan
was in conformity with the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg.
The City Council, following publication of notice of a public hearing as provided by law
atld providing notice to other taxing entities duly conducted a public hearing on the Amended
and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and, following said hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 815 on
December 28,1998, approving the Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. On December
30, 1998, a summary of Ordinance No. 815, as adopted by the City Council of the City of
Rexburg on December 28,1998, was published in the Standard Journal. Pursuant to the Idaho
Urban Renewal Law, Ordinance No. 815 became effective as of December 30, 1998, and
retroactive to January 1, 1998. See Idaho Code $ 50-2906(2). Ordinancc No. 815 specifically
found that the Project Area as defined by the Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan is a
deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Idaho Urban Renewal Law.

In September 2005, the Agency authorized the commencement of an eligibility study and
the preparation of an eligibility report ("Eligibility Report") which examined the then labeled
South Addition to the North Highway Urban Renewal Area. The Eligibility Report, dated
November 7,2005, was submitted to the Agency for its consideration and approval. On or about
November 8,2005, the Agency accepted the Eligibility Report by way of Resolution No. 2005-1.
(Ex. 2.) Pursuant to Resolution No. 2005-1, the Agency authorized the Chairman of the Board
of Directors, or the Agency Administrator, to transmit the Eligibility Report to the City Council
with a rcquest the City Council consider the area identified in the Eligibility Report for
designation as an urban renewal area and requesting the City Council to direct the Agency to
prepare an urban renewal plan for the area, which plan may include a revenue allocation
provisio~~.
(Ex. 2.)
On November 9,2005, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Resolution No.
2005-17, making certain findings of fact and determining the South Addition to the North
Highway Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, to be a deteriorated or deteriorating area.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION - 8
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(Ex. 3.) Resolution No. 2005-17 authorized the Agency to prepare an amendment to the North
Highway Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. (Ex. 3.)
On November 18,2005, the Agency adopted Resolution No. 2005-2, rccommeiiding
adoption of the Second Amended and Restated North Highway Urban Renewal Plan, South
Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan"). (Ex. 4.) The Second
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan contains revenue allocation financing provisions.
(Ex. 4.)
On November 19,2005, notice of the public hearing by the City Council on the Second
Amended and Restatcd Urban Renewal Plan was published in the Standard Journal. (Ex. 5.) On
November 21,2005, the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was submitted to
the affected taxing entities. (Ex. 6.) On December 1,2005, the City of Rexburg Plaming and
Zoning Cominission considered the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and
declared its conformity with the Colnprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg. (Ex. 7.) The City
Council duly conducted a public hearing on the Second Ainended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan and, following said hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005, approving
the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and making certain findings. (Ex. 8.)
On December 23,2005, a summary of Ordinance No. 950, as adopted by the City Council
of the City of Rexburg on December 21,2005, was published in the Standard Journal. (Ex. 9.)
Additionally, a copy of Ordinance No. 950 was transmitted to the other taxing entities. (Ex. 10.)
Pursuant to the Idaho Urban Renewal Law, Ordinance No. 950 became effective as of December
23,2005, and retroactive to January 1,2005. See Idaho Code $ 50-2906(2). Ordinance No. 950
specifically found that thc Project Area as defined by the Second Amended and Restated Urban
Renewal Plan is a deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Idaho Urban Renewal Law.
(Ex. 8.)
On November 21,2007 and November 28,2007, the Agency published its Notice of
Negotiated Private Bond Sale and Notice of Bond Purchase Agreement in the Standard Journal,
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notifying the public of its negotiation for and private sale to Zions Bank Public Finance of
approximately $6,300,000 of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008, for
improvements, authorized by the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and its
intent to enter into a Bond Purchase Agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance. (Ex. 11.)
On December 4,2007, the Board of Commissioners ("Board") of the Agency adopted
Resolution No. 2007-4, approving a Bond Purchase Agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance,
to provide for the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the Agency and Zions Bank Public
Finance for purchase from the Agency in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 Revenue
Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds. (Ex. 12.) A copy of the Bond Purchase Agreement is
attached to Resolution No. 2007-4. (Ex. 12.)
On December 4,2007, the Board of the Agency, adopted Resolution No. 2007-4,
authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008 (the "Series
2008 Bonds") in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 for the purpose of providing
financing for the Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project, consisting of (1) acquisition of land and
construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road,
parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and furnishing of a
building for sporting and commnnity events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football,
baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2) deposit of funds
into the Debt Service Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to meet the Reserve Fund
Requirement; and (3) payment of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the Bonds.
(Ex. 12.) The Project is defined in Section 2.1 of Resolution No. 2007-4 as follows:
Section 2.1

The Project

The Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project (the "Project") to be
financed from the proceeds of the [Series 20081 Bonds shall consist
of (1) acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor
swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, parking
facilities, and related furnishings and improvements;coiistructioiland
furnishing of a building for sporting and community events;
installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other
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public recreation purposes, and related improvements;(2) deposit o f
funds into the Debt Service Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to
meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and (3) payment of the
reasonable and necessary Costs o f Issuance o f the Bonds. The
Agcncy hereby authorizes and directs the appropriate officerso f the
Agency to carry out the Project consistent with the terms of this
Resolution and the UrbanRenewal Plan. The total cost ofthe Project
is estimated to be not to exceed $6,300,000, which shall be paid from
the proceeds o f the Bonds.
On December 12,2007, the Agency caused to be published a notice indicating passage o f
Resolution No. 2007-4. (Ex. 13.)
Resolution No. 2007-4 includes, by exhibit, a Bond Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase
Agreement") between the Agency and Zions Bank Public Finance (the "Underwriters"). The
Purchase Agreement requires the Agency to obtain a judgment confirming the validity of:
a.

the Agency's authority under the Constitution and the laws o f Idaho to
issue the Series 2008 Bonds;

b.

that the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceablein
accordance with their terns; and

c.

that the Purchase Agreement will be valid and cnforceablein accordance
with their terms.

The Agency must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel.
Under the Resolution No. 2007-4, the Agency is required to tender funds &om revenue
allocation proceeds to the Revenue Allocation Fund. The revenue allocation proceeds deposited
therein shall be used only for the following purposes and in the following order o f priority: first,
to pay the interest accruing on the Series 2008 Bonds and any Additional Bonds by required
deposits into the Bond Fund; second, to pay the principal o f the Series 2008 Bonds and any
Additional Bonds payable within the next Bond Year by required deposits into the Bond Fund;
third, to fund the Debt Service Reserve Fund by required deposits thereto, i f any; fourth, to fund
the Administration Fund; fifth, for any other lawful purpose of ihe Agency. (Ex. 12.)
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IV.
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
The judicial confirmation procedure is contained in Idaho Code $7-1301, et seq. Idaho
Code $ 7-1302(1) indicates the legislative purpose in providing for the judicial confirmation
procedure. That section states:

An early judicial examillation into and detennination of the validity
of the power of any political subdivisionto issue bonds or obligations
and execute any agreements or security instruments therefor promotes
the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state.
Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7-1304(3), the governing body of any political subdivision
seeking to file a Petition for Judicial Confinnation, must first hold a public hearing to consider
whether it should adopt a resolution, authorizing the filing of the petition. At least fifteen (15)
days prior to the public hearing, a notice must be published in the official newspaper, or papers
of general circulation within the jurisdiction concerning the public hearing. See Idaho Code
$ 7-1304(3). The filing of the petition must be authorized by a resolution adopted by the

governing body. See Idaho Code 5 7-1304(1). The Agency published its notice ofpublic hearing
as required on January 5,2008, (Ex. 14.) The Agency held the public hearing on January 22,
2008. As required by the Judicial Confirmation Law, the Agency then convened a special
meeting fourteen (14) days later to consider the resolution. On February 12,2008, the Agency
convened its special meeting and adopted Resolution No. 2008-1 authorizing the filing of this
Petition. (Ex. 15.)
Idaho Code $7-1304(1) provides that in order to determine validity of a bond or
obligation, or an agreement or security interest related thereto, a political subdivision
may file or cause to be filed a petition at any time in the judicial
district court in and for the district in which the political subdivision
is located wholly or in part, praying a judicial examination and
detennination of the validity of any bond or obligation or of any
agreement or security instrument related thereto.
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Idaho Code $7-1305 provides the action 1s one in the nature of a proceeding in rem, "and
jurisdiction of all parties interested may be had by publication and posting.

. . ." The publication

and posting procedure is designed to notify all interested parties of the filing of the petition, so
that anyonc who may be adversely affected may then appear and challenge the valldity of the
procedure. See Idaho Code 5 7-1302(3). Idaho Code $ 7-1306(3) indicates "~lurisdictionshall
be complete after such publication and posting." Idaho Code $ 7-1308(1) further provides that
the court, following the filing of the petition and publication and posting, "shall examine into and
determine all matters and things affecting each question submitted, shall make such findings with
reference thereto and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case warrants."
The judicial confirmation procedure provides for a method by which a political
subdivision can bring an issue before the court and join all adverse parties. It is similar to a quiet
title proceeding, probate proceeding, or a name change proceeding, where adverse parties are
joined in the proceeding by publication and posting. Many statutes provide for jurisdiction by
publication. See Idaho Code $ 7-801, et seq. (name change); Idaho Code $5 43-405 and 43-406
(petition regarding confinnation of bonds of irrigation district); Idaho Code $42-3206 (sewer
district formation); Idaho Code $ 67-4901, et seq. (petition to establish auditorium district).
On February 12,2008, the Agency adopted and passed Resolution No. 2008-1,
authorizing the filing of a judicial confirmation proceeding. (Ex. 15.) On February 13,2008, the
Agency filed its Petition for Judicial Confirmation. (Ex. 16.) Thereafter, the Clerk of the Court
issued a Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation scheduling this case for hearing on
March 17,2008. (Ex. 17.) The Agency then caused the Notice to be posted in the appropriate
locations and published in the Standard Journal, all in compliance with Idaho Code $ 7-1306.
The Notice was published in the Standard Journal on February 21,2008, and February 28,2008.
(Affidavit of Judy C. Coy ("Coy Aff."),

7 3.)

The Notice will also be published in the Standard

Journal on March 6,2008. (Coy Aff., 7 3.)
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The validity of actions taken by the Agency are subject to potential dispute. First, and
primarily, the validity of these actions must be determined before Bond Counsel can issue an
unqualified opinion. (See Affidavit of Michael C. Moore ("Moore Aff.")) Additionally, a
condition of the purchase of the Series 2008 Bonds by Zions Bank Public Finance is a judgment
confirming the validity of the Series 2008 Bonds and the Bond Purchase Agreement. Clearly,
these are important legal questions that must be answered before the goals of the Agency can be
l l l y accomplished. The Idaho Legislature has provided a mechanism for resolution of these
important legal questions. The procedure provided is similar to procedures allowed for a
declaratory judgment, where a court may be asked for a judgment declaring the rights, status, and
other legal relations of the patties. The Declaratory Judgrnent Act is often used to determine the
validity of a statute, the validity of an instrument or other subject matter, or the validity of a
contract prior to an actual breach of that contract. See Idaho Code $ 10-1201, et seq.
The declaratory judgment procedure has been used in other jurisdictions to determine the
validity of bonds.
The plaintiffbelieves it is compelled to take the initiative in bringing
the matker to a head because of precautionary advice received from
bond counsel respecting possible legal liability for the payment of
interest. It is for the benefit ofthe State that plaintiffs bonds should
continue to enjoy a high rating for the public sale of suchbonds is the
direct and immediate means by which the capital construction fund
of the State will obtain the r e h d of the cost of constructing the
Thruway. The State's interest in this respect is evidenced in
Constitution, article 10, section 6. The use of the declaratory
judgment is necessary in this case to settle a dispute involving the
meaning or application of a statute. The defendant has failed to take
action which would dispose of the issue and so long as it remains
unresolved a possible unprovided for and unascertainable liability,
involvingmillions of dollars, hangs suspended over the marketability
in the future of the plaintiffs bonds.
New YorkState Thruway Auth. v. Hurd, 284 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1967), afd, 286 N.Y.S.2d 436

Some courts have commented on the declaratoryjudgment procedure, noting its specific
purpose to determine rights in advance, before action is taken.
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A declaratory judgment, by its very nature, is intended to clarify the
rights o f parties before those rights are violated. Once rights are
violated, declaratoryreliefis inappropriate. W e stated in West Fargo
Public School District No. 6 v. West Fargo Education Association,
259 N.W.2d 612,617 (N.D.1977),that theDeclaratoryJudgment Act
is intended 'to ~rovidea method whereby parties to a justiciable
controversy may have it determined by a-court in advance o f any

Cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted the
Uniibm Declaratory Judgment Act, from which Chapter 32-23,
N.D.C.C., was adopted, support our conclusion. For example, in
Sappv. ABC Credit & Investment Co., 243 Ga. 151,159,253 S.E.2d
82, 87 (1979),the Supreme Court o f Georgia stated:
'The object o f the declaratory judgment is to permit
determination o f a controversy before obligations are
reuudiated or riehts are violated. As many times vointed out

Allen v. City ofMinot, 363 N.W.2d 553,554 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis added).

Courts in other jurisdictions have approved the use o f a special statutory proceeding to
judge the constitutionality o f a particular statute.
This special proceeding is no ordinaryprivate dispute between
these petitioners and respondent; it was created by the legislature to
permit a speedy resolution o f a public issue on which further action
by those responsible for the state's fiscal policies might depend. Our
only jurisdiction under Section 8 is to render a judgment 'as to the
constitutionality and legality o f Paragraph 3, Senate Joint
Resolution 30.' Because o f this limited grant ofjurisdiction,no other
relief or order is in issue.

It should be clear to Oregon voters and the legislature that a
declaration that the proposed amendments were submitted b y an
improper procedure has substantial practical significance. First, we
do not take for granted that respondent's view ofher duty to place the
amendments on the ballot will remain the same in the light o f this
opinion. W e are given no jurisdiction to advise her in this
proceeding. W e refer to a possible reconsideration by the Secretary
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o f State only to meet the argument that the proceeding is without
practical substance.
Second, we do not lose sight o f the fact that it was the
Legislative Assembly that made this provision for a speedy
adjudication of the validity o f the disputed procedure. Possibly
members of the legislature wished to be in a position to suggest
further legislative action in case the validity o f the amendments
proved seriously doubtful. W e cannot assume that the validity of the
disputed procedure would be of no practical importance, when the
legislature took exhaordinary steps to have it decided by this court in
priority to all other matters.
I f the present dispute were not justiciable, the validity o f the
procedure by which this amendment was submitted could not be
tested by means of this proceeding under Section 8. Decision
whether the constitutional amendments and the sales tax statute
became law or not would have to await a later challenge to their
validity i f they should gain approval by the voters. This delay, with
its risk o f legal complications and fiscal tunnoil at a later time, is
what Section 8 was designed to avoid. The petitioners' interests as
pleaded in the petition, the genuine disagreement between these
parties over properly identified and briefed legal issues, and the
possibility that our judgment may affectrespondent's further action
together bring this proceeding under Section 8 within the bounds of
justiciability.
Hart v. Paulus, 676 P.2d 1384,1387 (Or. 1984).

h1 this case, Bond Counsel for the Agency has indicated without a decision on the validity
o f these bonds using revenue allocation financing in Idaho, an unqualified bond opinion cannot
be issued and bonds cannot be sold. (See Moore Aff.) Additionally, Zions Bank Public Finance
will not purchase the Series 2008 Bonds without a confirmingjudgment. Consequently, this is
precisely the type o f case which requires use o f the judicial confinnation procedure, to allow
determination o f the controversy before bonds are sold.
The legislature was no doubt aware o f the drastic consequences that can occur i f a
financing project, with the accompanying issuance o f public bonds, is allowed to proceed without
a judicial assessment of the validity o f the particular transaction. Lawsuits arising from the
default on public bonds issued by the Washington Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS")
dominated news reports in the 1980's. In 1983, the Idaho Supreme Court held certain Idaho
MEMORANDUM IN SWPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION - 16

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION
PAGE 48

cities had no authority to enter into power purchase agreements after WPPSS had sold bonds to
the public premised upon the validity o f these agreements. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho
432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983). The resulting financial catastrophe clearly demonstrates the need for a
pre-issue declaratory judgment procedure for the protection o f the public.
On July 3, 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Idaho Falls
RedeveIopment Agency v. Countryman, 118 Idaho 43,794 P.2d 632 (1990). The Idaho Supreme

Court denied a petition for writ o f mandamus, saying the Agency had another plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law. Id. at 635. By its decision, the supreme court implied a petition for
judicial confirmation was available to test the validity o f any tax increment financing project
The judicial confirmation method o f obtaining an early resolution of bond issues is a
practice dating to the early 1900's in Idaho. A number o f cases discuss the judicial confirmation
statute that applies to irrigation districts. These cases address the validity of a confirmation
procedure and the res judicata effecto f a confirmationjudgment. In American Falls Reservoir
Llist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 105,228 P. 236 (1924),the court stated:

It is a matter o f common knowledge that bonds about which
there is no question as to their validity and payment at maturity can
be sold for more than bonds which are liable to be assailed and
questioned years after their issuance, and that bonds o f doubtful
validity are reluctantly taken at any price. It was doubtless for the
purpose o f settling this class o f questions in advance and thereby
making the bonds o f irrigation districts more readily salable and at
better prices than they would otherwise command that the legislature
passed the confirmation acts providing that districts might, before
offering their bonds, have all questions affecting their validity
judicially and finally determined. The confirmationproceeding is in
the nature o f a proceeding in vem, the object being to determine the
status of the district and its power to issue valid bonds.
Id. at 135 (citations omitted),

The court went on to state that once the proceedings were confirmed, the decision was res
judicata as to all owners o f land given constructive notice o f the proceedings:
Notice o f the confirmationproceedings was given, and the owners of
all lands assessed were entitled to appear before the court in this
proceeding, in which the court was authorized to correct all enors in
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the assessment, apportionment and distribution of costs. This
constitutes due process of law and is not a taking of property without
compensation.
The method which the legislaturehas provided and which has
been followed is clearly within its constitutional power, and the law
is valid and the proceedings had bind all the lands within the district
and the owners thereof.
Id. at 145.
The court has reached a similar holding in several other cases. See also Nampa Irr.
Dist. v. Brose, 11 Idaho 474, 83 P. 499 (1905); Smith v. Progressive Irr. Dist., 28 Idaho 812,
156 P. 1133 (1916); and Knowles v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 235, 101 P. 87 (1909)

In Crane Creek R.A. Board v. Irr. Dist., 48 Idaho 662,284 P. 557 (1930), the court said:
The attacks directed against the contract in this suit could and should
have been made in the confirmation proceedings. The decree binds
all parties and precludes further examination of the questions there
determined.
Id. at 667.
In Koch v. Canyon County 2008 W L 204232,4 (2008)' taxpayers brought action against
the county contending that the lease agreement entered into by the County violated Article VIII, $
3 of the Idaho Constitution. Id. The Court noted:
The Idaho legislature has enacted the Judicial Confinnation Law, LC. $5 7-1301
et seq., which provides a procedure enabling political subdivisions to obtain a
judicial determination of the validity of a proposed obligation. The County
recognized that the lease agreement may violate Article VIII, $3, but elected not
to seek a determination of whether it did. Had it done so, the Plaintiffs could have
appeared in the proceeding to raise their objections. LC. $ 7-1307.
Id. at 4.
Thus, based upon the foregoing case authority, the Idaho courts have approved of and
reinforced the judicial confirmation tool over the course of the last century.

'Please note that this case has not yet been released for publication in the permanent law
reports. Until the case is released, it is subject to revision or withdrawal.
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v.
OTHER IDAHO PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING AND USE OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
Several other actions in the State of Idaho involved the issue of the validity of tax
increment financing and resulted in judicial confirmation of Agency action.
A petition for judicial confirmation, In re Boise Redevelopment Agency, Case
No. 91781, Fourth Judicial District, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, issued
by the Honorable Duff McKee.
Another petition for judicial confirmation, In the Matter of Twin Falls Urban
Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Case No. 41756, Fifth Judicial

District, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable George
Granata.
A third petition for judicial confirmation, filed in In re Urban Renewal Agency of
Boise City, Case No. 93240, Fourth Judicial District, resulted in Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable Deborah Bail.
A fourth petition for judicial confirmation filed in In re Urban Renewal Agency o f
Idaho Falls, Case No. 40006, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the

Honorable Marvin M. Smith. (Ex. 18.)
A fifth petition was filed in Madison County, Case No. CV-92-00212, In re
Urban Renewal Agency of Rexburg, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued

by the Honorable Grant L. Young. (Ex. 19.)
A sixth petition, In re Urban Renewal Agency of Boise City, aka Capital City
Development Corporation, filed in the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada,

Case No. 98126, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable
Judge Carey.
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A seventh petition, In re Twin Falls Urban Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation

(Tax Increment) Bonds, filed in the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Case
No. 9500252D, resulted in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree issued
by the Honorable Roger Burdick.
An eighth petition, In re Urban Renewal Agency of the City ofAmmon, filed in the
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, Case No. CV-95-757 (Ex. 20), resulted in Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable Judge Marvin M. Smith.
A ninth petition, In re Urban Renewal Agency of the City ofAmmon, filed in
Bonneville County, Case No. CV-96-5952, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
issued by the Honorable Judge St. CIair. (Ex. 21.)
A tenth petition, In re Twin Falls Urban Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation

(Tax Increment) Bonds, filed in the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Case
No. 9801806D, resulted in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree issued
by the Honorable Daniel Meehl.
An eleventh petition, In the matter of: Lewiston Urban Renewal Agency Revenue
Allocation Bonds, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Lewiston, Idaho, filed in Nez Perce
County, Case No. CV 06-02398, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment
and Decree by the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie.
A twelfth petition, In the matter of: Caldwell Urban Renewal Agency Revenue
Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Urban Renewal Agency o f the City of Caldwell, Idaho, filed
in the Third Judicial Disti-ict, Canyon County, Case No. CV-2006-7456-C, resulted in Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order issued by the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie.
A thirteenth petition, In the matter of: Urban Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation
Bonds, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Caldwell, Idaho, filed in the Third Judicial District,
Canyon County, Case No. CV-2007-9073, resulted in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order issued by the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie.
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Only one judicial confirmation proceeding seeking a determination of the validity of tax
increment financing resulted in a finding this method of financing was invalid. See In re Urban
Renewal Agency of Boise City,Ada County Case No. CV-OC-98-00978-D. (Ex. 22.) In this
proceeding the Honorable Robert G. Newhouse found tax increment financing violated
Article VIII, 5 1 of the Idaho Constitution. However, subsequent to Judge Newhouse's decision,
Article VIII, $ 1 was amended. See S.J.R. No. 107 (S.L. 1998, p. 1363). This amendment was
ratified at the 1998 general election. As amended, tax increment financing does
Article VIII,

violate

5 1 under Judge Newhouse's analysis.
VI.
VALIDITY OF THE REVENUE ALLOCATION
FINANCING MECHANISM

Several constitutional and statutory questions are presented in this judicial confirmation
proceeding. The following are the major issues to be addressed:
(1)

Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho

Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation, contained in the Idaho Constitution, Article 7,
Section 5. (Petition, 7 X(1))
(2)

Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of the Idaho

Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to private entities as coiltained in
Article 8, 5 4, and Article 12, 5 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether it further generally
violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from incurring an
indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year and pledging ad
valorem taxes for the payment of such indebtedness without the assent of qualified electors, as
provided in Idaho Constitution, Article 8, 5 3. (Petition, 1[ X(2).)
(3)

Whether by reason of the coinposition, action, and operation of the Rexburg

Urban Renewal Agency Board of Directors, the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter ego
of the City of Rexburg, and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Rexburg
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Urban Renewal Agency thereforeviolates the provisions o f the Idaho Constitution prohibiting
municipalities from lending credit to private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article 8,
Section 4, and whether it further violates provisionsof the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a
municipality from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a
specific year and pledging ad valorem taxes for the payment o f such indebtedness without the
assent of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution,Article 8, Section 3. (Petition,

7 X(31.1
(4)

Whether by virtue o f the ability of the city council to declare itself as the board o f

commissioners of the urban renewal agency under Idaho Code $5 50-2006(b)(2)and (3),whether
exercised or not, an urban renewal agency is the alter ego o f a municipality. (Petition,fj X(4).)
(5)

Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing power

in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and standards as required under the
doctrine o f separation o f powers, to govern the assessment and collection o f tax, to ensure the
taxes collected are used in furtherance o f the legislative purpose and in furtherance of the public
purpose. (Petition,7 X(5).)
(6)

Whether the provisions o f the statute and the ordinance violate the due process

rights o f taxpayers o f the State of Idaho, by not requiring the expenditure o f public funds
collected from taxpayers for a public purpose. (Petition,7 X(6).)
(7)

Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violated Article I ,

Section 16 o f the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws that impair the obligation o f
contracts. (Petition,fj X(7).)
(8)

Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by the legislature for a "City

Purpose" in violation o f Article 7 , Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. (Petition,fj X(8).)

(9)

Whether the revenue allocation method o f taxation violates Article 7 , Section 7 o f

the Idaho Constitution. (Petition,7 X(9).)
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(10)

Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits

received. (Petition, X(10).)
(1 1)

Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts. (Petition,

T X(1 11.)
Each of these constitutional and statutory questions will be addressed in turn. Based on
an exhaustive analysis of the Idaho Constitution and decisions from other jurisdictions which
have nearly unanimously upheld the implementation of revenue allocation financing, it is clear
that Idaho's law is sufficient to withstand constitutional challenge, and thus judicial confirmation
of the proposed method of financing is appropriate.
A.

Standards Governing Constitutional Questions
The present judicial confinnation process seeks a dctcrmination from the court on a

number of constitutional issues. Consequently, the standards governing any decision on the
constitutionality of a statute should be reviewed. The legislature is presumed to have acted
within its constitutiollal power. Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 525 P.2d 957 (1974); Western
Beverage, Inc. v. State, 96 Idaho 588,532 P.2d 930 (1974). Legislative enactments are presumed
constitutional. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5,696 P.2d 856 (1985); State v. Reed, 107 Idaho
162,686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App. 1984). Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of
the constitutionalityof a statute. State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707,518 P.2d 969 (1974); Caesar v.
Williams,84 ldaho 254,371 P.2d 241 (1962). Statutes must be construed whereverpossihle to
afford a constitutional interpretation. Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho 796,451 P.2d 542 (1969).
It is the duty of the courts to uphold legislative enactments wherever possible. Hecla Mining
Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 108 Idaho 147,697 P.2d 1161 (1985).
B.

The Revenue Allocation Financing Provisions Do Nut Violate the C:oustitutional
Requirenrent of L'niformih. of Taxation.
The Idaho Constitution requires all taxes be levied in a uniform manner.
$5. Taxes to be uniform-Exemptions.-A11
taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits,
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of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected
under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxaiion of all property, real and personal:
provided, that the legislature may allow such exemptions froin
taxation from time to time as shall seem necessary and just, and all
existing exemptions provided by the laws of the territory, shall
continue until changed by the legislature of the state: provided
further, that duplicate taxation of property for the same purpose
during the same year, is hereby prohibited.
Idaho Const. Art. 7, $ 5. The basic purpose for the uniformity provision is to distribute the
burden of taxation evenly and equitably, as far as practical. 84 C.J.S. Taxation $ 2 2 at 76. This
equality in taxation is accomplished when t h e m ofthe tax falls equally and impartially on
all the persons and property subject to it, so that no higher rate or greater levy in proportion to the
value of such property is imposed on one person or species of property than on others similarly
situated or of like character. 84 C.J.S. Taration $ 22 at 78 (emphasis added).
The uniformity provision of the Idaho Constitution is violated when an assessed tax is
levied unevenly within the same class of subjects within the taxing district

when one class of

property is systematically assessed at a higher percentage of actual cash value, thereby subjecting
the taxpayer to a higher rate of taxation than applies to other property within the taxing district.
The requirement of uniformity is violated not only when the tax is
levied unevenlv within the same class of subiects but also when one
class of propesy is systematically assessed 2 a higher percentage of
actual cash value, subjecting the taxpayer to a higher rate of taxation,
than applies to other prope;ty within the taxingdistrict.
County ofAda v. Red Steer Drive-Ins, Etc., 101 Idaho 94,97-98,609 P.2d 161 (1980). The

uniformity provision in Idaho is concerned with one taxpayer bearing a proportionately heavier
burden than another taxpayer, similarly situated, in the same taxing district. From apurely
logical perspective, the revenue allocation financing legislation should not run afoul of the
concerns of the uniformity clause. A taxpayer situated outside the urban renewal area would still
pay property taxes based on the assessed value of the property, as would a taxpayer within the
urban renewal project area. The only difference in treatment is not with respect to the assessment
of tax, but only with respect to the distribution of the tax proceeds.
SUPPORT
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The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a uniformity challenge in Board of Trustees of Joint
Class A School District No. 151 in Twin Falls County v. Board of County Commissioners of
Cassia County, 83 Idaho 172,359 P.2d 635 (1961),where a statute provided for a county tax

levy i f a school district in the county had a fmding deficiency. School District 151's bounda~ies
did not encompass all o f Cassia County and included a portion o f neighboring Twin Falls
County. County taxpayers outside School District No. 151, or within another school district, had
to pay an additional tax in order to support School District No. 151. The court held the tax did
not violate the constitutional uniformity requirement, because it applied to all emergency needs
o f all school districts in the county.
The fact that the need for such emergency funds may be
greater in one area or district within the county, than in another, does
not invalidate the levy. W e are not here dealing with a special tax
levy against the property in one district, the proceeds o f which are
used in another. It is a county tax levied equally and uniformly upon
all taxable property in the county. The taxpayers are not assessed as
members o f a school district but as citizens o f the county. The fund
is apportioned fairly and equitably to the various schools within the
county according to their needs.

The fact that the proceeds o f a tax levy are apportioned in
varying amounts and that some districts receive less than the mount
o f levy therein does not constitute lack o f uniformity,where the tax
is apportioned reasonably and according to need in an effort to
equalize education or standards throughout the county.
Id. at 178.

Revenue allocation financing legislation has withstood constitutional uniformity
challenges in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Richards v. City ofMuscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48,60
(Iowa 1975);People Ex Rel. City o f Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242,249 (Ill. 1980);
Metropolitan Development and I5ousing Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427,429-30 (Tenn.

1979);Sigma Tau Gamma, Etc. v. City ofMenomonie, 288 N.W.2d 85,93-94 (Wis. 1980). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court pointedly recognized under revenue allocation financing laws, there
was no taxpayer who was singled out for preferential treatment over any other taxpayer.
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Under tax increment financing. . .there is no disproportionateimpact
upon taxpayers within the same territorial boundaries of the unit
imposing the tax. All taxpayers within the territorial limits of each
local governmental unit . . . continue to be taxed at a uniform rate
based upon valuations uniformly arrived at. No taxpayer or group of
taxpayers is being singled out for preferential treatment either in the
form of an exemption from taxation or a tax credit. Thus, we
conclude, taxation under tax incremental financing is uniform.
City ofMenomonie, 288 N.W.2d at 94. In City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980), the

Nevada Supreme Court dismissed a petitioner's challenge of revenue allocation financing
legislation on uniformity grounds, stating that the contentions "lack relevant authority, and
therefore need not be considered. . . . Moreover, we find the contentions without merit." Id. at
640 (citations omitted).
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld its revenue allocation financing law over a challenge
based on the uniformity and equality requirements of the Kansas Constitution. State, ex re1
Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 (Kru~.1980). The Kansas court stated:

The only possible nonuniformity or inequality would result
from the statutory allocation or distribution of the tax money already
collected. Article 11, Section 1, does not require uniformity and
equality in the distribution of tax money. That constitutional
provision only requires the legislature to provide for a uniform and
equal
of assessment and taxation. . . . That constitutional
provision has not been made applicable to the distribution or
allocation of taxes after they are collected.
Id. at 562 (original emphasis). Thus the Kansas court held the revenue allocation financing

legislation applied uniformly throughout the taxing district, and the constitutional mandate of
uniform and equal taxation had been fulfilled. Id. at 562-63.

In Meierhenvy v. City oflluron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984), the supreme court of South
Dakota upheld a challenge to revenue allocation financing on unifonnity grounds. The court
clearly held that uniformity relates to the levy of taxes and does not limit the authority to allocate
or distribute public funds collected through such levies.
Although it is true that under the Act the additional tax
revenues derived from the increase in the assessed valuation of the
property within the tax incremental district is earmarked for the
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repayment o f the project costs, SDCL 11-9-31, and thus is not
available to defray the costs o f school and local governmental
operations, this fact does not necessarily render the Act
unconstitutional. Constitutional requirements o f equality and
uniformity relate to the levy o f taxes, and neither the requirement o f
unifonnity nor o f equal protection o f the law limit the legislature's
authority to allocate or distribute public funds, Douglas Indep.
School Dist, No. 3 v. Bell, 272 N.W.2d 825 (S.D.1978); Dean v.
Coddington, supra. The findings that the governing body o f the
municipality must make as a prerequisite to establishing a tax
incremental district, SDCL 1 1-9-8, presuppose that in the absence o f
the creation o f the district the assessed valuation o f the property
within the area o f the proposed district will not increase and, indeed,
will likely decline.
Meierheny v. CityofIuron, 354N.W.2d 171, 177 (S.D. 1984). InSouth Bendpublic
Transportation Corporatioiz v. City of South Bend, the Indiana Supreme Court also upheld the

statute on similar grounds.
Appcllunts next conrend that the tax allucalion financingplan
set onr In ind. Code $ 18-7-7-39.I . r1currr. does not incet the exisrine
criteria governing taxation by spkcid taxing districts and does n$
meet the uniform and equal taxation requirement o f Article 10,
Section 1 o f the Indiana Constitution. Appellants complain that the
burden of the costs o f the improvements falls not only on the people
and property within the Allocation Area but also indirectly on
residents outside o f the Area but within overlapping taxing units.
They cite the SouthBend Community School Corporation,St. Joseph
County, the South Bend Public Library, and the St. Joseph County
Park Board as examples of taxing units which overlap both the
Allocation Area and other areas outside the corporate limits o f the
city. They complain that a taxpayer, such as appellant Helling, who
resides outside o f the city but within the area o f the overlapping
taxing units, will indirectly bear a portion o f the cost o f the
redevelopment financing but will not receive any special benefits
therekom. W e see no merit to this argument since the overlapping
taxing units will eventually share the benefits o f the higher assessed
values in the redevelopment area. W e have consistently held that the
legislature has the power to create special taxing districts without
regard to the boundaries o f the municipal or political subdivisions o f
the state. "[Tlhepowerexercised is a legislative one, and there is no
express or implied limitation upon the power found in the
constitution."
South Bend Public Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217,222-23

(Ind. 1981). The Indiana court held the uniformity provision does not limit the expenditure o f
funds collected through taxation.
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lIlt
. , has consistentlv been held that the uniformity clause protects
residents against discriminatory assessment procedures and docs not
cuntrol lcgisla!ive expenditure tlecisiuns. Tax 311ocation financing
does not &ange the bisic rate of assessment and all taxpayers within
the territorial limits of each taxing unit continue to be taxed at a
uniform rate based upon valuations uniformly arrived at.

In at least six other states, the supreme courts have upheld tax
allocation financing statutes against challenges based upon tax
uniformity clauses similar to ours. Thesejurisdictions all recognized
that uniformity clauses aim to protect against discriminatory
assessment procedures and do not apply to legislative expenditure
decisions.
Id. at 223.
In Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, the Colorado court made a similar ruling:

Denver contends that this provision is violated because of the unequal
distribution of its ad valorem revenues. Specifically, Denver argues
that this provision is violated because a portion of the tax revenues
from the levy upon property within the project area are allocated to
DURA for retirement of the bonds.
Colo.Const. Art. X, Sec. 3, however, has not been held to
require equal distribution of tax revenues, nor do we today render
such an interpretation. Rather, this provision requires that the burden
of taxation be uniform on the same class of property within the
jurisdiction of the authority levying the tax. Citizens Committeefor
Fair Taxation v. Warner, 127 Colo. 121, 254 P.2d 1005 (1953);
Leonard v. Reed, 46 Colo. 307, 104 P. 410 (1909); Ames v. People,
26 Colo. 83, 56 P. 656 (1899); Palmer v. Way, 6 6010. 106 (1881).
It is auuarent from the discussion that the tax burden upon owners of
property within the project area and othcr owners of p;operty within
Dcnver is the same. Accordingly,
- . we find no \,iolation ofColo.Cons1.
Art. X, Sec. 3.
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374,1386 (1980).
Upon infonnation and belief, no court has invalidated a revenue allocation financing law
on the basis of a uniformity constitutional provision. See also Tax Increment Financing for
Redevelopment in Missouri: Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L.REv. 77 (1985). Consequently,
Idaho's law should similarly be upheld against any challenge based on Article 7, 6 5, of the Idaho
Constitution.

hiUhKnR AND1 JM
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C.

Revenue Allocation Financing Does Not Violate the Prohibition Against a
Governmental Entity Lending Credit.
Article 8, 5 4, and Article 12, $ 4, of the Idaho Constitution prohibit governmental

entities from loaning credit to or for the benefit ofprivate interests. Article 8, 5 4, provides:
No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school
district, or other subdivision, shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith
thereof directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of any
individual, association or corporation, for any amount or for any
purpose whatever, or become responsible for any debt, contract or
liability of any individual, association or corporation in or out of this
state.
Article 12, 5 4, similarly provides:
No county, town, city, or othermunicipal corporation, by vote
of its citizens or otherwise, shall ever become a stockholder in any
joint stock company, corporation or association whatever, or raise
money for, or make donation or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any
such company or association . . . .
There are a number of Idaho cases interpreting this particular provision and a similar
provision which applies to the Idaho Legislature. In one case dealing with the legislative
provision, Article 8, $ 2, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the history of this type of a
constitutional provision and its intended application.
The history of this constitutional provision, and others of its kind
adopted in our sister states is well known. As stated succinctlyin one
law review article:
"In the nineteenth century, the United States was
enjoying a rapid westward expansion. A key element in this
expansion was the construction of railroads and other
communication and transportatioil systems, the routes of
which vastly influenced growth. An adjacent railroad was
ofien crucial to the economic growth, if not the very
existence, of many localities. As a result, state and local
govemnents, in order to encourage specific routes and spurs,
offered financial assistance to struggling railroads. This
assistance was not entirely without precedent in light of
earlier successes with similar projects such as the Erie Canal.
Governmental assistance usually took the form of stock or
security purchases, or co-signatures on bonds issued by
railroads. Since these private ventures were at best highly
speculative,many failed, leaving governmental units, and thus
the taxpayer, either holding worthless stock certificates or,
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even worse, liable for large inadequately secured debts.
During the depression of 1837 nine states defaulted on, or
repudiated, debts of this type. These repudiations were made
easier because a significant portion of the debt certificates
were held by European investors who desired a stake in the
American venture.
"The resulting economic crisis led to the passage of
constitutionalprovisions designed to limit state indebtedness
and restrict governmental involvement in private ventures.
Forty-five state constitutions contain provisions prohibiting
the lending of credit . . . ."
Idaho Water Resources Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,560,548 P.2d 35,60 (1976) (footnotes

omitted). A similar concern was expressed by the court in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick
Kong Corporation:

The purpose of such a prohibition is clear. Favored status should not
be given any private enterprise or individual in the application of
public funds. The proceedings and debates of the Idaho
Constitutional Convention indicate a consistent theme running
through the consideration of the constitutional sections in question.
It was feared that pfivate interests would gain advantages at the
expense of the taxpayers. This fear appeared to relate particularly to
railroads and a few other large businesses who had succeeded in
gaining the ability to impose taxes, at least indirectly, uponmunicipal
residents in western states at the time of the drafting of our
constitution. We are led to the firm conviction that only private
interests were intended to fall within the strictures of those sectioiis
relating to "association," "corporation" and "joint stock company."
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yiclc Kong Corporation, 94 Idaho 876,883-84,499 P.2d 575

(1972). The court in Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho 217,458 P.2d 213 (1969),
attempted to define the word "credit" withi11 this constitutional provision.
The word "credit" as used in this provision implies the imposition of
some new financial liability upon the State which in effect results in
the creation of State debt for the benefit of private enterprises. This
was the evil intended to be remedied by Idaho Const. art. 8, § 2, and
similar provisions in other state constitutions.
Id. at 221-22 (footnote omitted). Several separate lending-of-credit issues are raised by the

revenue allocation financing law.
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1.

The Citv of Rexburg Is Not Lending Its Credit to a Private Entity.

This issue was addressed in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corporation,
94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). The Idaho Supreme Court in YickKong held the
constitutional provisions regarding lending of credit apply only if the governmental entity is
r&
lending its credit to or for the benefit of p&

interests. Id. at 883-84. See also Idaho Falls

Consolidated Hospital v. Bingham County Board, 102 Idaho 838,642 P.2d 553 (1982). In Yick
Kong, the court held that the Agency, ''being a public and not a private enterprise, does not fall
within the strictures and prohibition of Article 8, 5 4 and Article 12, 5 4 of the Idaho Constitution

. . . ." Id. at 884. This conclusion was based upon the court's finding the Agency could not
impose taxes upon the residents of the city or encumber public assets to the advantage of private
enterprise. Id.
Even with the addition of the revenue allocation financing mechanism, the Agency
remains unable to exercise any power to levy or collect taxes. See Idaho Code $$50-2007
and 50-2910. Revenue allocation bonds are payable froin a special account funded by
incremental tax revenues. However, the issuance of such bonds does not encumber public assets
because the Act limits the payment of revenue allocation bonds to revenues available in the
special fnnd. The Act specifically indicates no encumbrance of public funds is intended or
allowed. See Idaho Code 5 50-2910.
As to this issue, Yick Kong remains viable authority for the proposition that the Agency is
a public entity. The Agency's specific purpose is to aid in the development and redevelopment
of a deteriorated or deteriorating areas within the city. This is clearly a public purpose, as the
court held in Yick Kong, and will be discussed later in this memorandum. Consequently, the
Agency does not lend its credit to a private entity in violation of the Idaho Constitution.
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2.

The Agencv Is Not a Governmental Entitv Subieet to the "Lendinv Credit"
Prohibition of the Idaho Constitution.

Article 8, $4, and Article 12, $4, of the Idaho Constitution do not specifically include a
redevelopment agency within the parameters of their proscriptions, but they do include a catchall
"other subdivision." The question presented is whether the Agency should be included within
this "other subdivision" provision. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled on this question in Boise
Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corporation, 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). In

addressing the issue of whether voter approval was necessary for the encumbrance of Agency
property, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly ruled the Agency was not a "subdivision of the state."
We further hold that the [Redeveloument Agency1 is not a
subdivision of the state within the meaning of Sections 3 and 4 of
Article 8 of the Idaho Constitution. As pointed out in Lloyd v. Twin
Falls Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941), the
questioned authority has no powers of taxation and therefore the
provisions of Article 8, Section 3 do not apply. Herein plaintiff has
no ability to actually encumber any of the resources of the City of
Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property holdings.
Id. at 882-83 (emphasis added). Even with the addition of the revenue allocation financing

mechanism, the Agency remains powerless to encumber the general funds of the city or assess
taxes on the general public. While the Agency can now serve as a recipient for tax h d s
assessed and collected by a public entity, the Agency has no independent power of taxation.
Yick Kong thus remains viable authority on this point.

This issue may also turn on whether the Agency is an "alter ego" of the city of Rexburg.
The alter ego issue will be discussed in more depth later in this memorandum in connection with
the voter approval sections of the Idaho Constitution. Resolution of that issue also requires
reference to the authority of the Yiclc Kong case.
Regarding the lending credit provision, a specific concern has been the availability of the
general revenue fund to satisfy any obligation created through the lending of credit. If the
general revenues are available for the repayment of obligations, the taxpayers' interests are
placed in jeopardy if the obligation is incursed to aid a private scheme. The fact the Agency has
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no general revenue power and thus cannot affect the general revenue fund in which the public has
a unique interest excludes the Agency from the proscriptions of these constitutional provisions.
In addition, the fact the only encumbrance created lies against the fund created to receive the
revenue il~ilitatesagainst a finding the lending credit provisions are implicated.
3.

Proceeds of Revenue Allocation Bonds Are Issued for the Benefit of a Public
Use.
-

Some courts have engrafted a public purpose requirement onto the lending credit
provision. It appears Idaho has also adopted this analysis. In Engelklng v. Investment Board,
93 Idaho 217,458 P.2d 213 (19691, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically stated where funds
were being used to increase the earnings of the state, that was a predominant and public use, and
the credit clause was intended to preclude state action which aims to aid various private schemes.
Thus, where the funds are used to effectuate a broad public purpose, no violation of the crcdit
clause can be shown.
Certainly, public interests in Rexburg are beiiefittcd by the issuance of the revenue
allocation bonds for redevelopment. The proceeds fi-om these bonds will be used to finance the
acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing
facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and imnprovements; construction
and furnishing of a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for
soccer, football, baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements - all of
which clearly serve a public purpose. While those facilities will provide the incidental benefits
of stimulating and assisting private development, they clearly fulfill the valid public purpose of
eliminating urban deterioration, stimulating the local economy, and increasing the tax base for
the various taxing districts, all to the benefit of the taxpayers in the expanded urban area. The
Idaho Supreme Court has specifically upheld a redevelopment agency's authority to condemn
property on the grounds that a public use was served by the urban renewal plan. See Yick Kong,
94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). The same analysis should apply to the lending credit
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provisions of the constitution. Further discussion of the public purpose argument is included
within this memorandum, in the discussion of due process requirements.
4.

Authorities From Other Jurisdictions Uphold Revenue Alfocation Fiuaucin~
Under a Lending Credit Provision.

A number of jurisdictions have considered the constitutionality of revenue allocation
financing under constitutional provisions similar to Article 8 , $ 4 . Most of the courts have
upheld the revenue allocation financing laws under such provisions. See Denver Urban Renewal
Authority V. Byrne, 6 18 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); People Ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch,
403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980); In re Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988);
City ofDuluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986); CLty ofMinneapolis v. Wurtele,
291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); City ofSparlcs v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980); Meierhenry v.
City ofHuron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984); Metropolitan Development andHousing Agency v.
Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). A similar
challenge under Idaho's provisions should also withstand attack.
D.

The Issua~~ce
of Revenue Allocation Bonds Does Sot Viulate the Curistitutional
Kecluireme~ltof \'oter Approval for the Issuance of Debt
.-

Article 8, $ 3, of the Idaho Constitution states:
No county, city, board of education or school district, or other
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in
any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income
and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of twothirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof. . . .
Under settled Idaho law, voters must approve both general obligation bonds (secured by the full
faith and credit of the issuer) and revenue bonds (secured only by a pledge of a special fund)
issued by one of the enumerated governmental entities. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432,
670 P.2d 839 (1983), cert. denied, Chemical Bankv. Asson, 469 U.S. 870, 105 S.Ct. 219,
83 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984); Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32,129 P. 643 (1912); City of
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388 (2006). Revenue allocation bond financing by the
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Agency raises two categories of issues under Article 8, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution:
(1) whelhcr bonds payable from and secured by incremental tax revenues constitute
"indebtedness" or "liability"; and, if so, (2) whether the Agency is one of the enumerated
governmental entities.
1.

Revenue Allocation Bonds Do Sot Constitute "Indebtedness" or "Liability"
for P~~rposes
of Article 8 , s 3, of the ldaho Constitution. Additionally, the
Bonds Are Sot a Pledee of Ad Valorem Taxes for the Payment of Such
Indebtedness.

hi Asson v. City ofBurley, 105 Idaho 432,670 P.2d 839 (19?Y3),cevt. denied, the Idaho
Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing rejection of the "special fund" doctrine. Adopted in
the majority of other jurisdictions, that doctrine holds that "a municipality does not contract
indebtedness or incur liability, within the constitutional limitation, by undertaking an obligation
which is to be paid out of a special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the
property purchased or constructed." Asson, 105 Idaho at 438. Consequently, even though
revenue allocation bonds would be payable solely out of a "special fund" funded by incremental
tax revenues attributable to appreciation in value of the tax base due to the improvements
financed by the bond proceeds, the special fund doctrine apparently will not immunize such
bonds from classification as "indebtedness" or "liability" for purposes of Article 8, 5 3.
Absent the special fund doctrine, there appears to be a split of authority among
jurisdictions on the issue of whether obligations issued in conjunction with tax increment
financing are "debts" within constitutional confines. See generally Oklahoma City Urban
Renewal Authority v. Medical Technology and Research Authority ofOklahoma, 4 P.3d 677,688

(Okla. 2000),
There is a line of case law which supports the proposition that revenue allocation bonds
do not fall within the constitutional terms of "indebtedness" or "liability." For example, in South
Bend Public Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981):

Appellants further argue that the tax allocation bonds do constitute
debt within the meaning of Article 13, Section 1 of the Indiana
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Constitution since they ultimately involve the general taxing power
of the municipality. A careful study of the law negates this analysis.
The Redevelopment Commission can only apply incremental tax
revenues which are attributable to increases in the assessed value of
taxable property in the Allocation Area to the repayment of the bonds.
If the value of property does not increase, the bonds will not be
repaid. Therefore, the original taxing power of the municipality will
not be changed.

Id at 221 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court specifically relied upon the provisions of
the revenue allocation statute in making a determination that a debt was not created by the
financing mechanism.
The Act specifically provides that the bonds and other
obligations of the agency are not a debt or obligation of the
community (which is defined in the Act as a city, county or
combination ofthe two), thestate, or any of its political subdivisions.
In addition, the enabling statute, the proposed bond resolution, the
proposed bond form, and the city ordinance ofratification all prohibit
the use of credit of the city for the repayment of the bonded
indebtedness. The bondholders can look only to revenues from the
operation of the facility and the allocated taxes, for retirement of the
bond obligation. Under the subject statute, providing for this
arrangement, there can be no city debt created contrary to
Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4; nor can there be a lending of the city's
credit in contravention of Article VI, Scction 29.
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah 1975) (footnotes omitted)

Idaho's revenue allocation financing statute contains provisions very similar to those
addressed by the court in Tribe. For example, Idaho's statute specifically indicates the credit of
the city is not available for repayment of the bond. Idaho Code 9 50-2910. Under Idaho's
provisions, as in Utah's provisions, the bondholders may look only to revenues from the
operation of the facility and the allocated taxes for retirement of the bond obligation
Consequently, Idaho's revenue allocation statute does not provide for a "debt" within the
meaning of the constitutional limitations in Article 8, 9 3.
Other courts, however, have reached a different conclusion. In City of Tucson v. Corbin,
623 P.2d 1239, 1243-44 (Ariz. 1981), the Arizona statute empowered the &, not a
redevelopment agency, to implement a revenue allocation financing program for redevelopment
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purposes. The court acknowledged that "the city's general funds would not be liable even in the
event that no incremental tax revenues are ever collected." Id. at 1243. Nevertheless, the court
found the bonds to be invalid.
The key constitutional infirmity in Arizona's tax increment
statutes is that they allow the pledge of proceeds from ad valorem
taxation to pay off municipal property tax increment bonds. Even
though the incremental tax revenues are placed into a special fund,
the special fund doctrine does not remove these bonds &om the
category of obligations which must be approved by the voters under
our constitution.
Id. at 1243. The Arizona court cited State, ex rel. Washington State Finance Committee v.
Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963).
If the revenues in [a special fund] derive exclusively from the
operation of the device or organ of goverment financed by the fund,
as in the case of a toll bridge, or the operation of the State Liquor
Control Board, or from the sales or leases of publicly owned lands,
any securities issued solely upon the credit of the fund are not debts
of the state, but debts of the fund only. But if the state undertakes or
agrees to provide any part of the k n d from any general tax, be it
excise or ad valorem, then securities issued upon the credit of the
fund are likewise issued upon the credit of the state and are in truth
debts of the state.
Id. at 842. The court also cites similar holdings in Keutucky, Miller v. Covipzgton Development
Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976), and in Iowa, Richards v. City ofMuscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48,
64 (Iowa 1975)
Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida receded from precedent and held tax-increment
financed bonds constitute long-term debt requiring approval by referendum as mandated by the
Florida Constitution. Strand v. Escambia County, 2007 WI, 2492294,4 (Fla. 2007). In Strand,
t h e m , not a redevelopment agency, adopted an ordinance establishing the Southwest
Escambia Improvement District and the Southwest Escarnbia Improvement Trust Fund,
authorizing the use of tax increment financing to fund the trust. Id. at 1. Additionally, the
county adopted a resolution authorizing the county to issue bonds not exceeding $135,000,000
for the purpose of financing a four lane road-widening project. Id. The bonds were to reach
maturity no later than 35 years after revenues are first deposited into the trust fund. Id.
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The county filed a Complaint for Validation seeking validation of the bond issuance. Id.
at 2. Dr. Strand intervened. Id. The circuit court entered final judgment validating the bond
issuance, concluding that the county had authority to issue the subject bonds without first
obtaining approval by referendum mandated by article VII, section 12 of the Florida Constitution

Id. Dr. Strand appealed the final judgment. Id. at 3.
The Supreme Court of Florida had previously held that tax increment financed bonds
were not subject to the Constitutional referendum requirement based on the premise that the
Constitutional language 'payable from ad valorem taxation" referred only to the pledge of ad
valorem taxingpower, not to the pledge of ad valorem tax revenues. Id. at 3 . Upon review of
the language in article VII, section 12 of the Constitution and the facts of the case, the Court
concluded that there was no support for the distinction made between the pledge of taxing power
and the pledge of tax revenues. The Court stated:
In contrast, Escarnbia County plans to issue bonds to finance the widening of a
road, a typical county capital project. And, unlike Miami Beach, the only primary
funding to service the bonds is ad valorem tax revenues. The County would only
appropriate revenues from secondary, non-ad valorem sources if the tax increment
revenues are insufficient to service the bond debt. In effect, the County wants to
pledge revenue from ad valorem taxation for thirty-five years as the primary
source of funding a road improvement project without the consent of the
electorate. We are concerned that allowing this would abrogate the referendum
requirement of article VII, section 12 for long-term debt and render meaningless
the phrase "payable from ad valorem taxation." It also appears that such a result
would violate the purpose of this constitutional restraint on the power of local
governments to incur long-term debt.

Id. at 5 .
The Court appeared concerned that in the case before it, the county was attempting to do
indirectly that which it could not do directly: attempting to indirectly pledge ad valorem taxation
for the repayment of long-term bonds used to finance a capital project. Id. The Court held:
[Tlhe phrase "payable from ad valorem taxation" in article VII, section 12 refers
not only to a pledge of the taxing power itself but also to a pledge of ad valorem
tax revenues. And, because tax increment financing pledges funds obtained from
ad valorem tax revenues, bonds that rely upon such financing schemes are bonds
"payable from ad valorem taxation." Consequently, approval of such bonds by
referendum, as mandated by article VII, section 12, must be obtained.

Id. at 4.
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held tax increment bonds issued to finance an economic
development project were debts within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution because they
attempted to bind future legislative bodies to make apportionments through a clear promise that
the payments would continue for a period up to twenty five-years. Oklahoma City Urban
Renewal Authority v. Medical Technology and Research Authority of Oklahoma, 4 P.3d 677,687
(Okla. 2000). In response to the Court's decision, the Oklahoma legislature amended the Local
Development Act providing that it was the intent of the Legislature in adopting the Local
Development Act that no long-term contractual obligation be created by the mere adoption of an
ordinance or resolution establishing an increment district, and that such ordinance or resolution
constituted a legislative act that could be repealed, modified, or amended at any time during the
term of the district by subsequent action of the governing body. In re Application of Oklahoma
Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 87,89-90 (Okla. 2004). Since then, the Oklahoma
Court has held that tax increment districts do not violate the constitutional provisions on
municipal debt. See, In re Application of Oklahoma Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d
87,89-90 (Okla. 2004); Hawey v. City of Oklahoma City, 111 P.3d 239 (Okla. 2005); City of
Guymon v. Butler, 92 P.3d 80 (Okla. 2004).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the development authority was
the sole entity liable for repayment of the bonds, not the city. In re Application of Oklahoma
Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 87,94 (Okla. 2004). The Court held that the
development authority was a "public trust7'and that previous decisions of the Court had held that
the indebtedness by the issuance of revenue bonds under a public trust was the indebtedness of
the trust, not the city. Therefore, the public trust did not violate the municipal debt provisions of
the Oklahoma Constitution and was not subject to the constitutional requirements of voter
approval. Id. at 94-95. See, Grimes v. City of Oklahoma City, 49 P.3d 719,726-727 (Okla 2002);
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Arthur v. City of Stillwater, 61 1 P.2d 637,641 (Okla. 1980). See also, Morris v. City of
Oklahoma City, 299 P.2d 131, 136-137 (Okla. 1956).
The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that urban renewal agencies are not one of the
governmental entities enumerated in Article VIII, 9 3 of the Idaho Constitution. See Boise
Redevelopment Agency v. YickKong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 881-882,499 P.2d 575 (1972).
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho case law, the issuance of tax increment revenue bonds by an urban
renewal agency cannot constitute a debt subject to voter approval under Article VIII,

5 3. Based

on the Court's decision in Yick Kong, this Court does not need to engage in an analysis of
whether the issuance of such bonds constitutes a "debt" requiring voter approval because the
Agency is not subject to the voter approval requirements of Article VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho
Constitution.
The decisions by the Courts in Florida and Arizona are distinguishable because in each
case the entity issuing the bonds was subject to the voter approval requirements of their state
constitutions; therefore, the only remaining issue was whether such bonds were debts of a
municipality requiring voter approva1. As noted above, Supreme Court of Idaho precedent has
held that the Agency is not an enumerated entity subject to the voter approval requirements under
Article VIII, 8 3.
The rationale for determining that the Agency is not the alter ego of the municipality is
based upon the idea that the Agency cannot use the city taxing power for the repayment of bond
obligations under the Idaho statute and the fact that it is the Agency that is responsible to repay
the bonds, not the city or county. Additionally, the Court's decision in Yick Kong, holding the
Agency was not the alter ego of Boise City, was predicated on its finding that the degree of the
city's contro1,overthe Agency did not compromise the Agency's independence. In that case, the
Court found the municipality and the entity to be separate and distinct. Consequently, revenue
allocation bonds issued under the Idaho redevelopment statute cannot be deemed to be debts of a
municipality, and thus the statute does not violate Article 8, 8 3.
nmnnu
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2.

'The Agencv 1s Not 811 Enumerated Guvel.nmeutal Entitv Forbidden From
Issuing Debt \\'ithoot \'oter Approval.

Resolution of the issue of whether the Agency is a political subdivision subject to the
constitutional requirements of voter approval rests on an analysis of whether the Agcncy is an
"alter ego" of the municipality. Analysis of the alter ego issue must be undertaken both in
connection with the voter approval provision and the lending credit provision. This alter ego
issue was specifically addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Redevelopment Agency v.
Yick Kong Corporation. The action was brought by the Agency to condemn Yick Kong
Corporation's property for urban renewal purposes. The condemnee challenged the
constitutionality of the law, the validity of the Agency sought to be crcated by the statute, and the
ability of the Agency to operate under the authority granted by that statute. Yick Kong, 94 Idaho
at 877. In particular, even though no revenue bonds were to be issued to finance the
condemnation, the condemnee contended that the Agency's "authorized activities, insofar as the
issuance of revenue bonds without the consent of the electorate was concerned, violate[d]
Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution." Id. at 880. The condemnee contended that the
Agency was subject to the constitutional voter approval requirement, either because the Agency
was the "alter ego" of the city of Boise or because the Agency was itself a "subdivision of the
state."
The Idaho Supreme Court held the Agency was not the alter ego of the City of Boise,
even though (1) the city had to make a finding of a deteriorated area before the redevelopment
agency could exercise any of its power; (2) the Boise mayor and city council appointed the
Agency's commissioners; and (3) the Boise mayor and city council had the power to remove thc
commissioners. The court reasoned that "while the particular city may trigger the existence of
the [redevelopment agency], it cannot control its power or operations." Id. at 881. The court
reasoned further that the appointment procedures did not cause inherent control in the city, and
the removal procedures were not arbitrary or solely in the discretion of the city. Under the
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statute, removal could only occur after a hearing and only for inefficiencyor neglect o f duty or
misconduct in office. The court concluded the legislature intended only to allow a local voice in
the selection of the commissioners, and "the degree of control exercised by the city o f Boise does
not usurp the powers and duties o f the [Agency]. The close association between the two entities
at most shows two independent public entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes." Id.
at 882. The court noted "[tlhereis no attack upon the integrity or independence o f the
commissioners . . . ." Id. The court's decision the Agency was not the alter ego o f Boise City
was predicated, therefore,on its finding the degree o f the city's control over the Agency did not
compromise the Agency's independence.
The facts concerning the existing relationship between the Agency and the city o f
Rexburg now vary only slightly from the facts discussed in Yick Kong. At the time Yick Kong
was decided, the law prohibited any member o f the city council fiom sitting on the board o f
directors of the redevelopment agency. Since Yick Kong was decided, however, $ 50-2006 o f the
law was specifically amended to allow a city council to terminate an existing agency board
without cause and to designate itself as the agency board, during which time the board would
operate, according to the statue, as an "arm o f the state government, entirely separate and
distinct from the municipality. . . ." Idaho Code 8 50-2006(b)(2).In 1986, the law was again
amended to eliminate a conflict o f interest provision which had previously prohibited city council
members from sitting on the board. The city retains its statutory power to appoint other council
members to the Board, as well as its power to designate the City Council as the Board, and
thereby cause the Board to operate as an "arm o f the state government." Id. At the time the
Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was adopted by Resolution o f the Ageucy,
one Rexburg City Council member and the Mayor o f Rexburg sat on the Agency Board. (Coy
Aff., 7 5.) The Agency Board consists of a total o f nine ( 9 ) members. At present, one Rexburg
City Council member and the Mayor o f Rexburg sit on the Agency Board. (Coy Aff.,7 6.)
However, the city o f Rexburg has decreed that it will not exercise its power to designate itself as
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the Agency Board so long as Agency Bonds are outstanding even though Idaho Code
(i 50-2006@)(2)would allow such appointment. (Coy Aff., 7 7.) (See also Ex. 12.)

The principles of Yick Kong remain viable. The Agency and the city remain completely
separate entities, with separate governing bodies and separate functions. The city, by express
acceptance, remains unable to "control [Agency] power or operations." Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at
880 (See also Ex. 12.) Although there remains an association between the two entities and there
is cooperation between them, the association "at most shows two independent public entities
closely cooperating for valid public purposes." Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 881; see also Idaho Code
(i 50-2015.

Relying on Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941),
the court in Yick Kong further held the Agency was not a "subdivision of the statc" within the
meaning of Article 8, (i 3 or 4, of the Idaho Constitution. In Lloyd, the court evaluated the
constitutionalityof the Housing Authorities Act and the legality of Housing Authority bonds
payable from and secured by housing project revenues and United States Government grants.
Like the Law, the Housing Authorities Act did not permit the Authority to levy or collect a tax.
The court held that the Authority "was not a county, city, town, township, board of education, or
school district or other subdivision of the state, within the meaning of Article 8, 5 3, of the
Constitution, and the prohibition expressed in that section does not apply to it." Lloyd, 62 Idaho
at 598. The court reached this conclusion because liability for repayment of the bonds issued by
the Authority was limited to funds derived exclusively from income and revenues of the housing
projects or grants and contributions from the federal government. The Lloyd court, inter alia,
relied on State v. State Board ofEducation, 56 Idaho 210,215,52 P.2d 141, 143 (1935), which
reasoned that a 30-year loan from the United State Government, payable froin revenues arising
from operation of an infirmary constructed with loan proceeds, was not subject to Article 8, (i 3,
because the Board of Regents did not have any taxing power; could not collect or levy taxes of
any kind; and were not representatives of the municipality, territory, subdivision, or taxing unit
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of the state. The regents were merely the managers and corporate representatives of an
educational institution, which was dependent on state and federal appropriations and private
donations for its finances and operating expenses. See Lloyd, 62 Idaho at 600.
Analogizing to the Housing Authority in Lloyd, the Yiclc Kong court noted the Agency
had "no powers of taxation, and therefore, the provisions of Article 8, 9 3, do not apply." Yick
Kong, 94 Idaho at 882-83. The court also noted the Agency "has no ability to actually encumber

any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property
holdings." Id. at 883. Thus, pursuant to the authority of Yick Kong, the Agency is not a
subdivision of the stale, and voter approval provisions are inapplicable.
Voter approval provisions would be applicable to any city, county, or other entity
enumerated in the constitution which secks to use revenue allocation financing. At the present
time the legislature has chosen to allow only urban renewal agencies the option of such a
financing mechanism. This was a legislative judgment and one which should be respected in the
absence of a clear constitutional violation.
3.

'The Suureme Court of Idaho's Dccision In Citv ofBoise v. k'ruzic.r Does Xot
Applv to the Agencv's lssuancr of Revenue Allocation Bonds.

The Supreme Court of Idaho recently construed the "ordinary a ~ necessa~y"
d
clause of
Article VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution. City ofBoise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388
(2006). InFrazier, the city petitioned for judicial confirmation to permit it to incur debt to

finance expansion of the airport parking facilities without a public vote. Id. Mr. Frazier
intervened. Id. The district court held the expansion was an ordinary and necessary expense
which did not require a public vote. Id. Mr. Frazier appealed. Id. The Supreme Court held
while the expansion of parking facilities was an "ordinary" expense, it was not a "necessary"
expense, therefore requiring voter approval. Id. at 392.
As previously noted, article VIII, 9 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally bars the
enumerated entities froin incurring debts or liabilities without voter approval unless the proposed
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undertaking is for an "ordinary and necessary" expense. Id. at 389-390. The Court engaged in an
analysis regarding whether the city's proposed project was an "ordinary and necessary" expense,
concluding the expenditure did not qualify as a "nccessary" expense. Id. at 391-392.
In this case, the Agency is not petitioning for judicial confirmation based upon the
"ordinary and necessary" clause o f article VIII, 5 3. In fact, the "ordinary and necessary" clause
is not applicable to the Agency. As mentioned above, the Agency is not a political subdivision
subject to the constitutional requirements o f voter approval (see Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 882.);
therefore, the "ordinary and necessary" proviso clause does not apply to the Agency.
Furthermore, Idaho's revenue allocation statute does not provide for a "debt" within the meaning
o f the constitutional limitations in article VIII, 5 3. Therefore,the Agency revenue allocation
bonds do not constitute "indebtedness" or "liability" under the Constitution. Consequently, the
decision in Frazier is dlstinguishable from the facts o f this case.
E.

The Urban Renewal Law Does Not Unlawfnllv Delegate Taxing Power.

Another potential constitutional challenge is the concept o f delegation o f legislative
authority. Under Article 3, 5 1, o f the Idaho Constitution, all legislative power is vested in the
Senate and House o f Representatives. In order to delegate that legislative authority, the
particular delegation must contain a meaningful standard. See Greater Boise Auditorium
District v. Royal Inn ofBoise, 106 Idaho 884,784 P.2d 296 (1984).

The Act does not violate this constitutioiional provision for several reasons. First, the
power o f the Agency itself is merely to collect tax increments from the taxing district themselves
and expend those funds for specified purposes. Thus, the Agency is not vested with any
legislative authority to affectthe taxing power o f rcsidents within the district. It is the districts
themselves who retain that authority. Consequently, any delegation problem must be addressed
to the taxing districts themselves. In Sun Valley Company v. City of Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424,
708 P.2d 147 (1985),the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the delegation issue with regard to the
legislature's enactment o f a resort tax provision allowing resort cities to impose excise taxes in
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the form of a tax on hotel and motel rooins and liquor by the drink. The court interpreted
Article 7, $ 6, of the Idaho Constitution as permitting the legislature to invest municipal
corporations with the authority to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporations.
Sun Valley Co., 109 Idaho at 426-27. Consequently, pursuant to the supreme court's
interpretation, revenue allocation funds may be transferred to the Agency for use for urban
renewal purposes.
Further, in Sun Valley Company, the supreme court determined the delegation doctrine
only serves to limit delegation of legislative authority to the executive or judicial branches. See
Sun Valley Co., 109 Idaho at 427. Consequently, delegation to a legislative branch, such as a city
council, does not violate the delegation doctrine.
Finally, the supreme court ruled the nondelegation doctrine is a doctrine of administrative
law and not precisely applicable to a case where a municipal entity is vested with the power of
taxation. Id. at 428. Consequently, pursuant to the authority of Sun Valley Company, the
nondelegation doctrille would not operate to invalidate any provision of the Act or Law.

F.

The Act and Law Do Not Violate the Due Process Rights of Tax~aversin the State
of Idaho.

There is a general requirement that the expenditure of public funds must be made only
where the funds are expended for a public purpose. In Idaho this requirement arises from the due
process provision of the Idaho constitution. Idaho Water Resources Board v. Kramer,
97 Idaho 535,548 P.2d 35 (1976).

In this case the legislature has made a determination the use of revenue allocation
financing is necessary to fund redevelopment in the State of Idaho. In addition, the legislature
has specifically made findings that redevelopment, the elimination of urban deterioration, and
stimulation of economic activity are public purposes. Many courts have ruled legislative findings
that funds are being expended for a public purpose will cany great weight. Wilmington Parking
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Authority v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954). Downtown redevelopment has been identified
as a public purpose in many eminent domain cases.
At least two courts have suggested that the redevelopment of
downtown areas, in and of itself, is a public use or public purpose in
the same way that the renewal of slums is a public use. In State v.
Coghill the Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld the city of
Charlestown's plan to lease private commercial space in a publicly
owned parking garage and expressly noted that revitalization of the
city's downtown was a public purpose. The court stated,
Certainly the creation of aesthetically appealing,
convei~ient,and efficient downtown urban centers is a public
purpose and may be considered in determiningthe validity of
a particular parhlg facility. The development of modern
urban centers with open spaces, fountains, and malls in which
people may gather and enjoy an enhanced social and
intellectual life is a public purpose.
More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Paley upheld
a local government's issuance of bonds to be used to acquire
property-by condemnation if necessary--for resale to private
downtown developers. The target area was blighted, and therefore,
the court relied on earlier cases upholding urban renewal in reaching
its decision. The Illinois court, however, did not end its analysis with
an analogy to the urban renewal cases; rather, the court went on to
express its belief that redevelopment of the downtown area was
justifiedbecause downtown redevelopment itselfis apublic purpose:
[Tlhe city's determination to promote the commercial rebirth
of its downtown area is a public purpose. . . . In so holding,
today's decision notes that the application of the publicoumose doctrine to sanction urban redevelovment can no
iongerberesrricted to areas where cnmc, vacancy, or physical
decay produce undesirable livi~lgcunditionsor imperil public
health. Stin~ulationof comlnersial growvth and rcmoval of
economic stagnation are also objectives which enhance the
public weal.
Lawrence, Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in Downtown Development
Projects, 35 VAND.L.REV. 293-94 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
Redevelopment projects are also favored in that they: (1) ease the financial burden of city
govemment; (2) encourage the use of existing city facilities; (3) assist in society's efforts to
conserve energy by concentrating redevelopment in a downtown core; and (4) enhance a
municipality's ability to provide a suitable living environment.
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One objective of these proiects is to ease the financial burden of city
povemment. New downtown develovment, of course. will add to tax
base: the same value. however, also would be added if the
development occurred on the citv's fringe, as long as it was still
within the city limits. More important, the city's service
infrastructure, especiallythe streets and utilities, is already in place in
the downtown area; the same inay not be true, however, for a new
development elsewhere in the city, and thus the city government
might have to build new streets or extend utility lines to the areas
where the development is occurring. Downtown development, then,
encourages the use of existing city facilities rather than requiring
construction ot'new ones. Thus, a city's encv~ragem?~il
ofdo\vntc~,n
projects at least to some cxtent reflects only its careful strwardship of
limited public resources. .
A second goal of downtown develovment is to assist in
societv's efforts to conserve energy. If gasoline prices increase
further, the use of public transportation undoubtedly will become an
increasingly important conservation strategy;
Downtown
development uniquely supports this strategy because the downtown
area is the hub of existing public transportation systems and will
continue to occupy that position if these systems expand because of
shortages of energy supply. Indeed, one definitional characteristic of
a "downtown" inay be that it lies at the center of the city's public
transportation system. Furthermore, high density, large-scale
developments-which
characterize the typical downtown
project-are more energy-efficient than smaller, detached buildings
that house the same activities. Moreover, if downtown development
draws developers to the inner city and away from its fi-inges, the city
perhaps could avoid losing some of the producing farmland at the
city's edge to other uses.
A third goal of downtown develovment is to enhance the
cauacitv of a varticular municivalitv to generate those attributes that
make cities exciting to their citizens and valuable to the community
at.
These attributes-cultural institutions, highly specialized
commercial enterprises, and the capacity to generate the new small
businesses that are the primaty source of new jobs in our
economy-are the things that distinguish cities from other forms of
community organization. Most scholars would agree that cultural
institutions and specialized commercial enterprises will prosper only
in cities of significant size and density. Moreover, considerable
evidence supports the proposition that cities are more effective as
settings for new, job-creating enterprises when they are large and
development is dense. Thus, as cities decentralize, they are less likely
to perform this characteristic community role. Downtown
redevelopment will not itself reverse decentralization, of course, but
it clearly is a necessary component of such a reversal.
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Lawrence, ConstitutionalLimitations on Governmental Participation in Downtown Development
Projects, 35 VAND.L.REV.293-97 (1982) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

Given that all of these public purposes are served by redevelopment of the North
Highway, South Addition Area of the city of Rexburg by the Agency, the due process rights of
taxpayers are not violated by use of public funds for a private purpose.

.

Use of Re\~enueAJlocation Financing Docs Sot Impair Existing Contracts in
Violatior1 of Article 1.6 16. of the ldahqConstitution.

Article 1, 5 16, of the Idaho Constitution bars the enactment of any state law which would
impair the obligation of contracts. This restriction applies to municipalities as well as to the
state. City ofHayden v. Washington Water Power Company, 108 Idaho 467,700 P.2d 89
(Ct.App. 1985). Where taxing districts within or overlapping the revenue allocation area have
issued general obligation bonds, it is very likely that these bonds have been secured by a pledge
of property tax revenues. Purchasers of those honds likely anticipated that unless the taxing
district issued additional general obligation bonds, following approval by the voters, property tax
revenues collected by the district would be available to pay the debt service on such honds.
Revenue allocation financing may arguably make a portion of these available property tax
revenues unavailable to pay the debt service on the older general obligation debt bonds. Thus the
question is whether adoption of revenue allocation financing or the issuance of revenue
allocation financing honds by the petitioner would constitute an impairment of contracts in
violation of the Idaho Constitution.
This argument has been presented and rejected by the courts of a number of different
states evaluating similar revenue allocation financing statutes. InSouth Bend Public
Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981), the court

reasoned:
The same general tax revenues previously available to the other
taxing districts will likewise be available after the plan is operative.
The portion of the tax revenues allocated to the Department
represents an amount generated as a result of increased property
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valuation due to the redevelopment project. Therefore, since the
other taxing districts have not lost the benefit o f any tax revenues
which would have otherwise been available, no impairment o f
contracts has occurred.
Id. at 225. Courts in South Carolina and Florida have reached the same conclusions. Wolper v.
City Council of the City of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d. 871 (S.C. 1985);Kelson v. City ofPensacola,

483 So.2d 77 (Fla.App. 1986).
The same analysis is applicable to revenue allocation financing within the state o f Idaho.
Consequently, the issuance o f such revenue allocation financing bonds does not impair contracts
in violation o f the Idaho Constitution.
VII.
EVEN IF A PORTION OF THE STATUTE IS L'NCONSTITL'TIOSAI.,
THE OFFEN1)INC; PORTIOSS ARE SEI'ERABLE

The provisions o f the Act indicate the Legislature's strong desire that the local economic
development statutes remain intact despite any potential constitutional problems. Idaho Code
$ 50-2912 states that the provisions o f the Act are severable, and i f any portion is declared

invalid, such invalidity does not affect the remaining portions o f the statute. Consequently,
should this court find any portion o f the Act invalid, that portion should be excised and the
remainder validated.

THE TAXES PAID TO THE AGENCY ARE NOT TAXES "IMPOSED" BY
THE LEGISLATURE FOR A "CITY PURPOSE," IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 7,9 6, OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION
'

Article 7 , 9: 6 , o f the Idaho constitution provides the legislature shall not "impose taxes"

for a "city purpose":
The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose o f any county,
city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in
the corporate authorities thereof,respectively, the power to assess and
collect taxes for all purposes o f such corporation.
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It can be argued that urban renewal is a "city purpose," and by enacting the Act, the legislature
bas "imposed taxes" for a "city purpose" in violation of Article 7, $ 6. Urban renewal, however,
is not only a "city purpose," but is also a "statewide concern" and therefore is a legitimate area
for state legislation. See Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 879-80; Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, although under the Act the taxes collected by Madison
County on the incremental value of property within the revenue allocation area are paid by
Madison County to the Agency, before that could happen the city of Rexburg had to make certain
tindings, take certain organizational steps, and adopt an authorizing ordinance. See Idaho Code
$$ 50-2005, 50-2006,50-2904 through 50-2907. Therefore, because the levy of taxes for the

Agency is not self-executing under the Act (i.e., the city had the option of not taking the
prerequisite steps), the Legislature has not "imposed" taxes within the meaning of Article 7, $ 6.

IX.

Article 7, $ 7, of the Idaho Constitution provides that no "property [in a county, city,
town, or other municipal corporation] shall be released or discharged from . . . its proportionate
share of taxes to be levied for state purposes":
All taxes levied for state purposes shall be paid into the state treasu~y,
and no county, city, town or other municipal corporation, the
inhabitants thereof, nor the property therein, shall be released or
discharged from their or its proportionate share of taxes to be levied
for state purposes.
The state is authorized to levy an ad valorem tax on real property within the state. Idaho Const.
Art. 7, $9; Idaho Code $ 63-61 1. Arguably the foregoing language requires that an ad valorem
tax levied for state purposes be levied against the full value of property in each "county, city,
town or other municipal corporation," and to divert the state's portion of that ad valorem tax on
the incremental value of property in the redevelopment area to the Agency "releases" or
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"discharges" that property kom part of its "proportionate share" of taxes to be levied for state
purposes in violation of Article 7, 5 7. However, under a plain reading of the foregoing
language, Article 7, 5 7, only prohibits the "release" or "discharge" of a tax levied for state
purposes after it has been levied and does not prohibit the legislature from excluding a portion of
the full value of property within a revenue allocation area from the value against which the state
tax is levied.

THE AMOUNT OF TAX THE AGENCY WILL RECEIVE
UNDER THE ACT BEARS A RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP
TO THE BENEFIT RECEIVED BY THE TAXPAYER
There is a rule of constitutional dimension requiring a rational relationship between the
amount of tax that is levied and the corresponding benefit that is received by the taxpayer.
Bothwell v. Salt Lake County Drainage Dist. No. 2,39 P.2d 737 (Utah 1935). This rule is likely

rooted in either the due process clause (Article 1, $ 13, of the Idaho Constitution; Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution) andlor the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation (Article 1, 5 14, of the Idaho Constitution provides that
"[plrivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation . . . shall be
paid therefore"; the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation").
Under the Act the Agency does not set its own tax rate. Instead, the Agency's tax rate is
equal to the cumulative total of the tax rates of each taxing district in which the revenue
allocation area is located. Idaho Code $ 50-2908. Therefore, the Agency's tax rate is determined
solely by the rates that those taxing districts decide to levy in any given year and, arguably, bears
no rational relationship to the benefits received by the revenue allocation area. However, since
all of the tax monies received by the Agency which are not used by the Agency for the benefit of
the revenue allocation area will eventually be returned to the taxing entities that would have
otherwise received them (see Idalto Code $ 50-2909(4)), the taxpayers will eventually receive the
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benefit of all of the taxes that they have paid, and the foregoing rule is not violated. See
Bothwell, 39 P.2d at 741.

XI.
THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE
OTHER TAXING DISTRICTS THAT PROVIDE SERVICES T O THE AREA
IMPROVED BY THE PROPOSED REVENUE ALLOCATION FINANCING
As discussed earlier, Article 1,s 13, of the Idaho Constitution contains the due process
clause. The due process clause has been interpreted to require a public purpose he demonstrated
whenever public funds are expended, thus protecting the rights of the public at large. See Idaho
Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976). Arguably, under the Act,
tax revenues are being "diverted" from other taxing entities to the Agency. Generally, as long as
the process provides meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to appear, the guarantees
provided under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions will have been discharged. See
Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112,666 P.2d 639 (1983).
The public objectives of tax increment have been accepted by numerous courts in many
jurisdictions. See Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financing, 19 Washburn
L.J. 536 (1980). The process by which an Idaho municipality can adopt a revenue allocation
project within an urban renewal plan is specifically defined within the Act.
The City Council must enact an ordinance in accordance with chapter 9, title 50, Idaho
Code, and conduct a public hearing as provided in $50-2008(c), Idaho Code. The city must also
prepare a notice stating:
(a) that an urban renewal plan or modification thereto . . . has been
proposed and is being considered for adoption, and that such plan or
modification thereto . . . contains a revenue allocation financing
provision that will cause property taxes resulting from any increases
in equalized assessed valuation in excess of the equalized assessed
valuation as shown on the base assessment roll to be allocated to the
agency for urban renewal . . . purposes; and . . . (c) that a public
hearing on such plan or modification will be held by the local
governing body pursuant to section 50-2008(c), Idaho Code. The
notice shall also state the time, date, and place of the hearing. . . .
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Idaho Code 5 50-2906(3).

In addition to the general notice requirements, the Agency and municipality must ensure
other taxing entities are provided additional notice. The taxing entities are given additional
specific notice of the plan and the public hearing before the City Council.
At least thirty (30) days but not more than sixty (60) days prior to the
date set for final reading of the ordinance, the local governing body
shall publish the notice in a newspaper of general circulation and
transmit the notice . . to the governing body of each taxing district
which levies taxes upon any taxable property in the revenue
allocation area and which would be affected by the revenue allocation
financing provision of the urban renewal plan proposed to be
approved by the local governing body.

.

Idaho Code 5 50-2906(3).
These mandatory notice requirements were discharged by the City of Rexburg and the
Agency, thus providing the taxing entities with meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity
to appear. The taxing entities were provided written notice of the hearing date before the City
Council. (Exs. 13 and 14.) The due process requirements of the Idaho Constitution have been
adequately met. See Glengmy-Gamlin Protective Association v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 675 P.2d
344 (Ct.App. 1983); Gay v. County Commissioners, 103 Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App.

XII.
THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED FOR THE PROJECT CONSTITUTE
PUBLIC ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE ACT AND LAW
As stated elsewhere in this memorandum, an urban renewal project was deemed a
legitimate public purpose in the case of Yick Kong v. BRA. (See discussion on pages 37-38,
supra and pages 60-62, inpa.) The specific activities authorized under Resolution No. 2007-4
and defined as the Project under 8 2.1 of the Resolution consist primarily of traditional public
facilities for a public purpose. (Ex. 12.) Both the Act and Law provide specific definitions of
authorized activities, facilities, and project.
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The Law defines the powers of an agency as follows:
50-2007. Powers.-Every urban renewal agency shall have
all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuatethe
purposes and provisions o f this act, including the following powers
in addition to others herein granted:

(a) to undertake and carry out urban renewal projects and
related activities within its area of operation;and to make and execute
contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the
exercise o f its powers under this act; and to disseminate slum
clearance and urban renewal information;
to provide or to arrange or contract for the furnishing
(b)
or repair by any person or agency, public or private, o f services,
privileges, works, streets, roads, public utilities or other facilities for
or in connection with an urban renewal project; to install, construct,
and reconstruct streets,utilities,parks, playgrounds, off-streetparking
facilities, public facilities, other buildings or public improvements;
and any improvements necessary or incidental to a redevelopment
project; and to a&Teeto any conditions that it may deem reasonable
and appropriate attached to federal financial assistance and imposed
pursuant to federal law relating to the determination o f prevailing
salaries or wages or compliance with labor standards, in the
undertaking or carrying out o f an urban renewal project and related
activities, and to include in any contract let in connection with such
a project and related activities, provisions to klfill such o f said
conditions as it may deem reasonable and appropriate; . . .
An urban renewal project is defined under the Law as follows:
(10) "Urban Renewal project" may include undertakings
and activities o f a municipality in an urban renewal area for the
elimination of deteriorated or deteriorating areas and for the
prevention o fthe development or spread o f slums and blight, and may
involve slum clearance and redevelopment in anurban renewal area,
or rehabilitation or conservation in an urban renewal area, or any
combination or part thereof in accordance with an urban renewal
plan. Such undertakings and activities may include:

Acquisition o f a deteriorated area or a deteriorating
(a)
area or portion thereof;
(b)
Demolition and
improvements;

removal

o f buildings and

Installation, construction or reconstruction o f streets,
(c)
utilities, parks, playgrounds, off-street parking facilities, public
facilities or build~ngsand other improvements necessary for carrying
out in the urban renewal area the urban renewal objectives o f this act
in accordance with the urban renewal plan;
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Disposition of any property acquired in the urban
(d)
renewal area; including sale, initial leasing or retention by the agency
itself, at its fair value for uses in accordance with the urban renewal
plan except for disposition of property to another public body;
Carrying out plans for a program of voluntary or
(e)
compulsory repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other
improvements in accordance with the urban renewal plan;
Acquisition of real property in the urban renewal area
(f)
which, under the urban renewal plan, is to be repaired or rehabilitated
for dwelling use or related facilities, repair or rehabilitation of the
structures for guidance purposes, and resale of the property;
Acquisition of any other real property in the urban
(g)
renewal area where necessary to eliminate unhealthful, insanitary or
unsafe conditions, lessen density, eliminate obsolete or other uses
detrimental to the public welfare, or otherwise to remove or to
prevent the spread of blight or deterioration, or to provide land for
needed public facilities;
(h)

Lending or investing federal funds; and

Construction of foundations, platforms and other like
(i)
structural fonns.
Idaho Code 5 50-2018(10).
The Act also provides specific definition and authorization of the use of revenue
allocation proceeds
(13) "Project" or "urban renewal project" . . . may include
undertakings and activities of a municipality in an urban renewal area
for the elimination of deteriorated or deteriorating areas and for the
prevention ofthe development or spread of slums and blight, andmay
involve slum clearance and redevelopment in an urban renewal area,
or rehabilitation or conservation in an urban renewal area, or any
combination or part thereof in accordance with an urban renewal
plan. Such undertakings and activities may include:

Acquisition of a deteriorated area or deteriorating area
(a)
or portion thereof;
(b)
Demolition and
improvement;

removal

of

buildings

and

Installation, construction, or reconstruction of streets,
(c)
utilities, parks, playgrounds, open space, off-street parking facilities,
public facilities, public recreation and entertainment facilities or
buildings and other improvements necessary for carrying out, in the
:IRMATION - 56

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION
PAGE 88

urban renewal area . . . , the urban renewal objectives of this act in
accordance with the urban renewal plan. . . .
Disposition of any property acquired in the urban
(d)
renewal area . . . (including sale, initial leasing or retention by the
agency itself) . . . at its fair value for uses in accordance with the
urban renewal plan except for disposition of property to another
public body;
Carrying out plans for a program of voluntary or
(e)
compulsory repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other
improvements in accordance with the urban renewal plan;
(f)

Acquisition of real property in the urban renewal area

. . . which, under the urban renewal plan, is to be repaired or

rehabilitated for dwelling use or related facilities, repair or
rehabilitation of the structures for guidance purposes, and resale of
the property;
Acquisition of any other real property in the urban
(g)
renewal area. ..where neeessaryto eliminate unhealthful, insanitary
or unsafe conditions, lessen density, eliminate obsolete or other uses
detri~nentalto the public welfare, or otherwise to remove or to
prevent tbe spread of blight or deterioration, or to provide land for
needed public facilities . . . ;
(h)

Lending or investing federal funds; and

Construction of foundations, platforms and other like
(i)
structural forms.
Idaho Code 5 50-2903(13).
Facilities are defined as:
"Facilities" means land, rights in land, buildings,
(9)
structures, machinery, landscaping, extension of utility services,
approaches, roadways and parking, handling and storage areas, and
similar auxiliary and related facilities.
Idaho Code 5 50-2903(9).
Based on these statutory definitions and the overall public purpose of an urban renewal
project as stated by the supreme court in Yick Kong, the project as defined in Resolution
No. 2007-4 constitutes public activities authorized by the Act and Law.
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TllE IJSE OF T I N BOYD PROCEEDS .\WETS THE REQL1iRER1EN1'
'1'HAl'AI.l. PIIUI.IC FUNI)S BE EXPENDED FOR A PUBI.IC PURPOSE

In addition to what might be termed hard construction costs, Resolution No. 2007-4 also
authorizes the Agency to pay the costs of issuance from bond proceeds. Additionally, Resolution
No. 2007-4 authorizes the Agency to use revenue allocation proceeds to pay for the costs of
administration.
The Resolution states as follows:
Cost of Acauisition and Construction, with respect to the
Project, shall include, together with any other proper item of cost not
specifically mentioned herein, the Costs of Issuance, the wst of
demolition, the cost ofacquisition and construction ofthe Project and
the financing thereof, the cost, whether incurred by the Agency or
another, or field surveys and advance planning undertaken in
connection with the Project, and the cost of acquisition of any land or
interest therein required as the sites thereof or for use in connection
therewith, the cost of preparation of the sites thereof and of any land
to be used in connection therewith, the cost of any indemnity and
surety bonds and insurance premiums, allocable administrative and
general expenses of the Agency, allocable portions of inspection
expenses, financing charges, legal fees, and fees and expenses of
financial advisors and consultants in connection therewith, cost of
audits, the cost of all machinery, apparatus and equipment, cost of
engineering, the cost ofutilities, architectural services, design, plans,
specifications and surveys, estimates of cost, the payment of any
bonds or notes of the Agency (including any interest and redemption
premiums) issued to temporarily finance the payment of any item or
items of cost of the Project and payable from the proceeds of Bonds,
and all other expenses necessary or incident to determining the
feasibility or practicability of the Project, and such other expenses not
specified herein as may be necessary or incident to the construction
and acquisition of the Project, the financing thereof, and the placing
of the same in use and operation.
Costs of Administration shall mean, with respect to the
Project, the Agency's expenses (includingreserves for such expenses)
for allocable administration and general expenses of the Project,
legal, financial, architectural and engineering expenses, fees and
expenses of fiduciaries under this Resolution, bond insurance,
guaranty andlor letter of credit fees, interest and finance charges,
trustee fees, if any, paying agent and registrar fees, and any other
normal expenses or contingencies required to be paid or provided for
by the Agency, all to h e extent properly attributable to the Project
and payable by the Agency.
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Cost(s) of Issuance shall mean printing, rating agency fees, if
any, legal fees, underwriting fees, fees and expenses of the Bond
Registrar, bond insurance premiums, if any, and all other fees,
charges, and expenses with respect to or incurred in connection with
the issuance, sale, and delivery of the Bonds.
(Ex. 12.)
Administrative costs are payable, however, only pfrer principal and interest on the Bonds
have been paid.
Section 5.1 : REVENUE ALLOCATION FUND
There has heretoforebeen created a fund, held by the Agency,
separate and apart from all other funds of the Agency, designated the
Revenue Allocation Fund (the "Revenue Allocation Fund"). All
hcremental Tax Revenues shall be promptly deposited upon receipt
by the Agency into the Revenue Allocation Fund. The Incremental
Tax Revenues deposited therein shall be used only for the following
purposes and in the following order of priority.
First, to pay the interest accruing on the Bonds and any
Additional Bonds by required deposits into the Bond Fund;

M,to pay the principal of the Bonds md any Additional
Bonds payable within the next Bond Year by required deposits into
the Bond Fund;

m,
m,

to fund the Debt Service Reserve Fund by required
deposits thereto, if any;
to fund the Administration Fund;

Fifth. for any other lawful purpose of the Agency.
Resolution No. 2007-4. (Ex. 12.)
These ancillary costs are all necessary to completely carry out the Project and are fully
authorized under the Act.
(12)

"Project costs" include, but are not limited to:

(a)
Capital costs, including the actual costs of the
construction of public works or improvements, facilities, buildings,
structures. and oermanent fixtures: the demolition. alteration.
remodeling, repa&or reconstruction of existing building$, structures;
and the clearing
and permanent fixtures; the acquisition ofe~uipment:
andgrading of land;
A
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Financing costs, includinginterest during construction
(b)
and capitalized debt service or repair and replacement or other
appropriate reserves;
Real property assembly costs, meaning any deficit
(c)
incurred from the sale or lease by a municipality of real or personal
property within a revenue allocation district;
Professional service costs, includiug those costs
(d)
incurred for architectural,planning, engineering, and legal advise and
services;
Direct administrative costs, includiug reasonable
(e)
charges for the time spent by municipal employees in connection with
the implementation of a project plan;
(f)

Relocation costs;

(g)

Other costs incidental to any of the foregoing costs.

Idaho Code $ 50-2903(12).

XIV.
Ih'CREMENTAL TAXES USED TO PAY THE BONDS
A m USED FOR A "PUBLIC PURPOSE"
The requirement that public funds be used for a "public purpose" is of constitutional
dimension, but is not expressly slated in either the United States or the Idaho Constitution. For a
discussion of the constitutional provisions that implicitly give rise to the "puhlic purpose"
requirement, see Idaho Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,559 n.42,548 P.2d 35,
59 11.42 (1976). Because the private entities located in a revenue allocation area will be
benefitted by the expenditure of proceeds from the bonds, it can be argued that the taxes used to
repay those bonds are not being used for a "puhlic purpose." This argument, however, has been
consistently rejected by other courts because any benefit to private entities as a result of
expenditures under an urban renewal plan is merely "incidental" and does not defeat the public
purpose requirement. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975);
Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954); and Lawrence,
Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in Downtown Development Projects,
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35 VAND.L.REV.277,293-94 (1982) (footnotes omitted). In YickKong, the supreme court
adopted that position, stating that "[mlere incidental benefits to private interests will not
invalidate such an urban renewal plan." Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 579.
Furthermore, where the Idaho Legislature has declared certain expenditures to be for a
"public purpose," the court will only overturn that finding if it is found to be "arbitrary" or
"unreasonable." In Idaho Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,559, 548 P.2d 35, 59
(1 976), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:

[A] declaration by the Legislature of public purpose is normally
afforded great deference, although it is by no means binding or
conclusive upon this Court. It will not be overturned, however,
unless it is found to be arbitrary or unreasonable.

In this case the Idaho Legislature has made a finding that expenditures under the Law are for a
"public purpose":
It is hereby found and declared that there exist in municipalities of the
state deteriorated and deteriorating areas (as herein defined) which
constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public
health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state; that the
existence of such areas contributes substantially and increasingly to
the spread of disease and crime, constitutes an economic and social
liability imposing onerous municipal burdens which decrease the tax
base and reduce tax revenues, substantially impairs or arrests the
sound growth of municipalities, retard the provision of housing
accomodations, aggravates traffic problems and substantially
impairs or arrests the elimination of traffic hazards and the
improvement of facilities; and that the prevention and elimination of
these conditions is a matter of state policy and state concern in order
that the state and its municipalities shall not continue to be
endangered by areas which are focal centers of disease, promote
juvenile delinquency, and consume an excessive proportion of its
revenue because of the extra services required for police, fire,
accident, hospitalization and other forms of public protection,
services and facilities.

It is further found and declared that the powers conferred by
this act are for public uses and ouruoses for which public money may
be expended as herein provided . . . .
Idaho Code 5 50-2002 (emphasis added).
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Similarly the legislature has determined that raising the revenue to finance the urban
renewal project for a limited period is a public purpose for municipalities. Idaho Code
§ 50-2902.

In this case the legislature has made a determination that the use of revenue allocation
financing is necessary to fund redevelopment in the State of Idaho. In addition, the legislature
has specifically made findings that redevelopment, the elimination of deteriorated or
deteriorating areas, and the stimulation of economic activity are public purposes.
Give11that all of these public purposes are served by redevelopment of the North
Highway, South Addition Area, the due process rights of taxpayers are not violated by use of
public funds for a private purpose. Consequently, because that finding is not "arbitraIy" or
'knreasonable," the court should defer to that legislative finding that a "public purpose" exists.
XV.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing legal arguments, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court issue
a judgment of judicial confirmation, confirming the power of Petitioner to issue its Series 2008
Bonds based upon revenue allocation financing.
DATED this

day of March, 2008.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

Attorneys for Petitioner
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CASE LAW ON TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
a.

City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239 (Ariz.App. 1980) (Bonds issued by
city, not redevelopment agency, and tax increment statute allowed pledge of
ad valorem taxation proceeds to pay off municipal property tax increment
bonds without voter approval);

b.

Bell Community Redevelopment v. Woosley, 214 Cal.Rptr. 788 (Ca1.App.
1985);

c.

Brown v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 214 Cal.Rptr. 626 (Cal.App.
1985);

d.

Denver Urban RenewalAuthority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980);

e.

State Ex Rel. City of Gainesville v. St. Johns, 408 So.2d 1067 (Fla.App. 1982)
(redevelopment ad valorem tax increment appropriation may not be required of
water management special taxing district);

f.

Kelson v. City ofPeiwacola, 483 So.2d 77 (Fla.App. 1986);

g.

Strand v. Escambia County, 2007 WL 2492294 (Fla. 2007) (tax-increment
financed bonds constitute long-term debt requiring approval by referendum as
mandated by the Florida Constitution);

h.

People Ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980) (revenue
allocation financing legislation withstood constitutional uniformity challenge);

i.

South Bend Public Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend,
428 N.E.2d 21 7, 222-23 (Ind. 1981) (uniformity provision docs not limit the
expenditure of funds collected through taxation);

j.

Richards v. City ofMuscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975) (bonds issued by
city, not urban renewal agency, held to be "constitutional debt;" different result
would be obtained if mllnicipal conkract were used)

k.

Dilley v. City of Des Moines, 247 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1976);
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1.

State Ex. Rel. Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 ( I h . 1980) (revenue
allocation financing law upheld over a challenge based on constitutional
unifonnity and equality requirements);

m.

Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976) (strict
and state-specific limitation imposed by narrow special purpose doctrine);

n.

In Re Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988);

o.

School District of the City ofPontiac v. City ofAuburn Hills, 460 N.W.2d 258
(Mich.App. 1990);

p.

R.E. Short Co. v. City ofMinneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978);

q.

City ofMinneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980);

r.

City ofDuluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986);

s.

Tax Increment Financing Commission v. J. E. Dunn Construction, 781 S.W.2d
70 (Mo. 1989);

t.

Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 566 P.2d 41 5 (Nev. 1977) (act unconstitutional as
special legislation benefitting only two specific cities);

u.

City ofSparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980) (petitioner's challenge of
revenue allocation financing legislation on uniformity grounds dismissed);

v.

Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority v. Medical Technology and Research
Authority of Oklahoma, 4 P.3d 677,688 (Okla. 2000);

w.

In re Application of Oklahoma Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 87, 89
(Okla. 2004) (acknowledged amendment to statute after 2000; tax increment
districts do not violate the constitutional provisions on municipal debt);

x.

City of Guymon v. Butler, 92 P.3d 80 (Okla. 2004) (tax increment districts do
not violate the constitutional provisions on municipal debt);

y.

Harvey v. City of Oklahoma City, 111 P.3d 239 (Okla. 2005) (tax increment
districts do not violate the constitutional provisions on municipal debt);
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z.

Meierhenry v. City ofHuron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984) (uniformity relates
to the levy of taxes and does not limit the authority to allocate or distribute
public funds collected through such levies);

aa.

W o w v. City Council of City of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. 1985);

bb.

Metro Dev. &How. Agcy. v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979) (revenue
allocation financing legislation withstood constitutional uniformity challenge);

cc.

El Paso Co. Com. Col. Dist. v. City ofEl Paso, 698 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App.
1985) (city cannot pledge and use incremental ad valorem tax revenues
belonging to community college for non-educational purposes);

dd.

City ofEl Paso v. El Paso Commun. College, 729 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1986);

ee.

Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975);

ff.

Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelop., 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979); and

gg.

Sigma Tau Gamma, Etc. v. City ofMenomonie, 288 N.W.2d 85 (Wis. 1980)
(revenue allocation financing legislation withstood constitutional uniformity
challenge).

STATUTES ON TAX INCREMENT FINANCING

5 11-99-1, et seq. (2007);

a.

Ala.Stat.

b.

Alaska Stat. 8 29.47.460 (2007);

d.

Ark.Stat.Ann. 5 14-168-305, et seq. (2007);

e.

Cal. Health & Safety Code $5 33670-33679 (2007);
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Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. $5 12-65(c) to -65(f) (2007);
Del. Code tit. 22, $ 1701 etseq. (2007);
D.C. Stat. $2-1217.01 etseq. (2007);
Fla.Stat.Ann. $ 163.335(5) (2007);
Ga.Stat. $ 36-94-01, et seq. (2007);
Haw.Rev.Stat. $ 46-101 (2007);
1li.Comp.Stat. ch. 65, F) 5111-74.4-8 (2007);
Ind. Code $ 36-7-14-27 (2007);
Iowa Code F) 403.19 (2007);
Kan.Stat.Ann. $8 12-1770 et seq. (2007);
Ky.Rev.Stat. $5 65.490, et seq. (2007);
La.Rev.Stat. 33:9032 (2007);
Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 30-A, $ 5227 et seq. (2007);
Md. Art. 41, $ 14-201, etseq. (2007);
Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 40, $ 59 (2007);
Mich.Stat.Ann. $5 125.1801 to -1830 (2007);
Minn.Stat.Ann. $ 469.175 (2007);
Miss.Code Ann. 5 21-45-1, et seq. (2007);

RMATION - 66

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION
PAGE 98

Mo.Rev.Stat. $ 99.800, et seq. (2007);
Mont. Code Ann. $$ 7-15-4282 to -4292 (2007);
aa.

Neb.Rev.Stat. $ 18-2116 (2007);

bb.

Nev.Rev.Stat. $$ 279.674-685 (2007);

CC.

N.H.Stat.

dd.

N.J. Stat. $ 52:27D-459 et seq. (2007);

ee.

N.M.Stat.Ann. $ 5-15-15 (2007);

ff

N.C.Gen.Stat. $ 160A-515.1 (2007);

gg.

N.D.Cent. Code $ 40-58-20 (2007);

hh.

N.Y.Gen.Mun. $ 970-0 (Consol. 2007);

ii.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. $ 725.01, et seq. (2007);

jj.

0kla.Stat. tit. 62, $ 861 (2007);

kk.

0r.Rev.Stat. $5 457.420-,460 (2007);

11.

Pa. Stat. tit. 53 $ 6930.1 et seq. (2007);

mm.

R.LGen. Laws $45-33.2-1, et seq. (2007);

nn.

S.C.Code Ann. $ 31-6-10, et seq. (2007);

$5 162-K9 to 162-K10 (2007);

S.D. Codified Laws $5 11-9-1 to -46 (2007);
Tenn. Code Ann. $ 13-20-205 (2007);
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qq.

Tex. Local Gov't Code tit. 12 $ 374.031, et seq. (2007);

n.

Utah Code Ann. $ 17C-2-201 et seq. (2007);

ss.

Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 24, $5 1891-1900 (2007);

tt.

Va.Code Ann. $ 58.1-3245, et seq. (2000);

UU.

Wash.Rev.Code 5 39.88.010, et seq. (2007);

w.

W.Va.Code $ 7-11B-1, etseq. (2007);

ww.

Wis.Stat.Ann. 5 66.1 105 (2007); and

xx.

Wyo.Stat. 5 15-9-120 (2007).
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Ryan P , Armbruster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
rpa@elamburke.com
mes@elamburke.com
Armbruster - ISB #I878
Sullivan - ISB #7038
Attorneys for Petitioner
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

I

In Re:

CASE NO. CV 08-121

URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE CITY REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
OF REXBURG,
CONFIRMATION
Petitioner.
On or about March 24,2008, Kenneth W. Hart filed his Response to Petition for Judicial
Confirmation ("Opposition Memorandum"). The Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg
("Agency") now submits this Reply Brief in support of its Petition for Judicial Conbation.

I. INTRODUCTION
Under settled Idaho law, the Agency is not the "alter ego" of the City of Rexburg ("City")
or a subdivision of the State of Idaho. Therefore, the Agency's issuance of revenue allocation
REPLY MEMORANDUM n\T SUPPORT CIW D
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m r W FOR JUDICIAL CONF~RMATION 1

i
1
i

(tax increment) bonds do not require voter approval under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho
Constitution. Since the Agency is not subject to the voter approval requirements under Article 8,
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the Court does not need to analyze whether the issuance of
such bonds constitutes "indebtedness" or "liability" for purposes of that constitutional provision.
Similarly, because the Agency is not an enumerated entity subject to the Article 8, Section 3
limitations, the Court does not have to perform an analysis of the "ordinary and necessary"
proviso. Finally, since the Agency is a public entity, the City is not lending its credit to a private
entity in violation of Article 8, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. Based on the above, the
Agency's authority to issue the Series 2008 Bonds does not violate Article 8, Sections 3 and 4.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

The Agency Is Not a Governmental Entity Forbidden from Issuing Debt Without
Voter Approval.

Mr. Hart argued in his Opposition Memorandum that the Agency is subject to the
constitutional requirements of voter approval under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution
because the Agency is the "alter ego" of the City or, in the alternative, the Agency constitutes a
"subdivision of the state." To the contrary, the Supreme Court of Idaho has expressly held that
urban renewal agencies are not one of the governmental entities enumerated in Article 8, Section
3 of the Idaho Constitution.
1.

The Aeencv is not the "alter eeo" of the Citv.

Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in
any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income
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and revenue provided for it for such year, without ihe assent of
two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof. . . .
Generally, Mr. Hart argued that the Agency is the "alter ego"of the City based upon the
degree of the City's control over the Agency. Mr. Nart supported his argument with the assertion
that the Agency is governed by the City, benefits the City, was established by the City,
commissioners, are appointed by the City, and the City can terminate the board of commissioners
andlor declare itself as the board.
The issue of whether an urban renewal agency is the "alter ego" of a city has been
expressly addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong
Corp.., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). In YickKong the urban renewal agency sought to
condemn Yick Kong Corporation's property for urban renewal purposes. Id. at 877. The
condemnee challenged the constitutionalityof the urban renewal law, the validity of the urban
renewal agency sought to be created by the statute, and the ability of the urban renewal agency to
operate under the authority granted by that statute. Id. Although revenue bonds were not at
m

e condemnee argued that the urban renewal agency was subject to the constitutional

voter approval requirement under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution because the
urban renewal agency was the "alter ego" of the City of Boise or because the urban renewal
agency was itself a "subdivision of the state." Id. at 880.
The wndemnee argued that the urban renewal agency was the "alter ego" of the City of
Boise, essentially based on the City's degree of control over the agency, e.g., (1) the City had to
make the finding of a deteriorated area before the agency could exercise any of its powers; (2) the
Boise mayor and city council appointed the agency's commissioners; and (3) the Boise mayor
and city council had the power to remove the commissioners. Id. at 881.
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The Court concluded that the agency was not the "alter ego" of the City of Boise. Id. at
882. The Court reasoned that the agency was an entity of legislative creation and that the
legislature established the agency's powers, duties and authorities. Id. at 881. The Court further
reasoned that the legislature intended there to be a local voice in the question of whether a
particular municipality had a need for urban renewal, thus requiring a finding of need by the
municipality prior to the time an agency could come into existence. Id. The Court stated that
"[wlhile the particular city may trigger the existence of the [agency], it cannot control its powers
or operations." Id. The Court reasoned further that the appointment procedures did not cause
inherent control in the city, and the removal procedures were not arbitrary or solely in the
discretion of the city. Id. at 882. The Court stated:
The degree of control exercised by the City of Boise does not usurp
the powers and duties of the [agency], and the close association
between the two entities at most shows two independent public
entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes.

Id.

In essence, the Court's finding that the agency was not the "alter ego" of the city was
predicated on the Court's finding that the degree of the city's control over the agency did not
compromise the agency's independence.
The principles of Yick Kong remain viable authority. The facts concerning the
relationship between the Agency and the City of Rexbnrg are nearly identical to the facts
discussed in YickKong. The Agency and the City of Rexbnrg are completely separate entities,
with separate governing bodies and separate functions. The cooperation between the two
separate entities is for valid public purposes. The Agency is not the "alter ego'' of the City;
therefore, the voter approval requirements of Article 8, Section 3 do not apply.
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2.

The Agencv is not a "subdivision of the state."

Mr. Hart argued in the alternative that if the agency was not an "alter ego" of the City,
that it could be a "subdivision of the state." As noted above, the Supreme Court of Idaho has
expressly concluded that urban renewal agencies are not subdivisions of the state within the
meaning of Article 8, Sections 3 and 4.
The Court in YickKong relied on the Court's decision in Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing

Authority, which held that the housing authority did not have any powers of taxation and,
therefore, the provisions of Article 8, Section 3 did not apply. YickKong, 94 Idaho at 882-883

(citing 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1104 (1941). Analogizing to the housing authority in Lloyd, the
Court in Yick Kong concluded that the urban renewal agency has "no ability to actually encumber
any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property
holdings." id, at 883. Based on the Court's decision in YickKong, the Agency is not a
subdivision of the state; therefore, the voter approval provisions of Article 8, Section 3 do not

B.

Since the Agency Is Not Subject to the Voter Approval Requirements of Article 8,
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the Court Does Not Need to Analyze (1)
Whether the Issuance of the Revenue Allocation Bonds Constitutes ccIndebtedness"
o r "Liability"; Or, (2) Whether the Subject Project Constitutes an "Ordinary and
Necessary" Expense.
1.

Since the Agencv is not an enumerated entitv subject to the voter avvroval
reauirements of Article 8,Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. an analvsis of
whether the issuance of the revenue allocation bonds constitute "indebtedness" or
"liabilitv" is unnecessary.

Mr. Hart argued in his Opposition Memorandum that the issuance of the revenue
allocation (tax increment) bonds constitutes debt under Article 8, Section 3.
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It is the Agency's position that the revenue allocation bonds do not constitute "debt"
within the meaning of the wnstitutional limitations of Article 8, Section 3 because the
bondholders may look only to the revenues eom the allocated taxes for retirement of the bond
obligation and the Idaho statutes specifically indicate that the credit of the city is not available for
repayment of the bond.
However, it is also the Agency's position, as argued above, that the Agency is neither an
"alter ego" of the City of Boise or a "subdivision of the state." Since the Agency is not an
enumerated entity under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the voter approval
requirements therein do not apply. Therefore, an analysis of whether the issuance of the bonds
constitutes a debt within the constitutional limitations of Article 8, Section 3 is not necessary.
2.

Since the Aoencv is not an enumerated cntitv subicct to thc voter anoroval
reauirenients of Articlc 8, Section 3 of the lddio Constitution. an analysis of
whether the subject vroiec! constitutes an "ordinarv and necessarv" expense is not

e.

Mr. Hart,citing to City ofBoise v. Frazier, argued in his Opposition Memorandum that
the project sought to be funded with revenue allocation (tax increment) bonds is not

''ordinary

and necessary" expense, thus requiring voter approval.

In general, Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution bars cities from incuning debts
or liabilities without voter approval unless the expenditure is for an "ordinary and necessary"
expense. City ofBoise v. Fraziev, 143 Idaho 1 , 137 P.3d 388 (2006); Article 8, Section 3 of the
Idaho Constitution.
As set forth above, the Agency is neither an "alter ego" of the City of Boise or a
"subdivision of the state." Since the Agency is not an enumerated entity under Article 8, Section
3 of the Idaho Constitution, the voter approval requirements therein do not apply. 'Therefore, an
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analysis of the "ordinary and necessary" proviso is not required. Consequently, the decision in

Frmier is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
C.

The City of Rexburg Is Not Lending its Credit to a Private Entity in Violation of
Article 8, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution.
Mr. Hart argued in his Opposition Memorandum that the City improperly pledged its

credit to the Agency in violation of Article 8, Section 4 of the Constitution.

This issue was also addressed in YickKong. In YtckKong, the Supreme Court of Idaho
held the constitutionalprovisions regarding lending of credit apply only if the governmental
entity is lending its credit to or for the benefit of

interests. Id. at 883-84. In Yick Kong,

the court held that the agency, "being a public and not a private enterprise, does not fall within
the strictures and prohibition of Article 8, 5 4 and Article 12, 8 4 of the Idaho Constitution. . . ."
Id. at 884. The Court's conclusion was based upon the Court's finding the agency could not

impose taxes upon the residents of the city or encumber public assets to the advantage ofprivate
enterprise. Id.
The Yick Kong decision remains viable authority that the Agency is a public entity, and
thus, the City does not lend its credit to a private entity in violation of Article 8, Section 4.

In. CONCLUSION
It is clear that there is no factual dispute. Based upon the legal arguments presented in the
opening Memorandum and set forth above, the Agency respectfully requests this Court issue a
judgment of judicial confirmation, confirming the power of the Agency to issue its Series 2008
Bonds based upon revenue allocation financing.
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DATED this&'day

of March, 2008.
ELAM &BURKE, P.A.

~ & e $ for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this @day

of arch, 2008, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Kenneth W. Hart
367 Salem Avenue
Rexburg, ID 83440

- U.S. Mail

32

-

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

-
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Kenneth W. Hart
367 Salem Ave.
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
(208)356-9661
Respondent in opposition to the Rexburg
Urban Renewal Agency's petition for Judicial Confirmation.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAJ30, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
MADISON
CASE NO. CV08-121
In re:
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY,
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
COMES NOW respondent Kenneth W. Hart presenting pro se, pursuant to
Idaho Code 7-1301 through 7-13 13. Idaho Code specifically grants standing
to "any other person interested..."
DISCUSSION
(1) "Article VIII 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally bars cities ftom
incurring debts or liabilities without first conducting an election to secure
voter approval for the proposed expenditure. The section, however, contains
*390 a notable exception. No public vote is required if the expenditure is for
an 'ordinary and necessary' expense" (see Idaho Supreme Court's "I11
Analysis" in City of Boise v. Frazier - Exhibit C)
Thus the petitioner needs and seeks a finding by this court (judicial
confirmation) that the project instant is "ordinary and necessary."

,-

The Idaho Supreme Court has recently addressed the "ordinary and
necessary issue" in CITY OF BOISE v. FRAZIER. In 2006 OPINION 37,
the court repeatedly sets a standard of EMERGENCY EXPENSE,
UNAVOIDABLE EXPENSE such as criminal trial costs, and expenditures
to INSURE PUBLIC SAFETY such as repair damage from floods or similar
catastrophe. The court described "necessary" as truly urgent and
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unavoidable, something that the government agency was legally obligated to
perform promptly and that ". .. under the proviso clause of Article VIII $ 3
there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such
year." The petitioners offer no assertions that the proposed outdoor
swimming facility qualifies as an "ordinary and necessary" exception in
Article VIII, sec. 3.
The claim of the Agency to possess "revenue allocation fmancing powers"
by Idaho Code 50-2901-50-2912 and bonding authority by Idaho Code 502012 -50-2902 clearly violates the higher authority of the Idaho
Constitutional provisions against long term debt without the assent of 213 of
the electors in Article VIII, sec. 3. For the purpose of funding an outdoor
swimming facility, the AgencyJCity does not meet the "ordinary and
necessary" exception requirements.
In fact, the City of Rexburg had a bond election on August 3,2004 for the
purpose of issuing $4,000,000 in bonds to pay for the acquisition and
construction of an outdoor swimming facility. The bond election failed (see
exhibit B). The city has made no further attempts to seek voter approval of
the project. This petition seems to be the city's attempt to avoid the
necessity of voter approval.
(2) It should be noted that the AgencyICity is not planning to issue Revenue
Bonds -that is the bonds will not be paid back from the revenues and fees
generated by the patrons of the swimming pool facility. The bonds the
petitioners desire will be paid off from property taxes diverted from the city,
county, school district, library, etc. (See exhibit A) to the Agency. These
amounts are based on already increased property values, not on theoretical
possible increases as in the case of some urban renewal agencies just starting
out.
(3) Also note that this is a true indebtedness or debt. Exhibit A of the city's
bond purchase agreement describes all of the characteristics of debt when
referring to these bonds. They will have a Dated Date from when the
interest starts. They will have a Closing Date, an Issue Size, true interest
cost (TIC), a maturity schedule, defined Principal and Interest Rates.
This reminds one of the "Duck" concept: If it swims like a duck, waddles
like a duck, quacks like a duck, eats like a duck, etc. than it doesn't matter
what one calls it, it's a Duck.
(4) Rexburg City Authority: The petition claims the Rexburg Urban
Renewal Agency (Agency) to be an independent body. By any construction
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and reasonable interpretation of the English language, the Agency is
governed by the City, benefits the City, was established by the City,
commissioners are appointed by the City, and the City can terminate the
board. The city can declare itself as the board of commissioners and have
the city council replace all the commissioners [Section 50-2006(b) (2) and
(3)] The City doesn't even need to give a reason. Indeed, all the authority
asserted by the Agency comes from the City. In this respect it is no different
than any other city department such as police, fire, or parks. The ultimate
purpose even includes a city recreational facility which will be owned and
operated by the city. This is just like the "Duck" concept mentioned earlier.
To claim the Agency is "an urban renewal agency of the state of Idaho7'
independent of the city of Rexburg is simply misleading. A city pledge
stating that it won't exert its control does not change the nature of the
relationship. If the Agency commissioners decided to deed the pool to their
best friend, then the City would need to step in to stop it. Exhibit A shows
the benefits provided to the Agency which will be used to benefit the City's
outdoor swimming facility. The swimming pool facility is not being used as
collateral for the bonds. Could the Agency give the pool to the county, the
school district or any individual? They intend to give the pool to the city
even before the bonds are paid off. Yet just as much taxes were diverted
from the county and school district to pay off the bonds as were given up by
the city (see exhibit A). If the agency is not considered the city, then could
it be an "other subdivision" mentioned in the first sentence of Article VIII
$3. It's very difficult to see the Agency as independent of the city.
(5) Another problem with the petition (specifically with the Bond Resolution
and the Bond Purchase Agreement) is that they are too vague in that they do
not state the maturity date of the bonds - city Resolution No. 2007-4 states
the closing date as "to be determined." The North Highway Urban
Renewal District was started late in 1991 with the property values based on
the value of property as of January 1, 1991. Idaho S m - 2 9 0 4 states:
Except as provided below, no reven& allocationprovision of
an urban renewalplan or competitively disadvantaged border
communitv area ordinance, including all amendments thereto,
.shall have &ation
exceedin-idthe
d w x & a n u & approved by the municipality.
Therefore any bonds, if allowed by this court, should ha& a maturity date
r
(which is 24 years from Jan. 1, 1991). The
before ~ e c e i b e 31,2014
statute then lists four possible exceptions to the above. Exception 1 should
not apply - judicial consent should limit the dollar amount of the bonds so
that they could be totally paid off by December of 2014. Exception 3

-
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mentions the date when the law was changed from 30 years to 24 years and
implies that the 30 year time frame is no longer operative. Exceptions 1
through 4 will not apply if the court limits the maturity date of the bonds to
the 24 year time frame.
The petitioner seeks a determination of the validity of Resolution No. 20074 (the Bond Resolution) and the Purchase Agreement, yet a key element of
the bond financing would be the maturity date and the amount of time
allowed for the Agency to pay off the bonds. To merely state that these key
items are "to be determined" and to allow a confirmation letting the Agency
fill in the blanks later does not seem correct. Allowing the confirmation of
the petition would be like giving the Agency and city a blank check with
respect to when the bonds should be paid off (and also with respect to the
amounts that would need to be paid each year). In other documents
examined at city hall and in verbal comments the city has made to the
respondent, the city says that the bonds can have a maturity date as late as
December of 2021. This would be in violation of the 24 year rule stated in
the statute.
DETERMINATION OF THE COURT
Based on the respondent argument, the Agency is in reality a city department
in every respect. The bonding authority asserted is without foundation.
Despite claims to the contrary, it would be impossible to disassociate the
City from the Agency in the event of default or any facet of the bonding
process. This is a City project in every respect regardless of assertions to the
contrary.
By releasing tax revenues otherwise destined for various units of
government (see Exhibit A) with legal taxing authority, those units are
making a DE FACT0 pledge of their faith and credit contrary to provisions
in Idaho Constitution Article VIII, sec. 4:
"SECTION 4. COUNTY, ETC., NOT TO LOAN OR GIVE ITS
CREDIT. No county, city, town, township, board of
education, or school district, or other subdivision,
shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith thereof
directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of
any individual, association or corporation, for
any amount or for any purpose whatever...I1

Certainly by virtue of foregoing tax revenues on improvements and
annreciated value within the Urban Renewal District, all the units of
lW3KPJDENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE
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,.-

government with levy authority are "pledging their credit or faith thereot' to
the repayment of bonded indebtedness of the Agency. Those revenues are a
prime source of funding for the project.
SUMMARY and PRAYER
Respondent prays the court find:
A. The fmancing scheme is unconstitutional based on Article VIII, sec. 3 of
the Idaho Constitution.
B. The Idaho Constitution prevails over Idaho Code with respect to any
indebtedness for any purpose.
C. The Agency is in every respect a division, department of the City of
Rexburg and the project is for the sole benefit of the City.
D. Without the tax revenues from units of government with taxing
authority, it would be impossible to repay the long term debt.
E. The City and Agency are attempting to get court approval for a project
requiring approval of the electorate.
F. If in the judgment of the court, the bonds are to be allowed, the
respondent requests that a maturity date for the bonds be set by the court.
The validity of the bonds could not be determined without some
limitation on the maturity date.
CONCLUSION
The petition should be denied. The project should be placed before the
voters at an election as provided in the Idaho Constitution Article VIII, sec.3

DATE

M& 2 q , 2 b o @

Kenneth W. Hart, pro se
Respondent
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State of Idaho

1
County of Madison County

)

A

,20&,
before me, the undersigned, a
On this
day of
%t,k
.devtne~h
&v
Notary Publ~cfor Idaho, personally appeared
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledge
to me that helshelthey executed the same.
n\i WITNES WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year

in this certificate first above written.
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Exhibit A
The spreadsheet below shows the amounts of money (rounded to the nearest dollar) that was taken from the County, City of Rexburg,
School District, Cemetery, etc. and diverted (given) to the North Highway Urban Renewal District for the year 2007. This payment
for 2007 represents the increase in property tax from the time the Agency was started (or from the time when it was amended) up to
the end of year 2007. Note that the Urban Renewal Agency does not affect the amount of property tax a property taxpayer pays.
It does affect how the tax revenues are distributed. In 2006, $421,082 was diverted to the Agency. In 2007 $496,000 was diverted to the
the Agency. Each year the amounts diverted from the various entities (County, City, School District, Library, Mosquito Abatement, and
Ambulance as shown below) get larger because property values in the District grow larger rather than smaller.

Summary of data taken from Rexburg North Highway 2007 Urban Renewal 1-0007

UP & UR
Main Roll
02 Missed Roll
Totals

Mosquity
Abatement
2 $
2 7 $
1 4 $
1 7 $
720
190.482
114.107
3.007
77.137
19.981
47.699
1.695
18,231
9,456
11,915
493,710
11
74
6
67
35
285
176
44
1,822
421
703
$191,463 $114,694 $3,022 $ 77,534 $20,084 $47,945 $ 1,704 $ 18,325 $ 9,505 $ 11,976 $496,252

Source of Data: the Madison County Treasurer's Office (March, 2008)

-.

-
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Marilyn Rasmussen
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~
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From:

April Howard [aprilh@rexburg.org]

Sent:

Thursday, March 20.2008 2:03 PM

To:

Marilyn Rasmussen

Subject: Resolution with Bond results
Mayor Larsen read Resolution 2004-14 which canvassed the votes for the General Bond Election on August 03,
2004.

RESOLUTION NO. 2004-14
A RESOLUTION OF THE ClTY COUNCIL OF THE ClTY OF REXBURG,
IDAHO, CANVASSING AND DECLARINGTHE RESULTS OF THE
GENERALOBLIGATION BOND FOR $4,000,000 HELD IN SAID CITY ON
TUESDAY, AUGUST 03,2004.
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Rexburg, Idaho has requested the electorate t o vote INFAVOR
of or AGAINST an Aquatic Center for the City o f Rexburg, Idaho; and
WHEREAS the City Council has set the maximum amount of the General Obligation Bond not to exceed
$4,000,000 to pay the cost of acquisition and construction o f an outdoor swimming facility, and related cost; and
WHEREAS the bonds t o mature and t o be payable from a levy of taxes over a term which may be less
than but which shall not exceed thirty (30) years; and
WHEREAS the City o f Rexburg has outstanding revenue bond indebtedness i n the amount o f $2,190,657,
and the City has no general obligation debt, and the interest rate anticipated on the proposed bonds is 5% per
annum.
WHEREAS the total amount t o be repaid over the life of the proposed bonds,
principal and interest, based on the anticipated interest rate is estimated t o be $7,806,172;

and

znd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Notice of Election of said election having been duly published i n
WHEREAS the lSt,
the Rexburg Standard Journal, Rexburg, Idaho, as provided by law for five consecutive weeks; and
WHEREAS, the Clerk o f said City has caused''1 and 2" Notice o f Sample Ballots containing the options
t o vote INFAVOR of or AGAINST the General Bond Election t o be printed as required by law; and,
WHEREAS, after the due and legal election held In said City on August 03, 2004, the Judges o f said
election have made their returns thereof and this City Council has found that in all manner said election was
conducted according t o law and has canvassed the sage.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
MAYOR AND ClTY COUNCILOFTHE C I N OF
REXBURG, IDAHO:
That

the City Council
of the City of Rexburg, Idaho, sitting as a canvassing board and having before it the
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(over)

proceedings and returns from the General Obligation Bond Election held in the City of Rexburg, Idaho,
on Tuesday, August 03, 2004, does hereby canvas and certify the returns of said election and the results of the
voting as shown on Exhibit A.
That said election was duly held during the hours prescribed by law and at the polling places designated.
That the number of ballots cast corresponds with the check list of the voters.
That those electors voting INFAVOR of the General Bond Election totaled 815, which is less than the
two-thirds (213) majority of the qualified voters voting at the election; and
That those electors voting AGAINST the General Bond Election totaled 874, which is in excess of the
one-third (113) of the qualified voters voting at the election.
That those electors voting an under vote (neither selecting INFAVOR of or AGAINST) the General Bond
Election totaled 3 non votes.
That those electors voting an over vote (selecting both INFAVOR of and AGAINST) the General Bond
Election totaled 1non vote.
That the City Council of the City of R$xburg, Idaho, sitting as a canvassing board on August 4,2004 does
hereby certify that the election failed to attain the requisite 213'~ majority of votes INFAVOR of the issuance of
the General Obligation Bond Election, and;
THEREFORE THE ELECTION TO ISSUE GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS IN THE AMOUNT NOTTO EXCEED
$4,000,000.00 FAILS.
APPROVED by the Council on August 4,2004
SIGNED by the Mayor on August 4,2004

Shawn Larsen, Mayor
ATTEST:

Blair D. Kay, City Clerk

April Howard
Deputy City Clerk
Phone: 208-359-3020
Fax: 208-359-3022
Email: aprilh@rexburg.org

7/7ni'
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held, the district court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law and granted the City's petition.
The district court found parking capacity to be an
integral part of the operation of a regional airport
and the parking facilities at the Boise Airport lo he
inadequate to meet current or future needs. The district court additionally found that the proposed five
level parking facility was not new construction, but
instead was an expansion of the existing facility. As
a result, the district court determined the expansion
project was an "ordinary and necessary" expense
that did not require a public vote for its approval,
and that leasing parking space to rental car companies would not be an impermissible gift of the City's
credit because such leases were consisaent with
public use of the facility
Frazier filed a timely appeal that is now before this
Court.
11. STANDARD OF REVlEW
[l][2][3] This Court defers to the factual findings of
the district court unless those findings are clearly
erroneous. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H F . Magnuson
Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999).
This Court exercises free review of tile district
court's application of the relevant law to the facts.
Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496, 975 P.2d 782,
784 (1999). Constitutional issues are questions of
law over which we also exercise free review. State
v Weber, 140 Idaho 89,91,90 P.3d 314,316 (2004).

UI. ANALYSIS
Article VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally
bars cities from incurring debts or liabilities
without first conducting an election to secure voter
The
approval for the proposed e~penditnre.~~'
section, however, contains *390 a notable exception. No public vote is required if the expenditure is
for an "ordinary and necessary" expense
"authorized by the general laws of the state...." This

-
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exception is referred to as the "proviso clause."
City o f P ocatello v . P eterson, 9 3 Idaho 774, 778,
473 P.2d 644,648 (1970).
F'Nl. The full text of Article VIII, 5 3 of
the
Idaho
Constihilion,
entitled
"Limitations on county and municipal indebtedness," provides:
No county, city, h o d of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the state, shall in cur
any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for
any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income
and revenue provided for it for such year, without
the assent of two thirds (213) of the qualificd electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that
purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of incurring such indebtedness, provisions shall be made
for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay
the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and
also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of
the principal thereos within thirty (30) years from
the time of contracting the same. Any indebtedness
or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall
he void: Provided that this section shall not be
construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary
expenses authorized by the general laws of the state
and provided furCher that any city may own, purchase, construct, extend, or equip, within and
without the corporate limits of such city, off street
parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and
air navigations facilities, and for the purpose of
paying the cost thereof may, without regard to any
limitation herein imposed, with the assent of two
thirds (213) of the qualified electors voting at an
election to he held for that purpose, issue revenue
bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which
to be paid solely from revenue derived from rates
and charges for the use of, and the service rendered
by, such facilities as may be prescribed by law, and
provided further, that any city or other political
subdivision of the state may own, purchase, construct, extend, or equip, within and without the corporate limits of such city or political subdivision,
water systems, sewage collection systems, water
treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, and may

claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities,
and for the purpose of paying the cost thereof, may,
without regard to any limitation herein imposed,
with the assent of a majority of the qualified electors voting at an election to be held for that purpose,
issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be paid solely from revenue derived from rates and charges for the nse of, and the
service rendered by such systems, plants and facilities, as may he prescribed by law; and provided further that any port district, for the purpose of canying into effect all or any of the powers now or hereafter granted to port districts by the laws of this
state, may contract indebtedness and issue revenue
bonds evidencing such indebtedness, without the
necessity of the voters of the port districteauthorizing the same, such revenue bonds to be payable
solely from all or such part of the revenues of the
port district derived from any source whatsoever
excepting only those revenues derived from ad
valorem taxes, as the port commission thereof may
determine, and such revenue bonds not to be in any
manner or to any extent a general obligation of the
port district issuing the same, nor a charge upon the
ad valorem tax revenue of such port district.
(Emphasis added).

In the present case, the district court ruled that the
parking expansion was an ordinary and necessary
expense within the meaning of the constiiution.
Consequently, the district court concluded the City
was lawfully authorized to incur liabilities in order
to financc its completion. Frazier argues the expansion is not an "ordinary and necessary" undertakmg and therefore the City must obtain the consent of the voting public before entering into the
proposed fmancing agreement.
A. The Development of Article VIII, 5 3
Article VIII, 5 3 has been part of Idaho's Constitution since the beginning of statehood. The draft version of Article VIIl, 5 3 that was submitted to the
1889 Idaho Constitutional Convention was modeled
after and nearly identical to Article XI, 5 18 of the

-
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California Constitution of 1879. See 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889. 589
(1912) (henceforth 1 PROCEEDINGS); CAL.
CONST. of 1879, Art. XI, 5 18. The intention was
to prevent local government entities from incurring
debts without approval from the voters and a clear
plan to retire those debts. DONALD CROWLEY &
FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE IDAHO STATE
CONSTITUTION 170 (1994).
Broadly speaking, Article VIII, 5 3 imposes two requirements to he met by local governments before
incnning indebtedness. The first requirement is a
public election securing two-thirds of the vote, and
the second is the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the debt within t h i i years. The remainder of the section consists of exceptions to
those requirements, beginning with the previously
mentioned proviso clause and continuing with language added in a series of subsequent amendments
not applicable to our analysis.
When the draft version of Article VIE, 5 3 was
presented to the constitutional convention, it was
amended by the delegates to add the words
"provided, that this section shall not be construed to
apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state."
SeeIDAHO CONST. art VIII, 5 3; 1 PROCEEDINGS at 584-94. Delegate William Claggett offered
the original proviso clause. See1 PROCEEDINGS
at *391 586. Claggett explained his intent to the
other delegates, stating: "[wle all know that in the
practical administration of county government, that
there sometimes will be extraordinary expenses, 1
mean extraordinary expenses in the ordinary administration of affairs." Id at 588. By way of example,
CIaggett mentioned the payment of witness fees. Id.
Other delegates mentioned juror fees and criminal
court expenses, id at 590, the expense of controlling streams and ditches, id at 592, and "any
emergency" id at 587.

B. Tlie P roposed Parking Expansion Is Not An

",?lm to Ortg
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"Ordinary And Necessary" Expense Under Article VnI, § 3
In determining whether the proposed parking expansion is ordinary and necessary, we turn first to
the question of whether it is "ordinary." This Court
has previously held an expense to be ordinary "if in
the ordinary course of municipal business, or the
maintenance of municipal property, it may be and is
likely to become necessary." Hamon v. City of
ldaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636
(I 968).
[4] ldaho law provides for local governments to
maintain and operate airports. LC. $ 50-321. The
City's proposal to expand the Boise airport's parking facilities to keep pace with rising demand is entirely consistent with "the ordinary course of municipal business" in operating City property and is a
type of expense that "may be and is likely to become necessary." See Hanson, 92 Idaho at 514, 446
P.2d at 636 (defming "ordinary" in the context of
the proviso clause). As a result, the City's proposed
project is an "ordinary" expense under the circumstances before us.
The phrase "ordinary and necessary," however, is
read in the conjunctive. See h s o n v. City of Burley,
105 Idaho 432, 443, 670 P.2d 839, 850 (1983).
Therefore, in order for the expenditure at issue to
he "ordinary and necessary" it must also qualify as
"necessary." See id. The proper defmition of
"necessary" as it is used in the proviso clause merits especially close sclutiny in this case. We have
articulated two definitions of the term as it appears
in the clause. Most recently, this Court quoted
Black's Law Dictionary for the proposition that "
'[nlecessary' means 'indispensible' " [sic].
Peterson, 93 ldaho at 778, 473 P.2d at 648. The difficulty
with
defining
"necessary"
as
"indispensable" is that the definition is cirtnlar and
provides little guidance. In particular, such a definition does not assist a court in distinguishing truly
necessary expenditures from those that are. merely
desirable or convenient.
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Earlier, in Dunbar v. Board of Commissioners of
Cartyon County, 5 Idaho 407, 412, 49 P. 409, 411
(1897), we wrote that in order for an expense to
qualify as necessary under the proviso clause "there
must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at
or during such year." (Emphasis added). The meaning of "necessary" in the proviso clause takes on
added clarity under the Dunbar test because expenditures qualify as "necessary" only if they are
truly urgent. The Dunbar test has the additional benefit of matching closely with the types of expenditures the delegates at the Idaho Constitutional
Convention discussed when they debated Article
VIII, $ 3 of our state constitntion. Those expenditures included unavoidable expenses, such as canying on criminal trials and abating flood damage,
that could not he delayed. See1 PROCEEDINGS at
590-2. We 0hsefve that the expenditures contemplated by the delegates involved immediate or
emergency expenses, such as those involving public
safety, or expenses the government entity in question was legally obligated to perform promptly.
Although our decisions in the years since Dunbar
was handed down have been broadly consistent
with the Dunbar test, we have not employed that
test expressly. See e.g., Bd. of County Cornm'rs v.
Idaho Health F ac. A uth., 96 Idaho 498, 510, 53 1
P.2d 588, 600 (1975) (expanding a hospital);
Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (replacing
unsafe airport terminal); Ifamon v. City of Idaho
Falls, 92 ldaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968) (creating
a police retiment fund); Corum v. Common Sch.
Dist. No. 21, 55 Idaho 725, 47 P.2d 889 (1935)
(paying teacher salaries); Lloyd Corp, v. Bannock
County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217 (1933)
(providing relief for the unemployed); Thomas v.
Glindeman, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921)
(provid'mg for *392 police and f i e protection services); Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, 150
P. 35 (1915) (paying organizational expenses for a
new county); Hickey v. City of Nampa, 22 ldaho 41,
124 P. 280 (1912) (rebuilding the city's destroyed
water system for f i e protection and domestic water
supply); Burler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393,
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83 P. 234 (1905) (satisfying a tort judgment and
paying the salaries of city officers and employees).
Here, we retuni to the test stated in Dunbm and
hold that in order for an expenditure to qualify as
"necessary" under the proviso clause of Article
VIII, 5 3 there must exist a necessity for makimg the
expenditure at or during such year.
In Bannock County v. C. Bunting & Co., 4 Idaho
156, 167, 37 P. 277, 280 (1894), this Court wrote
that an expenditure to provide for a temporary jail
was an ordinary and necessary expense for Bannock County. Such an expense, we observed,
"might very properly he expended, when necessary,
for repairing a jail already built; and as it was paid
for a temporary jail" it was an ordinary and necessary expense. Id. In the same case, this Court determined a debt to purchase land on which to build
a permanent courthouse was not ordinary and necessary. We wrote that "[iJt is, of course, the duty
of the commissioners to provide a suitable place for
holding of the courts and public offices, jails, etc.;
but such rooms must be temporarily provided, at as
little expense as is consistent with providing suitable quarters, until the question can be submitted to
the people." Id at 168, 37 P. at 281.

Discussing Article VIII, $ 3 of our state constitution, we observed in Williams v. City ofEmmett that
[tlhe Idaho Constitution is imbued with the spirit of
economy, and in so far as possible it imposes upon
the political subdivisions of the state a payas-you-go system of finance. The rule is that,
without the express assent of the qualified electors,
municipal officers are not to incur debts for which
they have not the funds to pay. Such policy entails
a measul-e of crudity and inefficiency in local government, but doubtless the men who drafted the
Constitution, having in mind disastrous examples of
optimism and extravagance on the part of public officials, thought best to sacrifice a measure of efficiency for a degree of safety. The careful, tbrifly
citizen sometimes gets along with a crude instrumentality until he is able to purchase and..pay for
something better. And likewise, under the Constitu-
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tion, county officers must use the means they have
for making fair and equitable assessments until they
are able to pay for something more efficient or obtain the consent of those in whose interests they are
supposed to act.
51 Idaho 500, 505, 6 P.2d 475, 476 (1931) (quoting
Dexter Horton Trust & Savings Bank v. Clearwater
County, 235 F. 743,754 @.Idaho 1916)).
151 Applying our interpretation of the phrase
"ordinary and necessary" in this instance, we observe that the parkimg expansion proposed by the
City falls outside the proviso clause. We do not
doubt the City's contention that parking facilities
are an important part of a well hnctioning airport.
Nor do we question the important role the Boise
airport plays in our transportation infrastructure and
regional economy. However, regardless of the impolmce of public airport parkh~g, circumstances
do not require the erection of a permanent parkmg
structure on an immediate or emergency basis. The
volume of traffic passing through the Boise airport
has been growing for some time, and the airport .itself has been improved to meet this rising demand.
Rather that1 being a sudden emergency thrust upon
the City, the need for expanded parking facilities is
an expected expense for which the City has been
able to plan. In the short term, the City has been
shuttling travelers unable to secure onsite airport
parking back and forth from parking areas located
offsite. As with the courthouse and jail in Bannock
County, we see that here the City is in a position to
provide a temporary substitute to a permanent
structure. Our state constitution requires the City to
make do with such measures until sufficient normal
revenue becomes available or the question of
whether to enter into debt to build the desired permanent structure can be submitted to the people in
accordance with Article VIII, $3.
*393 In its ruling in this case, the district court determined the proposed parking expansion was an
ordinary and necessary expense because it found
adequate parking facilities to be "critical" to the operation of the Boise h i o r t . However, that parlcing
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facilities are important, or even critical to the operation of the airport is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article VnI, $ 3. Instead, we have held that there must exist a necessity
not simply for the expenditure, hut also for making
the proposed expenditure at or during such year.
Dunbar, 5 ldaho at 412,49 P. at 41 1.
Additionally, the district cou~truled the proposed
expenditure was ordinary and necessary because the
City's plan called for the expansion of an existing
parking facility rather than new construction. Specifically, the City intended to build a multiple floor
parking garage on laud already being used as surface parking, ind the parking garage thus created
would be connected to an existing multiple floor
parking structure. The district court accurately cited
to our decisions in Board o f Cou nty Commissioners, 96 ldaho 498, 531 P.2d 588, and Peterson, 93
Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644, for the proposition that
expenses incurred in the repair and improvement of
existing facilities can qualify as ordinary and necessary under the proviso clause.
Both Board of' County Commissioners and
Peterson, however, are distir~guishable %om this
case. First, in both cases we noted the important
safety implications of the proposed expenditures. In
Board of County Commissioners we stressed the
impact of public health in relation to the proposed
hospital expansion. 96 Idaho at 510, 531 P.2d at
600. In Peterson we noted the safety threat posed to
passengers by an unsound aiqort passenger termina1 and other facilities the City of Pocatello sought
to replace. 93 Idaho at 778-79, 473 P.2d at 648-49.
The impact on public safety found in both decisions
provided the requisite urgency missing from the
present case.
Second, the logic holding that repair and improvement of existing facilities can qualify as an ordinary
and necessary expense, while sound, simply cannot
be extended so fax as to cover the circumstances of
this case. Converting a flat parking lot into a five
floor parking garage is not a repair, nor any recognizable form of maintenance. Likewise, while it is
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an "improvement" o f the existing surface parking,
the expansion is so profound as to constitute an entirely new consbuction in every meaningfir1 sense.
Accordingly, we hold that the proposed expenditure
is not "necessary" witkin the meaning of the proviso clause in Article VIII, § 3 and therefore the
City must obtain the consent of the voting public
before entering into the proposed fmancing agreement.
As a result of our holding, there is no need for this
Court to reach the remaining questions presented by
the Appellant.
C. Attorney Fees
[6] Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney
fees on appeal. The City requests attorney fees on
12-121. Idaho Code 5
appeal pursuant to LC.
12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a civil
action to the prevailing party if the court determines
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Mutual
of Enumciav Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 ldaho 135,
139, 983 P.2d 208, 212 (1999). The City is not the
prevailing party on appeal, and therefore no award
of attorney fees is wapanted. Frazier argues he is
entitled to attorney fees under LC. 5 7-1313, which
provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees
for a party who has appeared and prevailed against
a political subdivision's petition for judicial confirmation. We agree, and grant Frazier an award for
both the costs and attorney fees he incurred in this
action.

IV. CONCLUSION

In order for an expenditure to qualify as
"necessary" as the word is used in the proviso
clause to A~ticleVIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution,
there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such year. Dunbar, 5 ldaho at
412, 49 P. at 411. The required urgency can result
from a number of possible causes, such as threats to
public safety, Board of County Camm'rs, 96 Idaho
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at 510, 531 P.2d at 600, the need for *394 repairs,
maintenance, or preservation of existing property,
Asson, 105 Idaho at 441-42, 670 P.2d at 848-49, or
a legal obligation to make the expenditure without
delay, see B utler, 11 Idaho at 404, 83 P. at 238.
Whether a proposed expenditure is ordinary and necessary depends on the surrounding circumstances
of each case. Asson, 105 Idaho at 442, 670 P.2d at
849; Board ofCounQ Com'rs, 96 Idaho at 510, 531
P.2d at 600; Peterson, 93 Idaho at 776, 473 P.2d at
646. Here, the circumstances of this case do not require an immediate or emergency expenditwe exempting the City from the election requirement of
Article VIlI, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's confirmation of
the City's authority to enter into the proposed lease
and m s t agreement for the expansion of airport
parking facilities. Costs and attorney fees are granted to the Appellant, and we remand to the district
court pursuant to LC. 5 7-1313 and I.R.C.P. 54 for
a determination of costs and a reasonable sum of attorney fees below and on appeal.
Justice EISMANN and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS
concur.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, dissenting without
opinion.BUSH, J., pro tem, specially concurring.
I concur in the result of the majority decision, but
respectfully disagree with the reasoning of that decision and therefore write separately.
I agree that the judgment of the district court should
be reversed and remanded. However, it is not necessary to attempt the difficult task of sorting and
reconciling the history of case law u~terpretingthe
"ordinary and necessary expense" proviso of Art.
VIII, § 3 of our Constitution because the specific
question of whether or not an off street parking facility is such an expense is already answered by the
specific reference to "off street parkiig facility" in
the language of Art VIII, 5 3. The express reference
to "off street parking facility," in the context of
making such a facility eligible for a revenue bond
exception to the general rule, makes clear that such
a facility cannot he an "ordinary and necessary ex-
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pense."
The pertinent language is:

8 3. Limitations on county and municipal indebtedness.-

"Provided, that this section shall not be construed
to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state and
provided futther that any city may own, purchase,
consmct, extend, or equip, within and without the
corporate limits of such city, off street parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and air navigation facilities, and for the purpose of paying the
cost thereof may, without regard to any limitation
herein imposed, with the assent of two thirds (213)
of the qualified electors voting at an election to be
held for that purpose, issue revenues bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be paid
solely from revenue derived from rates and charges
for the use of, and the service kndered by, such facilities as may be prescribed by law...."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The words "off street parkimg facilities" first appeared in S.L.1949, p. 598, in the language of a
proposed constitutional amendment, which was
then ratified by the voters in the 1950 general election. Water systems, sewage collection systems,
water treatment plants and sewage treatment plants
were also specifically identified in the 1950 amendment. (In 1964, another amendment added port districts. In 1966, "public recreation facilities" wexe
added. In 1968, "air navigation facilities" were included and rehabilitation of existing electrical generating facilities joined the list in 1976.) The 1950
amendment provided cities an alternative means of
gaining voter approval of certain types of government expenses that otherwise required a 2 3 majority vote of the electorate. The 1950 amendment created a so-called "special h d " alternative for the
voters to consider. The political theory behind that
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alternative is transparent-voters who understand
that the cost of building a facility will he paid over
time by fees charged for use "395 of the facility,
rather than with direct tax dollars, will be more
likely to vote in favor of a bond referendum. Courts
in some other states had created such an exception
to the general rule of voter approval for large
spending projects by judicial interpretation of the
particular spending imitation in their state constitutions. The Idaho Supreme Court refused to do so, as
described ill this article on the subject:
The issue of what constitutes an "indebtedness or
liability" has been a recurring subject of litigation
over the century since the adoption of the Idaho
Constitution. In the early case of Feil v. City of
Coewr d'Alene, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a
far more restrictive view of this term than did the
courts of most other states, holding that the voter
approval requirement of aticle VILI, section 3, applied not only to general obligation debt payable
from property taxes, but also to indebtedness payable solely from the revenues of revenue-producing
public works. Thus, the Feil court rejected the socalled "special fund" doctrine recognized as an exception to constitution debt limitation provisions in
the great majority of jurisdictions. Although the
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that some
types of obligations do not constitute "indebtedness
or liability" within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and has also held that the limitation
does not apply to certain types of entities, it has
never retreated from the holding in Feil in that special revenue debt is an "indehtedness or liability"
within the meaning of article VIII, section 3 of
Idaho's constitution.

It is urged that we ovemle Feil v. City of Coeur
d'illene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912), and apply
the "special fund" doctrine in this case. That doctrine, accepted by a great majority of cases, holds
that a municipality does not contract indebtedness
or incur liability, within the constitutional limitation, by undertaking an obligation which is to be
paid out of a special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the property pwchased or constructed. Feil d ealt with a decision by the city of
Coeur d'Alene to purchase a municipal water system, to be financed by bonds which would he repaid out of a fund containing only the revenues derived from operation of the water works. It was argued'that since no indebtedness was contracted by
the city itself-but rather only by the bond fund-the
expenditure did not come under Idaho Const. Art.
8, $ 3. The Feil court rejected that argument, reasoning that Idaho's expansive constitutional provision' (which, unlike several other states examined
by the court, contained the word "liability" as well
as "debt") included a n indebtedness paid out of a
fund separate %om the city's general fund. The
court was critical of "subtleties and refkements of
reasoning" utilized to suggest that no liabiiity is incurred where a special fund is involved. 23 Idaho at
49, 129 P. at 649. Since Feil, a series of cases have
declined to apply the special fund doctrine. See,
Boise Development Co. v. Boise City, 26 Idaho 347,
143 P. 531 (1914); Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho
668,284 P. 843 (1930); Williams v. City ofEmmeft,
51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931); Sfraughan v. City
of Coewr d%lene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P.2d 321
(1932); O'Byyant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho
313,303 P.2d 672 (1956).

Michael C. Moore, The Idaho Constitution and
Local Governments-Selected Topics, 31 Idaho
L.Rev. 417,454-455 (1980) (footnotes omitted).

Asson v . City of B urley, 1 05 Idaho 432, 438-439,
670 P.2d 839,845-846 (1983).

The Feil decision has remained the law in Idaho to
this day, even though various attempts have been
made over the years to hy to persuade the Idaho
Supreme Coul? to choose a new course on the issue,
all unsuccessful, e.g:
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The Asson court went on to say:
However, Feil and its quite extensive succession of
authority no longer prevent application of the special fund exception because that exception has been
made a part of Idaho law by way of amendments to
Art. 8, 5 3. See. Idaho Water Resource Board v.
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Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976). The
first such amendment, passed in 1950, authorized
cities to purchase or construct water and sewage
systems,*396 treatment plants, and off street parking facilities to be fmanced by bonds, "the principal
arid interest of which to be paid solely from revenue
derived from rates and charges for the use, and the
services rendered by, such systems, plants and facilities ..!' Subsequent amendments have increased
the scope of the special fund exception to include
port districts (1964), public recreation facilities
(19661, air navigation facilities (1968), and rehabilitation of existing electrical generating facilities
(1976). We note that, with the exception of port
districts, indebtedness of a city for any of the purposes listed, even though not subject to the tax assessment provision of Art. 8, § 3, is nevertheless
specifically conditioned on voter approval. The intent of the framers of the constitutional amendments, and the electorate through their ratification,
is clear that approval of a municipality's qualified
voters is necessiuy whether its Art. 8, 5 3 indebtedness or liability is against the general fund of the
city, and its tax revenues, or limited to a special
fund of project-generated revenues.

I d , at 439, 670 P.2d at 846 (footnotes omitted).
The Asson decision on that issue was entirely consistent with an earlier decision on the same subject,
issued approximately a year and a half after the
passage of the 1950 amendment:
Prior to the 1950 amendment to Section 3, Article 8
of the Constitution, supra, this court had held, in a
series of decisions, that bonds payable out of revenues of municipal utilities created an "indebtedness,
or liability," within the provisions of that section
and that all of the original limitations imposed
thereby must be complied with. Feil v. City of
Coeur ciAiene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 43
L.R.A.N.S. 1095; Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho
668, 284 P. 843, 72 A.L.R. 682; Williams v. City of
Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475; Straughan v.
City of Coeur d'Alene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P:2d 321.
Cf Annotations, 72 A.L.R. 687,96 A.L.R. 1385,146
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A.L.R. 328. The trend toward the use of revenue
bonds to enable municipalities to acquire needed
utilities has continued and in order to enable the
municipalities of this state to employ that method
of fmancing such utilities, and to remove the restrictions of the original section 3 from such tinancing operations, the 1950 amendment was proposed
and adopted. So that henceforth, so long as the conditions contained in the amendment are observed,
the municipalities of this state may issue revenue
bonds for the purposes therein enumerated "without
regard to any limitation" contained in the original
section.
Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 60,
256 P.2d 515,522 (1953).

In other words, this Court has repeatedly rejected
opportunities to treat certain kinds of projects-proposed to be funded out of their own revenues-as
some sort of "special h d " exception to the general
prohibition of Art. VIII, 5 3 against long-term indebtedness. However, this Court has also recognized that certain amendments made to Art. VUI, 9
3 have created a "special fund" exception for some
types of projects and that such amendments were
enacted by the people to give cities the constitutional power to seek voter approval in an alternative
manner. Projects such as off street parking facilities, which are given such favored treatment, are
clearly not "ordinary and necessary" under the
meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3. If an off street parking
facility is an ordinary and necessary expense, then
there was no reason for the legislature to propose,
and Ule electorate to approve, an amendment to Art.
VIII, 9 3 that had as its sole purpose the creation of
a "special fund" exception to the general rule that
prohibited the incurrence of a long term debt or tiability for such projects without voter approval.
It might he argued that the use of the conjunctive
"and" in the language of the 1950 amendment
means that an off street parking facility could be an
ordinary and necessary expense funded by revenue
bonds, regardless of the fact that such a facility was
included by name in the "exception" language of

:aim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

.

Page 12 of 12
Page I 1

137 P.3d 388
143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388
(Cite as: 143 ldaho 1,137 P.3d 388)
the 1950 amendment. However, such an argument
runs afoul of this Court's description of the 1950
amendment in the Schmidt v. W a g e of Kimbe~ly
decision, which identified *397 the purpose of the
amendment as allowing "the municipalities of this
state [to] issue revenue bonds for the purposes
therein enumerated 'without regard to any limitation' contained in the original section!' Schmidt, 74
ldaho at 60, 256 P.2d 515. If an off street parking
facility is an ordinary and necessary expense, then
there is no limitation on the municipality's ability to
incur long term indebtedness to build such a facility
and, similarly, no need for special treatment for
such facilities in the provisions of Art. VIII, 5 3. In
other words, the 1950 amend~nenthas no meaning
if it is a "separate" exception, independent and
apart from the "ordinary and necessary expense"
proviso.
Therefore, even though this issue was not the suhject of briefing or argument by the parties, this constitutional question should be decided in the narrowest fashion possible, by focusing upon the inclusion of "off street parking facilities" in the existing language of Art. VIII, § 3. It is not necessary to
retravel the difficult path of prior decisions dealing
with what constitutes an "ordinary and necessary"
expense under our Constitution. Those prior decisions have created a settled landscape in the law,
albeit an arguably rubbled one. Hence, because it is
not necessary to the proper result in this case, the
majority decision amounts to an unnecessary reassembling of that settled law and runs counter to our
accepted rules of interpretation concerning our
Constitution. This Court has previously held that
"when a case can be decided up011 a ground other
than a constitutional basis, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is necessary
for a determination of the case." Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co.. 117 Idaho 706. 710. 791 P.2d 1285. 1289
(1990). h e corollary should also hold huetiat we
should not attempt to decide more of a constitutional issue than is necessary for a determination of the
case.
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Additionally, as a general matter, the statutory rules
of construction apply to the interpretation of constitutional provisions. Sweeney v. Otter, I19 ldaho
135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 (1990). Those ruleswhen applied to the appropriate construction of Art.
VIII, 3-support my view of the appropriate reasoning for the result in this case, e.g:
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that
where a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, we
are constrained to follow that plain meaning and
neither add to the statute nor take away by judicial
constmction. Moon v . Investment B oar4 9 7 Idaho
595, 596, 548 P.2d 861, 862 (1976). Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of the
literal words of the statute. In re Permit No.
36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851
(1992). Unless the result is palpably absurd, we
must assume that the legislature means what is
clearly stated in the statute. Id We must give the
words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, and
there is no occasion for conshuction where the language of a statute is unambiguous. Sherwood v.
Cmtw, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460
(1991). We furthermore must give every word,
clause and sentence effect, if possible. In re Permit
No. 36-7200, 121 ldaho at 822, 828 P.2d at 851.
Poison Creek Pub., Inc. v. Cent. ldaho Pub., Inc.,
134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257
(Ct.App.2000).
Accordingly, because the trial court should be reversed on the ultimate issue but for different reasons, I concur only in the result.
Idaho,2006.
City of Boise v. Frazier
143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D I ~ R I C TOF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY

1

IN RE:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG,

)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-121
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner.

FACTS
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg ("Agency") seeks judicial
confirmation of its power to enter into a bond purchase agreement with Zions Bank
Public Finance. The money from the bonds will go to building a park in Rexburg. Bond
Counsel and Zions Bank require the judicial confirmation of the bonds' validity before
the agreement is completed.
The bonds have the impressive title Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds,
Series 2008. They are secured only by a pledge of a special fund. This fund receives its
money from property taxes-the

park is expected to increase property values and the

fund will receive money from the taxes on that increase.
Mr. Hart, a concerned Rexburg citizen, raised three issues challenging the validity
of the agreement and the bonds. According to Mr. Hart, the Agency is just trying to do
what the City is forbidden from doing: the Idaho Constitution forbids a city from
becoming indebted or lending its credit without confirmation by a supermajority of the
city's citizens; the Agency is the "alter ego" of Rexburg; therefore the Agency should not
be able to issue the bonds. This opinion addresses Mr. Hart's objections.
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JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
Judge Newhouse had it about right in his 1998 Idaho District Court opinion In Re:

Urban Renewal Agency of Boise City;the Judicial Confirmation Act gives courts the
authority to play "superlegislature."' The Act allows local governing bodies to
circumvent the constitutional limitations regarding public indebtedness and lending of
credit by asking a court to confirm debts rather than obtaining permission from 213 of its
citizens.
Not only does the Act allow courts to dip into legislative matters, it allows the
courts to do this in a dampened adversarial contest. The party with the real interest in
arguing its position in these types of cases is the local governing body. That body has the
incentive to hire counsel to argue its position. But the opposing side has no such
incentive. Representation on the opposing side depends on the commitment of affected
citizens, citizens with a sufficient sense of civic duty to compel them to invest costly time
and effort. This procedural deficiency causes the Court concern about its ability to
address the substantial legal issues posed by this case.
But the law allows for judicial confirmation. The Act requires the Agency to
complete certain hearing and notice requirements.' This they have done. After the
procedural requirements are completed, the Act requires the Court to "examine into and
determine all matters and things affecting each question submitted," and to "male such
findings with reference thereto and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case

warrant^."^

The Agency has submitted 11 questions. The Court does not have the time

to address each of these questions. (The answer to any one of these questions could fill a
treatise.) Rather, the Court will presume that Mr. Hart has raised the most pertinent
issues. He raised three.

'

In Re: Oban Renewal Agency of Boise City,Case No. CV-OC-98-00978-D, p.14 (Ada County District
Court July 7, 1998) (Ex. 22 in the record).
LC. 8 7-1306.

3
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DISCUSSION
1. Mr. Hart raised three objections to the Agency's funding plan.

Mr. Hart raised three objections to the Agency's tax increment financing plan.
The first two objections are constitutional: the Idaho Constitution forbids a city from
becoming indebted or lending its credit without confirmation by a supermajority of the
city's c i t i ~ e n sMr.
; ~ Hart argues that the Agency is the "alter ego" of Rexburg; therefore
the Agency should not be able to issue the bonds. Both of these potential constitutional
violations hinge on the argument that the Agency is Rexburg's "alter egon-the
constitution only prohibits Rexburg from becoming indebted or lending credit, not an
urban renewal agency.
Mr. Hart's third challenge to the bonds is statutory. He argues that the purchase
agreement allows the bonds to mature beyond the life of the urban renewal plan. The
Court will first address the "alter ego" argument, and then it will address the maturitydate argument.
2. The Agency is not an "alter ego" of Rexburg because the Agency has no
ability to encumber any Rexburg resourees.

Mr. Hart's constitutional challenges rely on the argument that the Agency is
Rexburg's "alter ego." Mr. Hart argued persuasively that this is the case. The mayor and
a counc?l member sit on the Agency's board; the mayor appointed the Agency's board;
the Agency's actions will ultimately benefit Rexburg; Rexburg will collect the property
taxes that wilt pay off the bonds; it is undisputed bat the Agency will ultimately give the
park to Rexburg. And, Idaho Code 3 50-2006(b)(3) allows the city council to "terminate"
the Agency's board and appoint itself. It is very difficult to distinguish where Rexburg
stops and where the Agency begins.
Both parties addressed the 1972 Idaho Supreme Court case Boise Redevelopment
Agency v. Yick Kong carp.' In Yick Kong the Corn found that Boise lacked sufficient
"daho Constitution Art. VIlI §§ 3 and 4.
$0
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876,499 P.2d 575 (1972).

control over the redevelopment agency to consider it the Boise's "alter ego"; so, Art. VIII

$5 3 and 4 did not apply to the redevelopment agency.'
Mr. Hart tried to distinguish Yick Kong from this judicial confirmation. He
argued that post-Yick Kong amendments to Section 50-2006 make Yick Kong
inapplicable. At the time Yick Kong was decided, a city council could not terminate a
redevelopment agency's board and appoint itself. Now, with Section 50-2006(b)(3), a
city council can do just that. So, Mr. Hart argues, a city now has more control over the
agency and can be found to be an "alter ego."
But, despite these changes, Yick Kong is still Idaho's law on the "alter ego" issue.
First, the purpose of the Idaho Constitution's prohibitions on municipality indebtedness
and voter approval provisions is to "prevent local government entities from incurring
debts without approval from the voters and a clear plan to retire those debtsn7 One of the
main reasons the Idaho Supreme Court found that Boise lacked sufficient control over the
redevelopment agency-and

why the agency was not an "alter ego" of the city-was

that

redevelopment agency lacked the ability to encumber any of the resources of the city.
"Herein, [the redevelopment agency] has no ability to actually encumber any of the
resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property
holdings."8 Here, the Agency has no ability to encwnber Rexburg's resources.
Idaho Code 5 50-2012(a) makes the bonds payable "solely from the income,
proceeds, revenues, and funds of [the ~ g e n c ~ ] . ' Idaho
"
Code Section 50-29 10 also
makes clear that Rexhurg has no obligation for the Agency's bonds. So the bond owners
are prohibited by statute from enforcing their notes as against the city. Even though the
Agency looks like Rexburg in a dozen ways, it does not look like Rexburg in the most
significant way-the

Agency cannot encumber Rexburg's property. Yick Kong applies to

this case. The redevelopment agency is not Rexburg's "alter ego."
While the above is sufficient to resolve the matter, the Court makes two other
points regarding the post-Yick Kong, Section 50-2006(b) amendment. First, thougl~the
Ykk Kong Corp., 94 Idaho at 880-81,499 P.2d at 580-81 (1972).
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388,390 (2006).
Yick .Kong
94 Idaho at 883,499 P.2d at 582 (1972).
. Corp.,
.. .
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ability to terminate the board and appoint itself does result in more control over the
agency, the termination power has some restrictions. The statute requires the city council
to pass and ordinance, which would require notice and a hearing. Second, as a practical
matter, the city council cannot terminate the Agency's board and appoint itself because
the purchase agreement forbids the city council from doing this.
So the Agency is not Rexburg's "alter ego"; Yick Kong applies to this case. The
purchase agreement and the Revenue Allocation Bonds, Series 2008 do not violate
Article VIII $5 3 and 4.
3. The maturity date on the bonds does not raise a concern for the Court.

At the hearing, Mr. Hart argued that the matwity date on the bonds extends
beyond the life of Rexburg's 1991 urban renewal plan. As the Court sees Mr. Hart's
argument, the bonds will mature in 2021, the urban renewal plan began in 1991, the
statutes forbids maturity dates beyond 24 years of the original plan, so the maturity date
is too late. (According to Mr. Hart, 2015 would be the latest permissible maturity date.)
But this argument ignores Section 50-2904's exceptions. One of the exceptions
allows up to 30 years when the maturity date of any bond for a "specific project" extends
beyond the 24 year. Here, the 2021 maturity date satisfies that exception. Also, the
urban renewal plan was amended in 2005 (the North Highway, South Addition Plan).
The Court is persuaded that this amendment reset the clock for purposes of maturity
dates. The Agency has not violated Section 50-2904.
CONCLUSION
The Court contains itself to the objections raised by Mr. Hart, the contested
issues. Those objections did not produce a constitutional or statutory violation. No other
objections have been raised; accordingly, the Court finds that the Agency bas power to
issue the Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008. The purchase
agreement will be binding between the Agency and Zions Bank.
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So ordered.
Dated this
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Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
In Re:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG,
Petitioner.

1
I

CASE NO. CV 08-121

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, JUDGMENT AND DECREE

This matter came before the Court for hearing on the Petition for Judicial Confirmation
("Petition") on March 31,2008. The Petition was made pursuant to I.C. $ 7-1301, et seq. by the
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg ("Agency"). The Agency is a political
subdivision of the state of Idaho duly established pursuant to the Urban Renewal Law of 1965,
LC. 4 50-2001, et seq.
The Petition requests judicial confirmation of the validity of the Revenue Allocation (Tax
Increment) Bonds Series 2008, secured by the Agency's tax increment revenues, for the purpose
of providing financing for the Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project, consisting of acquisition of
land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
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road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and funlishing of
a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football,
baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements necessary to carry out
the Sewnd Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal
Project, including South Addition.
On or about March 24,2008, Kenneth W. Hart filed a response to the Petition. On March
27,2008, the Agency filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for Judicial
Confirmation. A hearing on the Agency's Petition was held on March 3 1,2008.
Appearing on behalf of the Agency was Ryan P. Armbruster, Attorney for the Agency.
Mr. Hart, a resident of the city of Rexburg, appeared at the hearing to oppose the Petition. On
May 8,2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting the Petition.
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS, based on the pleadings and
other matters on file herein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This Petition was made by the Agency as a political subdivision pursuant to the

Idaho Judicial Confirmation Law, Title 7, Chapter 13, Idaho Code, as amended and
supplemented.
2.

The Agency is an urban renewal agency created and existing under the authority

of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title 50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, as amended and
supplemented.
3.

The Agency possesses revenue allocation financing powers under the Local

Economic Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented.

I
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4.

The Agency is authorized by LC. $5 50-2909 and 50-2012 to issue revenue

allocation (tax increment) bonds.
5.

In September 2005, the Agency authorized the commencement of an eligibility

study and the preparation of an eligibility report ("Eligibility Report") which examined the then
labeled South Addition to the North Highway Urban Renewal Area. On or about November 8,
2005, the Agency accepted the Eligibility Report by way of Resolution No. 2005-1. On
November 9,2005, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted ResolutionNo. 2005-17,
making certain findings of fact and determining the South Addition to the North Highway
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, to be a deteriorated or deteriorating area.
Resolution No. 2005-17 authorized the Agency to prepare an amendment to the North Highway
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. On November 18,2005, the Agency adopted
Resolution No. 2005-2, recommending adoption of the Second Amended and Restated North
Highway Urban Renewal Plan, South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan"). The Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan contained a revenue allocation
financing provision. Notice of the public hearing by the City Council on the Second Amended
and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was published in the Standard Journal and was submitted to
the affected taxing entities. On December 1,2005, the City of Rexburg Planning and Zoning
Commission declared the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan's conformity with
the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg. The City Council duly conducted a public
hearing and following said hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005,
approving the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and making certain findings.
On December 23,2005, a summary of Ordinance No. 950 was published in the Standard
Journal. Additionally, a copy of Ordinance No. 950 was transmitted to the other taxing entities.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
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6.

On November 21,2007, and November 28,2007, the Agency published its Notice

of Negotiated Private Bond Sale and Notice of Bond Purchase Agreement in the Standard

Journal, notifying the public of its negotiation for and private sale to Zions Bank Public Finance
(the "Underwriters") of approximately $6,300,000 of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment)
Bonds, Series 2008 (the "Series 2008 Bonds"), for improvements, authorized by the Second
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and its intent to enter into a Bond Purchase
Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") with the Underwriters.
7.

On December 4,2007, the Board of Commissioners ("Board') of the Agency

adopted Resolution No. 2007-4, approving the Purchase Agreement with the Underwriters to
provide for the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the Agency and the Underwriters for
purchase from the Agency in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 revenue allocation
(tax increment) bonds.
8.

On December 4,2007, the Board of the ~ ~ eadopted
i c Resolution
~
No. 2007-4,

authorizing the issuance of the Series 2008 Bonds in a principal amount not to exceed
$6,300,000.
9.

The Purchase Agreement between the Agency and the Underwriters requires the

Agency to obtain a judgment confirming the validity of:
a,

the Agency's authority under the Constitution and the laws of Idaho to
issue the Series 2008 Bonds;

b.

that the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in
accordance with their terms; and

c.

that the Purchase Agreement will be valid and enforceable in accordance
with its terms.

The Agency must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel.
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10.

Bond counsel, Michael Moore, reviewed the revenue allocation financing as set

forth in the Purchase Agreement and submitted an affidavit to the Agency that bond counsel was
unable to render an unqualified approving opinion regarding the issuance of bonds under the
proposed Purchase Agreement until certain legal questions were resolved. Without an
unqualified approving bond counsel opinion, the Series 2008 Bonds could not be issued and sold
to the purchaser(s) under the proposed Purchase Agreement.
1I.

On January 5,2008, the Agency published its notice of public hearing, as required

by the Judicial Confirmation Law, to consider the filing of the Petition. The Agency held the
hearing on January 22,2008. Likewise, as further required by the Judicial Confirmation Law,
the Agency then convened a special meeting fourteen (14) days later to consider the resolution.
On February 12,2008, the Agency convened its special meeting and adopted Resolution No.
2008-1 authorizing the filing of the Petition
12.

The Agency sought a determination of the validity of any bonds issued pursuant

to the Purchase Agreement by filing the Petition with this Court on February 13,2008
Thereafter, the Clerk of the Court issued a Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation
scheduling this case for hearing on March 17,2008, as follows:
a.

Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho
Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation contained in Idaho
Constitution Article 7, Section 5.

b.

Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of
the Idaho Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to
private entities as contained in Article 8, Section 4, and Article 12, Section
4 of the Idaho Constitution and whether it further generally violates
provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from
incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a
specific year, and pledging ad valorem taxes for the payment of such
indebtedness, without the assent of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho
Constitution Article 8, Section 3.
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c.

Whether by reason of the composition, action, and operation of the Urban
Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg Board of Directors, the Urban
Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg is an alter ego of the City of
Rexburg and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Urban
~ e n e w Agency
3
of the City of Rexburg therefore violates the provisions
of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to
private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 4, and
whether it further violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting
a municipality from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding
income and revenue for a specific year, and pledging ad valorem taxes for
the payment of such indebtedness, without the assent of qualified electors,
as provided in Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 3.

d.

Whether by virtue of the ability of the city council to declare itself as the
board of commissioners of the urban renewal agency, under Section 502006(b)(2) and (3), whether exercised or not, an urban renewal agency is
the alter ego of a municipality.

e.

Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing
power in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and
standards as required under the doctrine of separation of powers, to govern
the assessment and collection of tax, to ensure that the taxes collected are
used in furtherance of the legislative purpose and in furtherance of the
public purpose.

f.

Whether the provisions of the statute and the ordinance violate the due
process rights of taxpayers of the state of Idaho by not requiring the
expenditure of public funds collected from taxpayers for a public purpose.

g.

Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violates Article I,
Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws which
impair the obligation of contracts.

h.

Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by the Legislature for a
"City Purpose" in violation of Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho
Constitution.

1.

Whether the revenue allocation method of taxation violates Article 7,
Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution.

j.

Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits
received.

k.

Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts.
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13.

Judicial determination of the validity of the proposed bond issuance pursuant to

I.C. 5 7-1301, et seq. will serve the public interest and welfare.
14.

This action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction of all interested

parties was obtained by publication and posting as provided under LC. $5 7-1305 and 7-1306.
15.

Notice of the Petition and the hearing was published in the Standard Jour~alon

February21,2008, February 28,2008, and March 6,2008.
16.

Notice of the Petition and the hearing was posted at the main door of the

administrative office of the Urban Renewal Agency and the main entrance to the Rexburg City
Hall in a place normally used for posting of public notices from February 13,2008, through
March 31,2008.
17.

The Petition prayed for a judicial examination and determination of the validity of

the Series 2008 Bonds to be issued pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4 approved by the Agency
on December 4,2007; Purchase Agreement between the Agency and the Underwriters; and
Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal Project,
including South Addition, approved by the City Council of the City of Rexburg by the adoption
of Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005; and a declaration that the Agency is duly
authorized by a valid state statute to enter into the agreements authorized by Resolution No.
2007-4, and that Resolution No. 2007-4, the Purchase Agreement, the Series 2008 Bonds, and
other agreements authorized by Resolution No. 2007-4 will be valid and binding on the parties
thereto and on all persons interested therein in full accordance with their terms, and that all
Madison County officials, including the Madison County Auditor and Tax Assessor and the
Madison County Treasurer, be authorized to carry out the duties and obligations set forth in
Chapter 20, Title 50, Idaho Code, the Idaho Urban Renewal Law and Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho
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Code, the Local Economic Development Act, including, but not limited to, the disbursement to
the Agency of revenue allocation proceeds.
18.

On or about March 11, 2008, the Agency was notified that the hearing on the

Judicial Confirmation could not be heard by the Court on March 17,2008. Thereafter, the Clerk
of the Court issued a Supplemental Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation and
Revised Hearing Date rescheduling this case for hearing on March 3 1,2008. The supplemental
notice was published in the Standard Journal on March 14,2008, and March 21,2008. The
supplemental notice was posted at the main door of the administrative office of the Agency and
the main entrance to the Rexburg City Hall in a place normally used for posting of public notices
from March 12,2008, through March 31,2008.
19.

The Response to Petition for Judicial Confirmation ("Response") filed on or about

March 24,2008, by Mr. ICenneth Hart, a resident of the city of Rexburg, raised three issues
challenging the validity of the Purchase Agreement and the Series 2008 bonds as follows:
a.

The revenue allocation scheme violates provisions of the Idaho
Constitution prohibiting the City o f Rexburg from incurring indebtedness
or lending its credit without confirmation by a supermajority of the city's
citizens;

b.

The Agency is the "alter ego" of the City of Rexburg, therefore, violating
provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting the City of Rexburg from
incurring indebtedness or lending its credit without confirmation by a
supermajority of the city's citizens; and

c.

The Purchase Agreement allows the Series 2008 Bonds to mature beyond
the life of the urban renewal plan in violation of I.C. $ 50-2904.

Mr. Hart did not raise objections to any other issues presented to the Court. The
Response was supported by legal citation to Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94
Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972) and argument. In support of the argument that the Agency was
the "alter ego" of the city of Rexburg, Mr. Hart argued that "[tlhe mayor and a council member
EMDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONSOF LAW,
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sit on the Agency's board; the mayor appointed the Agency's board; the Agency's actions will
ultimately benefit Rexburg; Rexburg will collect the property taxes that will pay off the bonds; it
is undisputed that the Agency will ultimately give the park to Rexburg. And, Idaho Code 5 502006(b)(3) allows the city council to "terminate" the Agency's board and appoint itself."
Additionally, Mr. Hart argued post Yick Kong amendments to section 50-2006, Idaho Code,
allowing a city council to terminate a redevelopment agency board and appoint itself, grant a city
more control over the agency, thus becoming an "alter ego" of the city.
20.

On March 27,2008, the Agency filed its Reply Memorandum addressing the

issues raised in Mr. Hart's Response.
21.

Mr. Hart appeared at the March 3 1,2008, hearing and argued in opposition to the

granting of the Petition.
22.

The Memorandum Decision entered on May 8,2008, only addressed the

objections raised by Mr. Hart. The Court presumed that Mr. Hart raised the most pertinent
issues; therefore, there was no objection to the remainder of the issues raised by the Agency.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

All issues raised by the Agency, but not specifically objected to by Mr. Hart are

deemed to be admitted by Mr. Hart.
2.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the Petition as the posting and publication

requirements of LC. 5 7-1306 have been met.
3.

The Agency is authorized to issue the Series 2008 Bonds by the Local Economic

Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, and the Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title
50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, and the proposed Series 2008 Bonds and Purchase Agreement,
when duly authorized, executed, issued and delivered, will be valid special obligations of the
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Agency and enforceable in accordance with their terms under the Constitution and laws of the
state of Idaho.
4.

Publication and posting as authorized by the Judicial Confirmation Law is a valid

method of vesting jurisdiction in this Court over the parties and the subject matter. Smith v.
Progressive Irrigation District, 28 Idaho 812, 156 P. 1133 (1916); Knowles v. New Sweden
Irrigation District, 16 Idaho 235, 101 P. 87 (1908). The Petition is taken as confessed by all
persons who received actual or constructive notice thereof and who failed to appear in objection
thereto. The Court is authorized to render the judgment and decree as set forth herein.
5.

The Agency is not an entity of the type required by the Constitution of the state of

Idaho to submit the issuance of its revenue notes or bonds to a vote of the electorate. Boise
Redevelopment Agency v. YickKong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972).
6.

The Agency is not the "alter ego" of the City of Rexburg because the Agency

cannot encumber the city of Rexburg's property. Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong
Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). YickKong remains viable precedent on the "alter
ego" issue. As a matter of law, the Purchase Agreement and the Series 2008 Bonds do not
violate Article VIII,
7.

$5 3 and 4 of the Idaho Constitution.

The maturity date of the Bonds is thirty (30) years. The Agency did not violate

LC. 5 50-2904.
8.

As a matter of law, the Agency complied with all procedural requirements which

are conditions precedent to and necessary to authorize the Agency to execute the agreements
filed with the Court in support of the Petition and to issue its Bonds all as authorized under Idaho
Code Title 50, Chapters 20 and 29, and as contemplated by Resolution No. 2007-4 of the
Agency.
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9.

Issuance of revenue allocation bonds to implement the Project was duly

authorized by the adoption of Ordinance No. 950 in accordance with Title 50, Chapters 20 and
29, Idaho Code.
10.

The findings and couclusions made herein are intended to be and are legally

binding upon all persons interested in the outcome of this proceeding including but not limited to
all persons or entities who received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the Petition.
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The Petition filed by the Agency is hereby granted.

2.

The Agency has the power under the Local Economic Development Act, Title 50,

Chapter 29, Idaho Code, the Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title 50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, and
the Constitution and other laws of the state of Idaho to issue the Series 2008 Bonds.
3.

The issuance by the Agency of the Series 2008 Bonds, as approved by the

Rexhurg City Council in Ordinance No. 950 and as authorized by Resolution No. 2007-4 of the
Agency, is valid and enforceable under the laws and the Constitution of the state of Idaho.
4.

The Bond Purchase Agreement, when duly authorized and executed, will be a

valid special obligation of the Agency and enforceable in accordance with its terms under the
laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho, and the Agency is lawfully authorized to undertake
the rights, duties, obligations and actions provided for therein and thereunder.
5.

The Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in accordance

with their terms under the laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho.
6.

The pledge of revenue allocation (tax increment) revenues as security for the

Series 2008 Bonds is valid and enforceable under the laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
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7.

Further, all Madison County officials, including the Madison County Auditor and

Tax Assessor and the Madison County Treasurer, are hereby authorized to carry out the duties
and obligations set forth in the Idaho Urban Renewal Law and the Local Economic Development
proceeds.
Act, including but not limited to the disbursement to the Agency of revenue allocation
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'
(day of May 2008.
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Brent J. Moss
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &day of

9

,2008, I caused a trueand

correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Ryan P. h b r u s t e r
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
Boise, Idaho 83702
Kenneth W. Hart
367 Salem Avenue
Rexburg, ID 83440

Ju.s.

Mail
Hand Delivery
___ Federal Express
- Facsimile Transmission

-

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

F
Deputy Clerk
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
KARL J. RUNFT OSB # 6640)
R W T & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-9495
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com
Attorneys for Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEWNTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

TIiE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AMI) FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

1
)
)
)

INRE
W A N RENEWAL AGFNCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG
Respondent.

CASENO. CV-08-121

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
)

1
1
)
)

1
1
TO: The above named Respondent, its attorneys of record, and the Clerk of the above
entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAR
1. The Appellant, Kenneth W. Kart, a concerned citizen of Rexburg, appeals

against the above named Respondent, the Urban Renewal Agency of the City
of Rexburg, to the Idaho Supreme Court: from the District Court's
Memorandum Decision of May 8, 2008, entered by the hnorable Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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i2008/WED 1 2 : 42 PM
i

.

?J

FAX No,

3

Brent J, Moss presiding, granting the Petition for Judicial Confinnation made
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg.

2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the
Memorandum Decision described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant
to Rule 1l(a)(l) S.A.R. and 1.C. $7-1309.
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of issues is as follows:

a. Whether the District Court erred in its Memorandum Decision of May

8,2008. in granting the Petition for Judicial Confimnation made by the
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg;
b. Whether the District Court erred in finding the Urban Renewal Agency
of the City of Rexburg was not the alter ego ofthe City of Rexburg;
c. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the Urban Renewal
Agency of the City of Rexburg was not precluded by the Idaho
Constitution Art. VBI $8 3 and 4 from incurring debt;

d. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the bonds to be issued
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg would not
mature &er the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg had
expired in violation of T.C. $ 50-2904; and,
e. Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. 8 7-1313.

4. A reporter's transcript of the following hearing is requestd, the hearing in
this matter on March 31,2008.

5 The Appellant requests i5e clerk's record be prepared pursuant to Rule 28
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7. I c e d i 4
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
Reporter;
b. The Appellants have ordered and will pay the estimated Reporter's
Transcript Fee when received;
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been
paid;
d. That the Appellants filing fee has been paid; and,
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served to

DATED this

YK

Rule 20.
day of ,June 2008.
.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By:

JON M! STEELE
Attorney fox the Appellant
.

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

P
day of June 2008, a Iruc and
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
correct copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon opposing counsel as
follows:
Ryan P. Armbmter
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Stxeet, Suite 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539

US Mail
Personal Delivery
Facsimile

RUNIT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for the Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
IN RE:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF
THE CITY OF REXBURG
Petitioner-Respondent

)
)
)
)

1

SUPREME COURT NO.
CASE NO. CV-08-121

)
VS

f

KENNETH W. HART, an interested party,

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL

Respondent-Appellant
)

APPEAL FROM: 7IhJudicial District Madison County
HONORABLE Brent J. Moss PRESIDING
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-08-121
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Memorandum Decision, dated May 8, 2008
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Jon M Steele & KarlJ. Run#, 1020 W. Main St. Ste. 400,
Boise, ID 83702
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ryan P. Armbruster & Meghan E. Sullivan, EIAM
& BURKE, PA, 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701-1539
APPEALED BY: Kenneth W. Hart
APPEALED AGAINST: Urban Renewal Agency of the Cily of Rexburg
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: June 18,2008
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD:
N/A
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED?: Yes
IF SO, NAME OF REPORTER: David Marlow
~ a t e tdh i @ d a y e ,2008

DEPUTY CLERK
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Ryan P. Annbruster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURICE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Armbmster - ISB 111878
Sullivan - ISB 117038
Attorneys for PetitionerIRespondent
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

I

In Re:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE
CITY OF REXBURG,
PetitioneriRespondent.

TO:

CaseNo. CV 08-121
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
RECORD

APPELLANT KENNETH W. HART AND HIS ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN, that the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

requests, pursuant to Rule 19(d), I.A.R., the inclusion of the following materials in the clerk's
record in addition to that required to be included by LA.R. 28 and identified in the notice of
appeal:
1.

Clerk's Record:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD
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2.

A.

Notice of Rling of Petition for Judicial Confirination filed February 13,
2008.;

B.

Urban Renewal Agency of ihe City of Rexb~rrg'sMemorandum in Support
of Judicial Confirmation Bled March 7, 2008;

C.

U~bailRenewal Agency of the City of Rexburg's Exhibits to
Memoranduin in Support of Judicial Confirmation filed March 7, 2008;

D.

Affidavit of Michacl C. Moore filed March 7,2008;

E.

Affidavit of Judy C. Coy filed March 7,2008;

T;.

Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rmbuirg's Reply Memor'mdum In
Support of Pctitioil for Judicial Coi~firinationfiled March 27,2008; and

G.

Supplemental Affidavit of Judy C. Coy filed March 28,2008.

1 ce16fy that a copy of this request was scrved upon the Clellc of the Dislriol Court and

upon all parties required toaho servcd pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this&

4 day of July 2008.
ELAM &BURKE, P.A.
--A

By:
~ ~ n ~ ~ ~ s m h r of
u the
s t efirm
r,
~ t t o &for
~ Pelitioner/Respondetlt
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 2
C:Documents and Setting~WAU~ocal
Settings\TempU(PGrpW~se\Request
far Addtl Record.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

PA

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ,hi$day of July 2008,I caused a true and coixect
copy ofthe above and foregoing inshument to be served upon the following in the mumer
indicated below:
Jail M. Steele
Karl J . RWIR
Rune & Stceio Law Officcs, PLLC
1020 W. M a ~ nStreet, Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Appellunt

- U.S. Mail
- Hand Delivety
- Federal Express

Facsimile Tra~~smission

$?J
Ryan

..-Fa

rmbruster

REQUEST FOR ADI)ITIONAI, RECORD - 3
C:Documeiztsand SettingsW?A\Local Settings\Te~npKPGIpWlse\Requestfor Addtl Rccord wpd
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JOHN L. RUNFI: fTSB # 1059)
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911)
RUN13 & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: jlnmft(lilrunfilaw.com
Email: jmsteele~inftlaw.com
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MADISON COUNTY

Attorneys for Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OB THE SEVENTH JUDICPAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THJ? COUNTY OF %CADISON
)
) CASENO. CV-08-121

1

IN REf

)

AMEMDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE )
CITY OF REXBURG
)

Respondent

1
1
1

TO: The above named Respondent, its attorneys of record, and the Clerk of the above
entitled Court:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT:
1. The Appellant, Kenneth W. Hat, a concerned citizen of Rexburg, appeals

against the above named Respondent, the Urban Renewal Agency of the City
of Rexburg, to the Idaho Supreme Court &om the District Court's
Memorandum Decision of May 8, 2008, entered by the Honorable Judge
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Brent J. Moss presiding, granting the Petition for Judicial Confirmation made
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg.

2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the
Memorandum Decision described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant
to Rule 1l(a)(l) I.A.R. and1.C. 8 7-1309.
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of issues is as follows:

a. Whether the Disb?ct Court erred in its Memorandum Decision of May

8, 2008, in granting the Petition for Judicial Canfirmation made by the
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg;
b. Whether the District Court erred in finding the Urban Renewal Agency

of the City of Rexburg was not the alter ego of the City of Rexburg;

c. Whether the District' Court erred in fmding that the Urban Renewal
Agency of the City of Rexburg was not precluded by the Idaho
ConstitutionArt. VlIljj93 and 4 f?om incurring debt;
d. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the bonds to be issued
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg would not
matwe after the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg had
expired in violation of LC. 8 50-2904; and,
e. Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. $ 7-13 13.
4. A reporter's transcript of the folloaing hearing is requested: the hearing in
this matter on March 3 1,2008.

5. The Appellant requests the clerk's record be prepared pursuant to Rule 28
LA.R.
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7. I certify:

a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court

Reporter;
b. The Appellants have ordered and wdl pay the estimated Reporter's

Transcript Fee when received,
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been
paid;

d. That the Appellants filing fee has been paid; and,
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served to
Rule 20.

DATED this 8" clay of July 2008.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By:

JOWL.
RWFT
~ d r n e for
y the Appellant
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 8" day of July 2008, a h e and
correct copy of the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon opposing
counsel as folIows:

RyanP, Armbrustet
Me&m E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Skeet, Suite 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539

US Mail
P e r s o n a l Delivery
Facsimile

David Marlow

US Mail

Court Reporter
Facsimile: (208) 528-8348

-Personal Delivery
-X- Facsimile
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES,PLLC

1l

By:.

f0WL.RUNFT \ f
for the Appellant

.)they
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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1
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE CITY )
OF REXBURG,
1

1

Petitioner-Respondent,
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1
1

v.

)
)
)

ICEWETH W. HART, a11 interested party,
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APPEAL FROM: 7'" Judicial District Madison Couniy
HONORABLE BrentJ Moss PRESIDING
. ,..
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-08-121
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t.n
&BURKE:, PA, 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701-1539
u
APPEALED BY: Kenneth K Hart
APPEALED AGAINST: Urban Renewal Agency of the Cily of Rexburg
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: June 18,2008
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
)

IN RE:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF
THE CITY OF REXBURG
Petitioner-Res~ondent

f
)

1
)
)

vs

I

KENNETH W. HART, an interested party,

)

SUPREME COURT NO.
CASE NO. CV-08-121
AMENDED
CI;F.RK:'S CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL

Respondent-Appellant

APPEAL FROM: 71hJudicial District Madison Comty
, ,
HONORABLE Brent J Moss PRESIDING
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-08-121
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Memorandum Decision, dated May 8, 2008
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: .Jon M Steele & KarlJ. Runft, 1020 W. Main St. Ste. 400,
Boise, ID 83702
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ryan P. Armbruster & Meghan E. Sullivan, ELAM
& BURKE, PA, 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701-1539
APPEALED BY: Kenneth W. Eiavt
APPEALED AGAINST: Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: June 18,2008
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD:
N/A
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRDPT REQUESTED?: Yes
IF SO, NAME OF REPORTER: David Marlow

Marilvn R. Rasmussen

DEPUTY CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY
)

IN RE:

URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF )
THE CITY OF REXBURG
1

I

PETITIONERRESPONDENT

SUPREME COURT NO
CASE NO. CV-08-121
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

1

VS

1

KENNETH W. HART, an interested party

)

RESPONDENTAPPELLANT

)

1
1

I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for Madison County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as
indicated:
NO.

DESCRIPTION

SENTRETAINED

1

Exhibits to Memorandum in
Support of Judicial Confirmation

SENT

said Court this

Lf

9

EREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
,2008.

IN WITNESS
day of

V
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

IN RE:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF
THE CITY OF REXBURG
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
VS

)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
CASE NO. CV-2008-121

KENNETH W. HART, an interested party )

1

RESPONDENTAPPELLANT

)
)

I, Marilyn R. Rasmussen, Clerk of the District Court of the 7'h Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that the
foregoing Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and contains truc and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers
designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross
Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be included.
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31
of the Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
of
,2008.
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9
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

1

IN RE:
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF

1
)
I

1

PETITIONERRESPONDENT
VS

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CASE NO. CV-2008-121
SUPREME COURT NO.

I

KENNETH W. HART, an interested party )
RESPONDENT APPELLANT
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerlc of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of
Record as follows:
ATTORNEYS
FOR APPELLANT
Jon M. Steele
Karl J. Runft
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400
Boise, ID 83702

ATTORNEY
FOR RESPONDENT
Ryan P. Armhruster
Meghan E. Sullivan
ELAM & BURKE
251 E. Front St., Sle 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

Y

IN WITNESS WI-IEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the said Court this
dayJ&~O
,2008
,, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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